Tonight's campaign assessment from @TheStudyofWar and @criticalthreats focuses on #Russian domestic responses to the #Kerch Strait Bridge explosion on October 9 and changes within the Russian chain of command.
/2 #Ukrainian forces continued to make advances towards Svatove-Kreminna highway on October 9. Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow.
2/ The attack on the #KerchStrait Bridge, coupled with recent Russian military failures and partial mobilization, is generating direct criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin from the Russian pro-war nationalist community. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct9
3/ These critiques from the pro-war camp may indicate rising doubts about #Putin’s ability to deliver on his promised goal of “denazifying” #Ukraine and may undermine Putin’s appeal within his core constituency. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct9
4/ Other Russian nationalists, propagandists, and proxy officials are blaming security services and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), a phenomenon that can undermine Putin’s regime in the long term. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct9
5/ The perception of the trajectory of the war and of Ukrainian capabilities is changing as well, and Russians are undergoing a rude awakening. Russian sources see that the Ukrainian southern counter-offensive poses a significant threat to Russian forces across southern #Ukraine.
6/ Russian voices within the info space responded by demanding that the Russian military retaliates for the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion by regaining the initiative on the battlefield and resuming the missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct9
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NEW #Russian forces conducted massive missile strikes across Ukraine for the second day in a row; Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensives east of the #Oskil River and in the direction of #Kreminna-Svatove.
2/ Army General Sergey #Surovikin’s previous experience as commander of Russian forces in Syria likely does not explain the massive wave of missile strikes across #Ukraine over the past few days, nor does it signal a change in the trajectory of Russian capabilities or strategy.
3/ As @TheStudyofWar noted in April, all Russian military district, aerospace, and airborne commanders served at least one tour in Syria as either chief of staff or commander of Russian forces...
Russian and Belarusian forces remain unlikely to attack #Ukraine from the north despite Belarusian President Alexander #Lukashenko's October 10 announcement that #Belarus and #Russia agreed to deploy the Union State’s Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV). isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
2/ The RGV is a strategic formation of Russian and Belarusian units tasked with defending the Union State. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
3/ The Russian component of any RGV formations in Belarus will likely be comprised of low-readiness mobilized men or conscripts who likely will not pose a significant conventional military threat to Ukraine. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
The October 10 Russian attacks wasted some of #Russia’s dwindling precision weapons against civilian targets, as opposed to militarily significant targets. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
2/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces successfully completed the mission of striking Ukrainian military command centers, signal infrastructure, and energy systems in Ukraine. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
3/ Social media shows that Russians instead hit a children’s playground, a park, a German consulate, and a business center among other non-military targets. Ukrainian air defenses also shot down half of the Russian drones and cruise missiles. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
New: #Russian forces conducted massive, coordinated missile strikes on over 20 #Ukrainian cities. Putin claimed the strikes were in retaliation for the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge, likely in part to curry favor with “pro-war” factions.
2/ The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also reported that #Putin has been planning this attack prior to the #KerchStrait Bridge explosion, and if true, could indicate that Putin planned this attack for the deflection of the Kharkiv-Izyum-Lyman failures.
3/ #Putin emphasized that he would conduct proportional escalation in any future retaliatory actions. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
#Putin’s partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in #Ukraine, interacting with Russian battlefield failures to exacerbate fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives.🧵
2/ #Putin is visibly failing at balancing the competing demands of the Russian nationalists who have become increasingly combative since mobilization began despite sharing Putin’s general war aims and goals in #Ukraine. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct4
3/ @TheStudyofWar has identified 3 main factions in the current Russian nationalist information space: Russian milbloggers & war correspondents, former Russian or proxy officers & veterans, and some of the Russian siloviki - people with meaningful power bases & their own forces.
The #Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged that #Ukrainian forces have penetrated Russian defenses in the direction of Zolota Balka (approximately 82km northeast of Nova Kakhovka). /3 isw.pub/RusCampaignOct3