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Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
@ArveloaMert
Nov 14, 2022 • 114 tweets • 61 min read • Read on X
As my Twitter thread for the Strategy of Ukrainian Counter-Offensive become too long, I will start a new thread for a possible Winter Counter-Offensive. After the liberation of Kherson things changed sligthly but they are significant to be mentioned. Image
But please remember that many key intakes in this thread will continue to be in play during the Winter Offensive. So I will not repeat them in this thread.
twitter.com/i/events/15689…
1) End of the Autumn means end of the mud which called as Rasputitsa. This could make motorized armoured vehicles and trucks to operate faster. Winter has two important aspects in it. The first one is of course temperatures. The winter temperature in Dnipro region is... Image
2) ... around -1 to -2C in average in winter. While in regions like Donetsk and Luhansk, it could fell to -3. While cold could ease the offensive actions, extreme cold could also hamper it and force both sides to use more fuel and resources. When it came to Dnipro River... Image
3) ...it could freeze if there would be 20 consecutive days below the 0C. Now Dnipro is 7.3C which is 1 degree higher than the average. For now, forecasts see no early freeze of the river. But Ukraine wants to deploy as much as SSOs and troops before the possible freeze. Image
4) As the ice will be fragile+hard to cross on it while it would be harder to cross the river via boats. But it will not be decisive as 🇺🇦 still have interior lines of communication within the other bank of the river. Another important issue is sunshine...
5)... Ukraine take 1 hours of sunlight in average for a month in winter. Which means longer nights and cloudy days. As 🇺🇦 has better night vision advantage, this could create opportunities for 🇺🇦 SSOs for hit-and-run operations and secure HIMARS strikes and counter-artillery. Image
6) The main need of Ukraine is winter equipments. While Russia's winter equipments are not really nice and even some of them revelaed as 'stolen' from the inventory. Ukraine guaranteed 500.000 winter uniforms from Canada (stand vs -30C) and from Lithuania.
novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/…
7) UK, now, pledges to contribute via uniforms, clothes and with heated tents. Heated tents would be crucial and life-saving in the trenches around Dombass. Quite good for a start but Ukraine needs more. Better logistics in winter would be game-changer.
news.sky.com/story/uk-to-se…
8) As 🇷🇺 have grave problems, ideal war awaits that 🇷🇺 should focus on defending lines rather than conducting offensive actions. But 🇷🇺 strategy is not leading by soldiers but by political demogogues. It is clear that Wagner and Chechens will do more for..
9) ... relocating elite troops and reserves under their command in the East. This is why we see main and costly Russian offensives in Bakhmut and Pavlivka. In incoming day with mud disapearence of mud, we could see more costly offensives. Russia could gain some minimal ground... Image
10) ... with maximum costs. Ukrainian focus will be on Kreminna and Svatove and in Zaporizhzhia region. While US Chief of Staff Mark Milley warned against a stalled frontline where minimal advances via huge losses could be ahead.
nytimes.com/2022/11/12/us/…
11) Indeed, it could be a time for negotiation and it should be. But Russia didn't show any realt intention for it and didn't show any change in their view. While in terms of military, looks like they lost the control to Prigozhin's group. So it looks hard
twitter.com/i/events/15899…
12) While for Ukrainian side, yes there some issues like casualties. But Kyiv is eyeing for the most basic fruit of offensives; continuity. Clausewitz underlined that 'losing times would mean loss of resources'. So most of the military therotecians called for dynamicly... Image
13) ... pursuing the withdrewing enemy to totally destroy its will to fight. Kyiv, naturally, wants to advance against loose re-grouping efforts. Failed Russian training of reserves, combined with possible failure of logistics and cold weather would mean a nightmare. Image
14) Reports have already indicated that Russian troops are subjected to psychological issues like PTSD and etc. Winter and possible failures of logistics could crumble the Russian Army as its command control become ill-functioning due to rise of Wagner and etc. Image
15) But Ukraine should have to take its attention to he top point of offense. Ukraine should always keep in mind that they are winning operations in Kharkiv and Kherson. But they still have a war to win. Power-save should continue to be the main theme. They did it until now. Image
16) Than what Ukraine needs? Same answer. Fire power, proper logistics, mobility for maneuver, intelligence and partisan warfare. But we also have to include this list the issue of Clausewitzian trinity. These were about Reason and Chance. But we have one more and it is PASSION. Image
17) Ukrainian people has already suffered much in this war. They need care with portable heating devices, deployable mobile generators and bottled waters, an excessive fund for reparing infrastructure and simply know-how. We have a race to protect people equally as their military Image
18) The best way to counter 🇷🇺 contactless warfare military strategy is to make sure that 🇺🇦 people to get rid of this immoral strikes w/ huge morale+least suffer. USAID acted for this, we simply need more may be Japan could contribute more in this issue.
