Well, this is quite the development in #Afghanistan: the #Taliban spokesman has stated that the explosion in Kabul yesterday was the result of a US drone strike against #ISIS-K targets👇
I'm surprised the US would do this (& esp in Kabul) now, given ongoing discussions w/the #Taliban on a host of other issues. Suggests the US calculated the benefit of target removal to outweigh the costs w/the TB (eg in ongoing talks) for conducting the strike. 2/n
One has to wonder if the #Taliban gave tacit approval for the strike, which would present the US with a lower cost to factor into its calculation, as the benefit of the target's removal doesn't immediately appear to be resoundingly high (though more info could emerge on that).3/n
I'm also a bit surprised that the #Taliban admitted it was a drone strike (esp after yesterday's statement by the MOI denying that). Will undoubtedly be used by #ISIS-K & others to further portray the TB as weak and/or complicit w/the US. 4/4
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As I think about the strike on #alQaeda’s Zawahiri, we know what the “finish” portion looked like: a drone strike in Kabul. What about the “find & fix” portions though? 1/n
We don’t *know* anything about that yet, though surely the Biden admin will release details to keep this in the news cycle as the midterms approach, so we’ll learn more. Still possible to speculate on the possibilities now, though. 2/n
First they had to *find* Zawahiri. Analysts like @asfandyarmir have argued for a while that he was likely in #Afghanistan somewhere. And there have been steady reports from Afghans of US drones flying over AFG post-withdrawal, to include over Kabul. 3/n
@SIGARHQ After reviewing the history of police development in #Afghanistan in detail since 2001, @SIGARHQ ID'd 11 key findings: 1. The US approach to police assistance in AFG resulted in an overmilitarized police force incapable of protecting citizens from internal & external threats. 3/n
Yesterday @SIGARHQ posted an interim version of its report titled "Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise"
In this thread, I'll summarize the report's main findings & offer some thoughts. 1/n
@SIGARHQ First, on scoping: @SIGARHQ was directed by Congress to "examine the factors that contributed to the #ANDSF’s collapse, including the underlying factors over the past 20 years that resulted in the underdevelopment of ANDSF military and police capabilities" 3/n
A question it seems everyone is asking these days: “Why has #Russia’s military been so ineffective in #Ukraine?”
Some answers in this THREAD. 1/n
(In case you’re wondering what qualifications I have to address this question—I teach a course on military power & effectiveness @ElliottSchoolGW. Also, this thread was inspired by @RisaBrooks12 excellent thread on her own work on this topic:
@ElliottSchoolGW@RisaBrooks12 There are *many* factors that play into whether a military is effective or not, as I’ve shown in what I call the “Grand Unified Framework of Mil Effectiveness.” The most commonly considered of these are the quantitative factors: people (size) & resources ($, materiel, time). 3/n
I was asked this morning what kind of threat #ISIS-Khorasan poses to the #Taliban: Existential? Nuisance? Something in between? Some thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
First, @AmiraJadoon can correct me if I’m wrong, but I believe the current attack numbers from #ISIS in #Afghanistan represent a slight uptick since the #Taliban took over, but are still well below the group’s peak a few years back. 2/n
The attention being given to #ISIS-K is thus less b/c they’re an immediate large threat, but more b/c: a) the US intel community assessed them to potentially be able to threaten the US in 6-12 mos (per @ColinKahl testimony) & b) they’re the last challenger to the #Taliban 3/n