1. Iraq’s informal politics and its shortcomings. Much of the rules of gov. formation in Iraq are INFORMAL, the outcome of intra-elite deals—including the choice of the prime minister, usually selected among Shiite parties by consensus. @ProfTobyDodgeeprints.lse.ac.uk/106532/2/Dodge…
2.Informal, old rules are unable to guide the political process. Shiite parties can no longer agree by consensus & engage in a competition to dominate representation of the Shia community. tcf.org/content/report…
3. Personality politics replaced party politics. Most traditional Shiite-Kurdish-Sunni parties dominating the post-2003 are in crisis. Single individuals have more power parties structures (e.i.politburos/leadership) making compromise more difficult to reach. Daawa is an example.
4. Shiite politics is traditionally fractious. Yet, intra-Shiite competition can now mobilise a more complex set of political resources.
Lines of fissures between Moqtada al-Sadr Vs Badr&Daawa are:
5. * Rooted in history: domestic opposition to Saddam (Sadeq al Sadr, father of Moqtada) Vs exiled Shiite opposition (Badr, ISCI, Daawa). The fissure between domestic and exiled opposition was particularly acute in the 1990s. @SajadJiyadnewlinesmag.com/argument/the-t…
7. * Rely on a complex set of political resources to prevail against each other.
First, mass-mobilization is now an important resource alongside coercion& patronage. Also, Shiite actors initiated/increased engagement with reg. actors other than Iran,such as Turkey, Gulf states.
7. Implications for political system. Violence shows that established rules of gov. formation are decaying and new ones have yet to emerge. The transition to new “rules of the game” can be dangerous, raising risks of violence as the current crisis shows. tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.108…
8. This begs the question of whether a political system governed by more formal rules, rather than informal intra-elite deals, would have prevented crisis such as this one. Future scholarship on #consociationalism in MENA may have to answer this question.
9. Reg. implications are also significant. Shiite crisis in Iraq can be THE Achille Heel for neighboring Iran, boost hopes of reg.rivals, such as Israel, that Iran’s influence is shattering like a broken glass and increase chances for reg.polarization. amwaj.media/article/muqtad…
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2/11 After a new round of #KSA-#Iran talks was announced yesterday, rumors suggested #Iran wished to suspend talks. Meanwhile Iran’s IRGC launched an attack on US installations in Erbil. This is worrying: reuters.com/world/middle-e…
3/11 Russia’s demands in #JCPOA talks and subsequent halt in negotiations, may disincentivize #Tehran to opt for dialogue and refraining from targeting #US assets & Iran’s regional rivals, either directly or through its allied paramilitaries in Iraq, Yemen and Syria.
Mixed feelings around the Sinjar deal. Hope that it puts an end to the impasse over Sinjar. Fear that it— once again— places the destiny of Sinjar in the hands of external players. 1/4 news.un.org/en/story/2020/…
2/4 For decades, Sinjar was ruled through external co-optation of local elites which empowered single Yazidi individuals but left the community divided and as a bargaining chip of regional politics. Rule through proxies is what paved the way to the 2014 genocide. 2/4
3/3 The 2014 tragedy brought a new generation of Yazidi to engage, break patterns of rule through proxies and take in their hand the destiny of their land. @YazdaOrg@murad_ismael@NadiaMuradBasee are among leading examples. 3/4