usaid.gov/news-informati…
19) Both 🇺🇦 people and soldiers were also subjected to war time pyschological problems like anxiety, PTSD, and depression. Winter could hamper these issues more. We need to provide more on this issue as it could hamper the morale and exist for generations.
utu.fi/en/news/press-…
20) Unconfirmed but still important even if it is a rumour. The river bank between Zburivka and Nova Kahovka is covered with shallow marslands with tree cover. Oleshky stand at the middle of this and directly at the opposite site of Kherson.
21) The region is important for hit-and-run campaigns vs. Russian garnizones. But harder for a complete offesives even with winter conditions. Existence of massive sand dunnes in Nyzhnʹodniprovsʹki Pisky and Oleshky made Radensk as the shortest way to Crimea. (Looks like Taiwan) Image
22) Another flash point is Kinburn Spit. It is again full of sand dunes and there is a lack of proper roads. But it directly faces Mykolaiv and Kherson. It gives a back door for infantry. Every battle is naval so the spit is important for riverine commerce
23) #Russia employs Putin’s indigenous counter-insurgency tactics in #Ukraine as it did in Chechenya. But be careful to draw paralels between this two historical cases. Yes, Moscow absurtly sees Ukraine as the part of Russia and approach this war as an insurgency, no it is not. Image
24) Ukraine use Zachitski style missile strikes, artillery shelling and indiscriminate violence against Ukrainian cities and villages just like Chechnya. Zachitski targeted local people to persude them to not support insurgents and expel them out of their cover. Image
25) This could not deliver a result. Ukraine is an independent state with strong national identity. Not a local village communities with their own traditions. We are not in the 2000s anymore, West tolerated Putin to counter Chechens as a part of War on Terror. Image
26) This is not the case anymore. It is not Russia’s interior affair and it fails to collect actionable intelligence against Ukrainian villages and military. This tactic and using it as a paralel to the war in Ukraine is absurd. It is part of the megalomaniac posture of Russia. Image
27) A good article by Souleimanov and Siroky on why Russia succeed with retributive violence tactics which required actionable intel. While random violence as in current Ukraine also failed to deliver the result in the Second Checnia War.
d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/48570756/rando… Image
28) War, now, entered to process of renewed planning phase for both sides. Russia re-arrange its elite troops around Donetsk. While it increasingly use mobilized soldiers in Lugansk and Eastern bank of Dnipro. Iranian UAVs and missile supplies could deliver a new offensive phase. Image
29) But it will be a limited one in Donetsk. While Ukraine is, now, reconning the weak points of Russia. Obviously, it is C3 and logistics. While they are searching for opportunities in Svatove and East Kherson, they need to rethink their strategy in Donetsk to protect men. Image
30) #Russia’s military, now, consists of three levels of soldiers. Even these three levels conduct operations as a whole, they did not communicate and see each other in same cohesion. The first level is a) elite troops: remnants of Spetsnaz, VDV, Marine Infantry and all other... Image
31) ... professional military units. They are trying to lead the frontal attacks in Donbass while limitedly conduct Special Operations. Most of the logistics and resources allocate to these groups as they have direct comms with Chief of Staff and MoD. The second level is... Image
32) ... b) Tier 1 Wagner PWCs, DNR and LNR militias. They have their own C2 structure based on the control of Prigozhin and other war contractors. They have a share of their own resources and hardware. They are the main men power that used in costly frontal attacks in Donbass. Image
33) c) Tier 3 Wagner PWCs (Convicts) and Mobilized soldiers or Mobiks. They are the least armed soldiers who barely reach logistics and resources. They exclude from comms of level 1 and 2. Positioned in garnizones as defenders of territory and to do some non-war roles. Image
34) But mobiks also could be used in the war when Command and Wagner need extra men power. They are the main target of Ukrainian counter attacks. The unit that collapsed in Izium-Kupyansk is also from this third level. So they are the weakest point in this military structure. Image
35 - Britain decided to supply three Sea King helicopters to #Ukraine. Not the one for Anti-Submarine Warfare but more for search and rescue missions. It is more likely for Kyiv to use it to ensure maritime security in grain corridor.
