Russian Defense Minister Sergei #Shoigu’s interview offers more insight into what the Russian “partial mobilization” really means. We will unpack some of the key points in this🧵
2/ #Shoigu, like #Putin, defends the mobilization order on the grounds of Western support for #Ukraine, rather than the upcoming annexation of occupied territory. It’s still a “special military operation,” not a Patriotic War.
3/ #Shoigu emphasized that this is a partial reserve call-up, not expanded conscription: “This is precisely from the reserves,” he said. “It isn’t anyone who has never seen anything of the army...”
4/ #Shoigu added (somewhat incoherently) that “it is actually those who have served their [conscription] period, who have a militarily-significant specialty, that is a specialty that is needed today in the Armed Forces, who have combat experience.”
5/ He preemptively declared that students would not be mobilized and would not be under any circumstances. “Everyone should go peacefully about their studies, no one will call them up, they won’t be mobilized,” #Shoigu said.
6/ #Shoigu also said it would not affect conscripts: “They will not undergo any mobilization and deployment to the...special military operation.” They will continue to serve as they have on Russian territory.
7/ The annexation of occupied areas of #Ukraine could matter here—making those areas part of #Russia would allow conscripts to serve there openly, as other analysts have noted.
8/ Shoigu wildly exaggerates the scale of Russia’s usable reserves, claiming there are almost 25 million with combat experience. Very few Russians have actual combat experience other than those who fought in #Ukraine.
9/ Even counting those who have completed conscript service, most of those 25 million are too many years removed from the limited training they had as conscripts to be much better than civilians.
10/ #Shoigu then describes a protracted process that will take months to produce fighting forces even from the reserves:
11/ “After being called up they will go through training or re-training. Coordination of crews, teams, detachments, and platoons will occur...and exclusively after that” reservists will be sent to their assigned combat tasks.
12/ This statement suggests that reservists will more likely deploy as small groups of replacements than as parts of newly organized battalions, which could get them to the front faster but dilute their impact over time and space.
13/ #Shoigu notes that 300k reservists will be called up, but not all at once or quickly—rather in a deliberate manner.
14/ This partial mobilization is also disrupting important planned training efforts. #Shoigu said the MoD was gathering reservists for two weeks or longer “to restore their skills driving military vehicles” but those efforts are now canceled.
15/ The Russian Ministry of Defense is likely using lists prepared for that refresher training as the basis for initial call-ups for the partial mobilization.
16/ This all adds up to a likely gradual call-up and deployment of limited numbers of reservists over the coming months that will not change the battlefield dynamics this year.
17/ It remains unclear if this call-up will offset Russian losses in the war so far enough to let Moscow sustain operations over the longer term.
18/ #Russia was going to have to either increase conscription or recall more reserves to make good its losses anyway. We will not know until 2023 if this call-up can stabilize the Russian military let alone increase its combat power over the longer term.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
