Thread by @ZimermanErik

#Ukraine has repeatedly hit the #Antonivskiy bridge across the Dnieper river in the #Kherson area. This started about July 19 & yesterday saw some of the heaviest strikes, reportedly by HIMARS. The bridge seems to be structurally intact, though closed due to surface damage.

#Ukraine is putting at risk many bridges and dams across the Dnieper. Besides the 3 around Kherson (1 road, 1 rail & 1 road & rail), they are all in UA hands and the entire Ukrainian army in the east depends on them for even the limited supply they are receiving now. We discussed

previously why these bridges had not yet been targeted.

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1528748554465976322

There was a tacit understanding between the parties not to try to strike at these bridges and dams. In preparation for now more modest UA aims, to regain Kherson and the west bank of the river,

UA is now targeting the road & rail bridges connecting Kherson to the RU held east/south bank. In the same thread we discussed how it would signal this more modest goal & that the war may yet get to that stage. So here we are. First a note about the RU strategic situation here.

Kherson has been held by Russian forces for a long time now. Throughout this time it has been railway fed with connections to Crimea & Donetsk. Supplies have been built up in hubs in Kherson, Snihurivka & others. RU can use any of 3 bridges plus ferries to continue fresh supplies

even if any one or more of them are damaged. The problem however is correlated to itself. As Western supplied rocket artillery (HIMARS) is now allowing UA to hit the bridges, it is also much more menacingly allowing it to accurately hit ammunition depots. This forces RU to keep

supplies further in the rear, but in the case of the Kherson region this is a problem since that rear would be on the other side of the bridges. Theoretically then UA can partially if not completely cut off supply to Kherson by damaging the bridges & in coordination with strikes

on supply & ammo depots, make it a serious problem for the Russian forces. In reality however, this is a situation that the RU forces may simply adapt to. First, note the 3 different bridges. The main Antonovskiy highway bridge. At first, RU forces were simply repairing it.

The relatively small HIMARS rocket warheads do not carry the punch needed to destroy the bridge completely. Not in small numbers at least, and many are being intercepted. UA has limited numbers and they are very expensive. RU however realized it should not play the cat-and-mouse

game of daily repairs & so closed the bridge, & will likely wait to repair & reopen it until it knows it can stop all the rockets & missiles or UA is no longer able or willing to send them. RU opened a ferry service as an alternative to this bridge for now. About 6km east there

the railroad bridge. It too has been targeted but has thus far only minor damage. This line connects straight to Crimea. About 50 km further east there is the bridge across the Kakhovka dam and power plant. This dam carries a road and railroad bridge. The railway line connects

through Novobohadanivka towards Tokmak or Melitopol & thus to Donetsk and Crimea respectively. Destroying this crossing is a completely different matter. While the small rockets can barely put the beam & truss bridges out of commission, they could do very little against the earth

and concrete filled dam. Surface damage can still restrict vehicle and railroad movement but cannot cause structural damage. On the other hand, if enough and/or powerful enough munitions are used to destroy the dam, that is an entirely different prospect. The resulting flooding

would cause heavy civilian suffering. Having said that, they targeted the dam already & attempted another's destruction as discussed in these threads:

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1549075749457518595

While this crossing is more secure & includes road & railways it does not perfectly substitute for the

Antonivsky bridges. The crossing puts you across the Dnieper but on the eastern side of the Ingulets river. The E-58 (P-47) highway then relies on another smaller bridge across this river to connect to Kherson. The rail line travels northwards towards the front and the key supply

hub of Snihurivka before crossing the Ingulets & turning back southwards towards Kherson. So this crossing is excellent & key to keeping the region north of the Dnieper & east of the Inhulets supplied, but has a vulnerability in supplying Kherson. The smaller bridges across this

river are also being targeted by UA strikes & Snihurivka is too close to the front line currently to be a safe supply route to Kherson, especially for rail. Overall however I expect RU forces will be able to adapt to these challenges & also increasingly intercept more of the

limited UA long range ammunition. (HIMARS to be discussed in more detail elsewhere). Where can Russia retaliate? Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kremenchuk, Cherkasy & Kiev are full of bridges across the Dnieper. They are an integral part of the economy, civil transportation & the supply

to the massive UA armies in eastern Ukraine. All of western supply comes in from the west, mostly across the Polish border and the bridges are the sole links to the east. All of Ukraine we must remember, east of the Dnieper, is surrounded by Russian or Belarussian held territory.

Destroying the bridges would collapse the supply of the eastern forces fighting the war. Of course Russia would run into the same issues in that some of these are free-standing bridges and others are atop dams but that problem is on both sides as indicated. RU can also limit

itself to damaging the bridges across dams rather than destroying them (though undoubtedly this is a dangerous game). The media will not note this Ukrainian escalation of the game, but here we do note it. By its repeated recent actions on the Kherson bridges across the Dnieper,

including a Hydroelectric dam, UA is putting at risk not only the civilians around Kherson, but all along the Dnieper including Kiev and some of its largest cities. The path is open for Russian retaliation on these bridges. Damaging only a portion of them, especially in Dnipro

and Zaporizhzhia would significantly hurt the UA forces in the main battle areas in the east. Their supply lines would get much longer, more difficult and more open to attack. Specifically for rail, there are only about 3 bridges in the UA-held south, and ~5 in total across the

country. #Russia could without much effort disconnect the eastern half of the country and the bulk of its armies from rail supply. RU clearly preferred to not strike these bridges & dams, but in order to maintain future deterrence against such acts, must respond in kind.