bbc.com/news/uk-637254…
36 - In operational terms, their utility would be limited. But the US supplied more HARM missiles in suppressed ADZ, these helis could be used for reconning purposes around Kinburn Spit and for CASEVAC and MEDEVAC purposes. Also there are more AD supplies, humvees and generators. Image
37 - #Ukraine advances relatively slow when compared with Kherson and Kharkiv in Svatove+Zaporizhzhia. It is not only because 🇷🇺 mobilized reinforcements (they are still ill-equipped) but because both of these are frontal actions. Kyiv still looks for fragile part of the front. Image
38 - #Russia has already lost huge number of 'identified' conscripts. While main losses from the Russian military was reported from BTGs or armoured vehicle personel, VDV, volunteers and marines. While Rosgvardiya has relatively less losses.
39 - But as Russian capabilities crippled more, we are approaching to a new strategical point where Kyiv completes its maneuver warfare phase. This means as parity in the battlefield come closer Ukrainians could also move to find a decisive battle.
40 - The untold story of Ukrainian combat engineers in this war is really invaluable. Let alone, all these pantoon bridges in river crossings as we covered earlier. Now, they are building winter heating modules and shelters to the trenches.
mil.in.ua/en/news/engine…
41 - Canada and other Allies provide support to engineering brigades. From restoring damaged equipments to logistical train tracks to refirbushing of trophy equipment, they are making an enormous job. Many thought 🇺🇦 equipments could not stand for a month.
cbc.ca/news/politics/…
42 - Could #Russia carpet bomb #Ukraine via heavy bombers? Indeed, theoretical power of Russian bombers make it possible as Russia has high quantity of mission capable bombers and dumb bombs to use in mass.
washingtonpost.com/business/energ…
43 - But what about its utility? They could unleash these carpet bombing campaigns over the Ukrainian poisitions in the Donetsk Front as an additional power. Or they could use it in bigger cities like Kyiv, Lviv, Kherson, Kharkiv and others as an Douhetian-instrument. Image
44 - 🇺🇦 authorities has already created a working air raid emergency system to protect civilians. Indeed, it could produce result but Kyiv will rapidly absorbe this new situation. In tactical manner, carpet bombing would not produce much result vs dispersed and fortified troops Image
45 - Also in terms of practical terms, Russia uses its bomber squadron beyond the Ukrainian SAM and ADZ range. Carpet bombing requires bombers to fly within the 🇺🇦 air space. This also requires figther jets from
🇷🇺 accompany them to safety. This strategy is so expensive for them Image
46 - Also operating strategic bombers in the Western Ukraine could easily led for a nuclear ambiguity and escalation risks as it is impossible to determine their missions. Russia did not want to risk its bombers as a part of suasion since their survivability rate in... Image
47 - ... denied airspaces is still a mistery. So if Russian bombers could be shoted down in mass via air defences in Ukraine, it would easily hamper Russian nuclear deterrence posture. But carpet bombing, with its destructiveness, is important for the West to counter... Image
48 - ... boldly. West should draw a line w/ a threat to arm Ukraine with long range missiles, fighters and even Patriots if 🇷🇺 unleash a carpet bombing campaign. West and Ukraine excessively needs to protect its population even strategic air campaigns did not produce any results. Image
49 - This is really great to hear but still have some questions about the security and utility of these ships. But, clearly, it is one of the most immediate options to support Ukrainian grid. These ships generate 470MW energy with the use of NG or LNG.
asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energ…
50 - In terms of logistics, Russia did not achieved much in filling the gaps. But the retreat from the Kherson changed the organization of it and allowed Russian forces to use mobilize soldiers to better allocate it through elite and mercenary forces. This partial adjustment...
