As I think about the strike on #alQaeda’s Zawahiri, we know what the “finish” portion looked like: a drone strike in Kabul. What about the “find & fix” portions though? 1/n
We don’t *know* anything about that yet, though surely the Biden admin will release details to keep this in the news cycle as the midterms approach, so we’ll learn more. Still possible to speculate on the possibilities now, though. 2/n
First they had to *find* Zawahiri. Analysts like @asfandyarmir have argued for a while that he was likely in #Afghanistan somewhere. And there have been steady reports from Afghans of US drones flying over AFG post-withdrawal, to include over Kabul. 3/n
So the US was undoubtedly using drones to listen/look for him. But unless they got a lock on a digital device being used by Zawahiri or someone close to him, would’ve been hard to pinpoint him that way. Much more likely that source(s) on the ground found him. 4/n
Who might those be? Could be disgruntled #Taliban members or those in need of $$. Could be intel sources from US partners (eg #Pakistan as @RupertStone83 has suggested). Could even be unwitting sources, such as TB or others who knew he was there & didn’t stay quiet. 5/n
Kabul has lots of eyes and ears…quite possible that someone got wind of his presence and used that information to their advantage. 6/n
Similar considerations apply on the *fix* aspect of the targeting cycle. US had to not just know his location, but guarantee that he’d be there. Again, unless the US had a lock on a device with Zawahiri, a human source seems more likely. 7/n
Reinforcing that for me is how long it took the US to verify/announce that it was Zawahiri. If they had confirmation yesterday, they’d have said so. Which means they didn’t confirm it via the drone overhead right away. 8/n
Possible they confirmed it via drone surveillance of #Taliban or #alQaeda chatter over the past day, though that could also have been picked up via cyber or human sources. 9/n
Regardless, we’re now onto the “exploit and analyze” phases of the targeting cycle. Which means more information (& hopefully, more successes against #alQaeda) should be forthcoming. 10/10
More info continues to come out. Looks like the @CIA had a team of some kind on the ground? Makes me wonder how they got there, though this report says planning was underway for past six months…that’s a lot of time to infiltrate a ground team
.@cnn reporting that Zawahiri was spotted on a balcony(!) of his compound which led to launch of two Hellfire missiles. And that they’d been fixing his location for a week before the strike. And that his family moved into the villa first, joined by Zawahiri later.
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Well, this is quite the development in #Afghanistan: the #Taliban spokesman has stated that the explosion in Kabul yesterday was the result of a US drone strike against #ISIS-K targets👇
I'm surprised the US would do this (& esp in Kabul) now, given ongoing discussions w/the #Taliban on a host of other issues. Suggests the US calculated the benefit of target removal to outweigh the costs w/the TB (eg in ongoing talks) for conducting the strike. 2/n
One has to wonder if the #Taliban gave tacit approval for the strike, which would present the US with a lower cost to factor into its calculation, as the benefit of the target's removal doesn't immediately appear to be resoundingly high (though more info could emerge on that).3/n
@SIGARHQ After reviewing the history of police development in #Afghanistan in detail since 2001, @SIGARHQ ID'd 11 key findings: 1. The US approach to police assistance in AFG resulted in an overmilitarized police force incapable of protecting citizens from internal & external threats. 3/n
Yesterday @SIGARHQ posted an interim version of its report titled "Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise"
In this thread, I'll summarize the report's main findings & offer some thoughts. 1/n
@SIGARHQ First, on scoping: @SIGARHQ was directed by Congress to "examine the factors that contributed to the #ANDSF’s collapse, including the underlying factors over the past 20 years that resulted in the underdevelopment of ANDSF military and police capabilities" 3/n
A question it seems everyone is asking these days: “Why has #Russia’s military been so ineffective in #Ukraine?”
Some answers in this THREAD. 1/n
(In case you’re wondering what qualifications I have to address this question—I teach a course on military power & effectiveness @ElliottSchoolGW. Also, this thread was inspired by @RisaBrooks12 excellent thread on her own work on this topic:
@ElliottSchoolGW@RisaBrooks12 There are *many* factors that play into whether a military is effective or not, as I’ve shown in what I call the “Grand Unified Framework of Mil Effectiveness.” The most commonly considered of these are the quantitative factors: people (size) & resources ($, materiel, time). 3/n
I was asked this morning what kind of threat #ISIS-Khorasan poses to the #Taliban: Existential? Nuisance? Something in between? Some thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
First, @AmiraJadoon can correct me if I’m wrong, but I believe the current attack numbers from #ISIS in #Afghanistan represent a slight uptick since the #Taliban took over, but are still well below the group’s peak a few years back. 2/n
The attention being given to #ISIS-K is thus less b/c they’re an immediate large threat, but more b/c: a) the US intel community assessed them to potentially be able to threaten the US in 6-12 mos (per @ColinKahl testimony) & b) they’re the last challenger to the #Taliban 3/n