Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
As for the provisions of the Genocide Convention it seeks to offer its construction, by reference to Ukraine's application France cites arts I, II, IV, VIII, IX. 3/
Before entering into the construction of the provisions themselves pursuant to the customary rules of interpretation, France begins with some general observations on good faith in the interpretation and application of treaties. 4/
In addition to the standard references, France argues that "good faith implies that the Convention's integrity must be respected". It adds that good faith demands a treaty be interpreted in light of its object & purpose and prohibits abusive and bias interpretations. 5/
In this light, France states that in its intervention it seeks to emphasise the cardinal importance of good faith in its various manifestations. 6/
France proceeds to its interpretation of art IX. It begins with standard references on the concept of "dispute", then emphasising that any dispute relating to the Convention's interpretation, application or fulfilment falls within the ICJ's jurisdiction. 7/
France then makes an intriguing argument – due to the inclusion of "fulfilment" in the compromissory clause, jurisdiction extends to disputes relating to the application of the obligation pacta sunt servanda regarding the Convention, including its implementation in good faith. 8/
It's possible that France has in mind the finding in the Nicaragua case that disputes over depriving a treaty's object and purpose do not pertain to the interpretation and application thereof. It is still far from clear that "fulfilment" has the effect of overcoming that. 9/
In any event, France then proceeds to the issue of non-violation. It notes the broad language in the French version of art IX, which speaks of state responsibility "en matière de génocide" (rather than "for genocide" in the English), as well as the terms "including those". 10/
Like 🇬🇧🇸🇪🇷🇴, it also notes the language of "any party" in the compromissory clause. This all leads to the conclusion that the language is broad enough not to condition jurisdiction on the applicant being the party alleging a violation of the Convention. 11/
France then proceeds to consider the substantive provisions at stake in the Genocide Convention. Beginning with art I, France focuses on when the obligation of prevention is triggered; namely if genocide is occurring or if there is a serious risk thereof. 12/
On this basis, France argues that no action can validly be taken pursuant to the obligation of prevention if these conditions have not arisen. Presumably, this lays the ground for arguing that Russia had no obligation to prevent genocide vis-à-vis Ukraine. 13/
France then briefly touches upon arts II and III (definition of genocide and modes of liability). Rather than offering constructions, it states that it plans on providing the Court with information on its implementation of these provisions in its municipal legal system. 14/
Interestingly France cites art 31 of the #VCLT as the basis for relevance of its practice. Yet, surely, the Court will not be receiving information on subsequent practice of *all* state parties. Are we not (relegated to) the realms of art 32 VCLT? 15/
Proceeding to art IV (punishment), like 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇬🇧🇸🇪🇷🇴, France emphasises that the means concerned are judicial procedures – not collective punishment. Here, too, France states that it will provide information on its implementation of the provision. 16/
Moving on to art VIII (seising UN organs), France highlights how this provision privileges collective action in preventing genocide. 17/
To conclude, France's intervention is an interesting read. IINM it is the first to allude to information it is leaving out of its declaration but plans to supply during the proceedings.
Unsurprisingly, France also highlights nuances in the French version of Convention's text. 18/
France also (seems to) breaks ground in addressing tricky issue of Cinderella-ing the issue of frustration of object & purpose of the Convention into glass slipper of the compromissory clause. However, it remains to be seen whether it is persuasive. 19/FIN
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To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/
As for the provisions it plans to offer its construction on, Romania cites arts IX (compromissory clause) and I (prevention and punishment), the latter in turn necessitating interpretation of arts II, III, VIII. 3/
As is becoming routine for these interventions, Sweden invokes both its "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute and the nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (though first to cite Judge Cançado Trindade's sep op in the Whaling case order). 2/
For its personal touch, Sweden invokes itself being a "a keen proponent of a rules-based world order", finding that "it is necessary for it to intervene in this case, in order to place its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention". 3/
In its opening remarks, the #US follows the trend of other states by invoking its right of intervention under art 63, but also underlining the erga omnes partes nature of the Genocide Convention obligations. 2/
For its personal touch, US underlines its involvement in developing the Convention and pointing to its past invocation of art VIII regarding Darfur (recourse to UN organs) and its support [yes, I know] for tribunals prosecuting genocide and other crimes. 3/
Perhaps the most conspicuous part of Germany's declaration is that it seeks solely to give its construction on article IX of the Genocide Convention (the compromissory clause), unlike 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇳🇿🇬🇧 which offered interpretations for several provisions and relating to the merits. 2/
Now, by reserving "right to submit further arguments as to the scope ratione materiae" if declaration deemed admissible, Germany would presumably address the interpretation of the Convention's substantive provisions. However, this doesn't really feature in present declaration. 3/
Text of the #UK's declaration of intervention in #Ukraine v #Russia, pursuant to article 63 of the #ICJ Statute, now available on the Court's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Some observations.🪡 1/20 (it's the longest declaration yet...)
As preliminary matter, UK is first intervener to refer to ICJ's recent The Gambia v Myanmar judgment, such as in underlining its erga omnes partes legal interest (though tbf, 🇱🇻 submitted its declaration the day before judgment and 🇱🇹 on the day). 2/
UK summarily addresses issue of capacity to intervene on jurisdictional matters, but is seemingly first intervener to consider different scenarios on how case may procedurally progress: either one-stage-case where it will address both issues of jurisdiction and merits... 3/
A few observations on #Latvia's and #Lithuania's respective declarations of intervention in the #ICJ's #Ukraine v #Russia case, under article 63 of the ICJ Statute and on the basis of them being parties to the Genocide Convention. 1/15🪡
While art 63 of the Statute enshrines the right to intervene, art 82 of the ICJ's Rules stipulates the form and content of a declaration to intervene. Art 83 thus compelled the two states to address important issues of procedure and substance which arise in the case. 2/
While the declarations of the two neighbouring states were submitted just a day apart and are supportive of Ukraine's case, they are quite different in their form, place emphasis on different issues and at times make different arguments (though not really contradictory). 3/