Thread by @alxgraef

The #Russian gov system has been in crisis since 2008/9. The elite has been looking for ways to generate political legitimacy & economic growth but w/o changing the domestic political order & the system of rent distribution. A struggle against decline. An (im)possible task. 1/20

2/ There have been several attempts of reform. In order to stimulate innovation, Putin, similar to Soviet times, decided to tap state resources and strengthen the military-industrial complex. Large conglomerates (Rostec, Rosnano etc) were supposed to enable civilian conversion.

3/ Simultaneously, #Putin deliberately selected Dmitri Medvedev as his successor to open the possibility for political change. But #Medvedev turned out to be a weak leader, who lost essential constituencies on which Putin's system of power depended.

4/ In 2009/2010 the tandemocracy, however, inspired much debate about the possibility of an evolving political system in Russia similar to the United States with Putin representing the conservative, Medvedev the more liberal wing. Gleb Pavlovsky, for example, promoted this idea.

5/ Such vision would have required Medvedev to remain President for another term, but already by summer 2011, Putin, watching Medvedev's choices, had decided to return. This decision and the subsequent rigged Duma elections, however, only strengthened the crisis of legitimacy.

6/ The mass protests over winter 2011 changed the tracks of Russian politics, as did the outcome of the war in Libya. Both events, among others, reinforced Putin's belief in Western malign intentions and influence, as well as in the primacy of political stability at home.

7/ At the same time, the Russian economic model based on commodity export & effective macro-economic policies, had exhausted itself. Further, sustainable growth, as some Russian elites like Alexey Kudrin and German Gref, understood perfectly well, would require political reforms.

8/ Putin, who may have understood the situation all the same, however, was unable (and probably also unwilling) to do anything that would have undermined his own power networks. Instead, he started two promote nationalist frames and economic integration in the post-Soviet space.

9/ The participation of Ukraine was key, not only with regard to economic factors but also as essential leverage in competition with the dominant West, whose standards, norms and values (in this order), exerted pressure on Russia's governance model and great power ambitions.

10/ In Nov 2013 Putin seemed to be close to reach his goals, at least with respect to Ukraine. But then the Maidan happened. For Putin this must have been nothing short of a nightmare, which he blamed on Yanukovich's cowardice and Western meddling. He acted rapidly.

11/ The annexation of Crimea temporarily solved the domestic legitimacy problem. The war in Donbas ensured to have a foothold in the geopolitical game. At some point, so the assumption in Moscow, the new elites in Kyiv would have no choice but to negotiate on Russia's terms.

12/ But this strategy did not succeed. To the contrary, Ukrainian elites continued to consolidate their power and moved along with introducing Western standards and increasing cooperation. Zelenskiy further accelerated this process, challenging the Kremlin's interests.

13/ In parallel, Putin himself increasingly delved into historical/cultural texts. This personal interest had took hold during his Premiership but after the Maidan it became a fixation and a politicized issue. To him history would provide domestic legitimacy and political purpose

14/ As any political use of history, Putin's ideological frames could build upon existing narratives in Russian society. But now they would be elevated to the status of state identity (which had not been the case before 2013), ensuring control and generating legitimacy.

15/ Meanwhile, the problems of finding a sustainable economic model continued. With Medvedev's failure to push cooperation with the West on Russia's terms, the political and economic agenda shifted towards cooperation with non-Western states, particularly China.

16/ After the Maidan, Russian nationalist ideology and Western economic sanctions added elements of national production and the promotion of domestic consumption. But limited market size, technological backwardness and, once again, political interests limited progress.

17/ Attempts to coerce Ukraine into submission continued, albeit unsuccessfully, while Putin’s personal fixation with historical narratives intensified. After 2014, the notion that Ukrainians & Russian were one people & Ukraine no state on its own turned into a personal ideology.

18/ Over 2021 the conflict between Russia and Ukraine escalated. Zelenskiy moved ahead with curbing Russian influence in Ukraine. Cooperation with the West intensified. The tactical possibilities of the Minsk process came to a halt. Putin saw a closing window of opportunity.

19/ The military escalation that followed was the logical consequence of incompatible interests, but its scale and the way it evolved had much to do with Putin’s personal beliefs and Ukrainian resistance. The consequences were way more severe than initially expected.

20/ They have also changed the Russian development model: decline & de-industrialization over the next 10- 20y combined with repression & ideol. radicalization. Among the Russian elite, the vague hope remains that a parallel change in world order will ultimately ensure 'victory'.