51 - ... and shortening of logistics roads by new Russian General proved as successful as it prevented the collapse of defensive positions in Kremmina/Svatove and Melitopol and limited offensive succes in Donetsk. But overall logistical problems persist and could become worser. Image
52 - While in Donetsk, #Russia tries to break down the Ukrainian defensive cordon reinforced by trenches, bunkers and Mine fields via frontal attacks. All war theorists warned against attacking defensive cordonnes as it would be costly and its results would be temporary. Image
53 - But success of the 🇷🇺 offensive in Donetsk is tightly connected with 🇺🇦 success in elsewhere (Melitopol, Kreminna or Kherson. Also to the Western support to provide more path-breaking weapons. West should step-up to prevent fall of more territory as retaking them is costlier Image
54 - This will be a minimal repeat of May-August period where #Russia will overuse its scarce resources and ammunations to control Donetsk. #Ukraine will save its power in this region to ensure that Russians lost a lot than strike again.
55 - A significant show of how much Russian strategic air deterrence capacity is vulnerable. Russian bombers and refueling tanker aircrafts are expensive and hard to produce. I wonder whether they lost one of them. Not sure which weapons set that Kyiv used but significant.
56 - At least one Tu-22M3 bomber armed with Kinzal missiles noted as damaged/cannot fly. There is a significant damage in critical systems like elevator and trim in this plane that control angle of attack. Could be replaced but level of damage is unknown.
57 - Suspected weapon system that used by #Ukraine against #Russia's bomber base is 1970s-made Tu-141 cruise missile. These are reconing drones rather than long-range strike but could be refurbished. This shows that Russian air defence capacity could extremely vulnerable. Image
58 - Crime rates in #Russia is sky-rocketing. Stealing arms and explosives are rising and explosive attacks are on 6-years high. Kursk and Belgorod reported an increase of 675%, 213%, Moscow has 203%. Mobilization and over-focusing on war has clear impact.
themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/23/arm…
59 - What is the strategic signifiance of the issue? #Russia never report how much of these attacks were conducted by underground sabotagers, anti-war partisans and mobilized criminals. Not all regions experienced the crime frenzy but cities+border regions are the most vulnerable Image
60 - So could we claim that surprise 🇺🇦 attacks that claimed by 🇷🇺 is also connected with soaring crime rates? Not sure but always a possibility. Also arms smuggling by mobilized soldiers and released convicts and rise of gun ownership (25m firearms) is becoming a grave problem.
61 - This perfect map shows how #Russia suffered high casualties from its own offensive actions around Bakhmut, Pavlivka, Soledar and Vuhledar due to defu'tart and around Svatove, Makiivka and Kreminna by Ukrainian strikes and offensives vs point'd appui.
62 - All 🇺🇦 long-range strikes (if really 🇺🇦) based on lucky shots with the use of limited munitions or drones to strike fuel tanks or tankers. It is not about 'luck' anymore. It shows that #Ukraine has a credible targeting and info about these targets.
63 - Another ref. for 'Chechnya-like future for occupied Ukraine'. Reports indicate that 🇷🇺 is looking for a Chechen future for occupied regions of #Ukraine. This means an authoritarian claimed control on other locals based on economic corruption of elites
64 - In an earlier post, I underlined that why Chechnya is not a right example for #Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine never experienced tribal understanding of communal production, land division and no unified leadership structure were established as in Chechnya.
65 - Putin’s further escalation in this war via attacking #Ukraine from the north with #Belarus would be the last ‘conventional’ option of this war. If this happens probably Southern and Eastern offensive will fail with it. Which would also trigger mass protests in both states.
66 - #Canada will donate 50 lighting towers to #Ukraine for assisting electrical mechanics in night-time repairs via providing a source of light to work. Engineering assistance for heroic infrastructure workers/engineers are as vital as weapons in this war
pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/…
67 - Sustaining and maintaining railroads, electricity, water systems, comms and gas pipes are key part of defence. For example, even w/ scarce resources Ottoman forces achieved to maintain Hejaz Railway in WWI despite Arabian raids which enabled the defence of Medina until 1918. ImageImage
68 - #Ukraine's Belarussian border is long and dominated by rivers and marshlands (and Pripyat's nuclear contamination zone). It is winter so crossing them could be seemed as easier but different from the February, Kyiv is aware of nothern danger.
