🧵Vladimir #Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in #Ukraine.
Our September 25 report examines those challenges, their roots, and their impact on the war: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
Our September 25 report examines those challenges, their roots, and their impact on the war: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1574195167556354049
2/ The “partial mobilization” #Putin ordered on September 21 will generate additional forces for Russia but inefficiently and with high domestic social and political costs. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
3/ The forces generated by this “partial mobilization,” critically, are very unlikely to add substantially to the Russian military’s net combat power in 2022. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
4/ Putin will have to fix basic flaws in the Russian military personnel and equipment systems if mobilization is to have any significant impact even in the longer term. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
5/ However, Putin's actions thus far suggest that he is far more concerned with rushing bodies to the battlefield than with addressing these fundamental flaws. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
6/ The Russian Armed Forces have not been setting conditions for an effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008 and have not been building the kind of reserve force needed for a snap mobilization intended to produce immediate effects on the battlefield.
7/ The Russian military tried to move to an all-volunteer basis amid the 2008 financial crisis and failed to make the transition fully, instead ending up with a hybrid model blending conscripts and professional soldiers.
8/ A reduction in the mandatory term of service for conscripts made Russia’s reserves less combat-ready, and the prioritization of a professional force/de-prioritization of conscript service likely translated into an erosion of bureaucratic structures required for mobilization.
9/ There are no rapid solutions to these problems, which stem in part from long-standing unresolved tensions in the Russian approach to generating military manpower. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
10/ Indeed, Putin has already conducted at least four attempts at mobilization in the last year, likely draining the pool of available combat-ready (and willing) reservists ahead of the “partial mobilization.”
Read more in tonight's report: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
Read more in tonight's report: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
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