ISW identified several key inflections in ongoing military operations and #Russian force generation efforts on September 25. /1 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian contract soldiers in Zaporizhia Oblast have been informed that the terms of their contracts are no longer relevant and that they will have to continue to serve at the discretion of the military command. /6 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
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The #Kremlin’s planned annexation of occupied #Ukraine may take place before or shortly after October 1, the start of #Russia’s normal fall conscription cycle, to enable the forced conscription of Ukrainian civilians to fight against Ukraine. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
If it does, the #Kremlin will likely order the Russian Ministry of Defense to include Ukrainian civilians in occupied and newly annexed Ukrainian territory in the Russian conscription cycle, broadening the forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians to fight against #Ukraine.
ISW has previously assessed that one motivation for Putin to order mobilization and annexation in concert with one another is to broaden the forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians...
1/ The #Kremlin is deflecting blame for the Russian government’s failure to abide by its own stated criteria for mobilization and exemptions onto the failing bureaucratic institutions responsible for the mobilization. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
2/ The Kremlin is downplaying the widespread violations as individual errors of local authorities, claiming to correct these errors as citizens call attention to them. But the violations are too common to be merely the result of individual errors, as Russian citizens clearly see.
3/ Unlike Russian failures in #Ukraine, which the #Kremlin has been able to minimize or deflect because its citizens cannot see them directly, violations of the mobilization decree are evident to many Russians. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
"#Russia will mobilize reservists for this conflict. The process will be ugly, the quality of the reservists poor, and their motivation to fight likely even worse."
2/ Despite these significant shortcomings, "the systems are sufficiently in place in Russia to allow military commissars and other officials to find people and send them to training units and thence to war." isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
3/ "But the low quality of the voluntary reserve units produced by earlier mobilization efforts is likely a reliable indicator of the net increase in combat power Russia can expect to generate in this way." isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
🧵Vladimir #Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in #Ukraine.
Our September 25 report examines those challenges, their roots, and their impact on the war: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
2/ The “partial mobilization” #Putin ordered on September 21 will generate additional forces for Russia but inefficiently and with high domestic social and political costs. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
3/ The forces generated by this “partial mobilization,” critically, are very unlikely to add substantially to the Russian military’s net combat power in 2022. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
The #Kremlin’s “partial mobilization” continues to hastily press thousands of men across Russia into military service but remains unlikely to generate effective combat power. /1 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…