69 - Both Belarussians and Russians have already experiencing perils in force generation and logistics. Their involvement is still doubtful but incursion points were still same. They could try the axis from Chernihiv and Chernobyl around Pripyat and Dnipro to move on Kyiv. Image
70 - Or a second option is risking the supply lines along Lviv with an offensive from high ground roads of Pinsk-Brest to Kovel or via marshlands of Sarny. Both of them are risky (more for logistics) as they have to cross rivers and than hills or marshlands with fortifications. Image
71 - Lviv option is more dangerous for Russia and Belarus as it is a really distant military effort from the other places that war wages. Their efforts and logistics would be sub one. With territorial leverage and interior lines of communication #Ukraine could pincer them out. Image
72 - Some notes on why retaking P-66 and Svatove-Kreminna goals takes so much time and effort. Firstly, 🇷🇺 mobilization temporarily renewed Russian garrison and reconnected Russian logistics. Secondly, Offensive in Donetsk is hard and #Ukraine could fall in a need of relocating..
73 - ... troops. Thirdly, winter arrived late to Ukraine. Most of the 🇺🇦 counter-attacks follow rural roads contrary to 🇷🇺 who follow mainroads. This is because using asymmetric advantage vs 🇷🇺. Another point is these are frontal attacks and 🇷🇺 excessively fortified the region.
74 - Indeed, winter with decreased temperatures could increase the pace of these counter offensives. But two things need for both Kreminna and Melitopol. More long-range firepower that could create panic beyond the new fortifications and a defensive boost for Donetsk region. Image
75 - An additional new thread 🧵 for understanding the basic characteristics and requirements of positional defence and trench warfare between #Ukraine and #Russia, you can take a look to here; #RussiaUkraineWar #Rusya #Ukrayna
76 - Significant increase in GPS jamming and spoofing incidents reported from Russian cities. This article related it as an effort against possible Ukrainian long renge drone strikes. This include #Russia’s borders with Belarus and Finland.
wired.com/story/gps-jamm…
77 - It is problematic that most of the drones use military-specific system that encrypted against spoofing. But we are not sure how much 🇺🇦 drones are capable for GPS resilience. Map did not show jamming on Belgorod, Rostov + Kursk. It is because of sites’ info gathering system.
78 - #Russia is re-organizing its military command and morale system with sending musicians and other entertainment professionals to boost military morale in #Ukraine. It looks like Moscow is preparing for a renewed offensive and probably ‘last’ full scale offensive in this war.
79 - Wagner’s C2 structure continues to drag offensives in Donetsk via convicts and mobilized. Their command is a distant one based on iron fist with arbitrary executions. #Ukraine need longer range artillery to phase out Wagner C2. This could lead to the collapse of the front.
80 - #Russia tries to tighten its hand in the administrative areas in #Ukraine especially in so-called DNR and Zaporizhia against #partisan movements. This increase in power grab led tensions between local people, occupational collaborars and occupiers itself.
81 - A detailed thread 🧵 about #Russia's Occupation Administrations in #Ukraine️ and surrounding problems about them. Political aspect of Russian occupation also increasingly become disputed. #UkraineRussianWar
82 - Ukrainian troops continues to hold Bakhmut and Marinka while clashes focused on #Kreminna’s forest belt. Both sides continue to hold the wood #Russia use it as a buffer while #Ukraine tries to hold it for pressuring Russian forces. Image
83 - Reports on recent military training between #Russia and #Belarus are for training 🇷🇺 mobilized soldiers to fight in #Ukraine rather than a direct 🇧🇾 involvement. However, this shows that pro-Russian officers in the 🇧🇾 army are still in large numbers.
84 - As war go down-fall and Russian military power crumbles, Belarussian regime continues to increase its crack-down over the opposition figures. The cause of why Belarus is not yet entered the war is not opposition and intent of officers and military...
hrw.org/news/2022/12/2…
85 - ... but regime's own need of military for further crackdown. #Belarus, now, face two future scenarios, either with fall of the Lukashenko regime or a silent annexation by #Russia. Troops send to Belarus is not enough for war in 🇺🇦 but enough for totally locking-down Belarus. Image
86 - #Russia’s missile and artillery shell stockpile increasingly come under a stress due to over-use. 🇷🇺 decreased its attacks on #Ukraine’s critical infrastructure to once a week. Lack of munitions will increase the use of banned incendiary munitions and old prod-dated shells.
87 - #Russia’s latest use of incendiary ammunitions in recently liberated #Kherson and #Kharkiv shows this trend. Even it is a war crime to use them in urban areas, 🇷🇺 would step-up more use of them across Dnipro, Zaporizhia and Donetsk in coming weeks. Another issue to think.
88 - The issue in incendiary munitions is almost they are impossible to defend against. They could be mitigated by structural changes. These are like developing an effective fire extinguishing strategy, placing homes and other materials dispersed and by using fireproof materials. Image
89 - This success demonstrates the power of leadership on soldiers morale. #Ukraine achieved to slow the pace of #Russia’s advance in #Bakhmut and even achieved some gains in counter-attacks after President Zelenskyy’s visit.
90 - Soldiers fight, medics save lives. An outstanding heroism. Emergency personel in wars are secret heros who were hardly mentioned in mainstream media. Same goes for medics, police, firefighters and infrastruc. workers in #Ukraine. Big respects to them.
91 - It looks like #Ukraine achieved to move to woods and conducted an offensive operation around #Kreminna. Even the recent attempts failed, Ukraine took the upper-hand via encircling the town. It will take few campaigns of reconing to locate weak points.
92 - Two important developments in #Ukraine. The first one is #Russia has a significant decrease in available men power around #Bakhmut. While reports indicate that #Russia is preparing for a 'decisive' offensive in #Luhansk.
93 - It would be interesting for #Russia to go an offensive in Luhansk as if they fail it could risk all front and especially #Kreminna and #Svatove. Kind a strange decision to make after preparing that much defensive build-up. May be they trust in them.
94 - #Ukraine achieved to break the momentum of #Russia after mobilization in #Bakhmut and wider #Donetsk. But Kyiv’s offensives also experience some problems. It take almost 3-4 months to cut the P-66 road that supplies #Kreminna. While offensives around #Svatove is also waging.
95 - The war approached to a phase of frontline stability as both sides experienced heavy casualties while #Russia fortified some regions hard. #Ukraine, now, needs 8-10 #Makiivka style deep strikes or a fresh and a new weapon that will alter the firepower balance on the ground.
96 - So many criticisms made on extended period of mud required more time to liberate territory. #Ukraine relied on a maneuver warfare where it benefited from speed against excessive 🇷🇺 use of firepower. As mud slowed 🇺🇦 it also slowed 🇷🇺, arrival of winter will also benefit both
97 - Even in mud+winter #Ukraine needs maneuver to avert excessive 🇷🇺 firepower. Kyiv needs weapons that can alter battlefield balance to prevent men and resource loss and to continue this maneuver warfare. This is not a failure but an asset. This is same with what 🇺🇦 gvt wants. Image
98 - #Ukraine still can and will liberate more towns even with this speed as they have will, courage and well-organized command. This is why I am not talking about a failure. Speed and firepower will be a boost to save more lives and resources. This is why it is an asset. Image
99 - Another criticism on the value of fortifications, excessive use of landmines and pos. defence measures clearly caused a short delay in the liberation of #Kreminna. Not a big deal but #Ukraine could gain more speed if they could obtain more deep strike+anti-mine equipment. Image
100 - After Franca, US and Germany moves to provide Marder and Bradley IFVs to #Ukraine. There are reports that the ground will freeze from Monday which will end the mud season. These weapons will contribute much in giving Kyiv, its much desired mobility.
101 - A remembering from my older twits on why supplying more and advanced armoured vehicles to #Ukraine is such a big deal in its war with #Russia.
102 - And do not remember that US supply heavy artillery to support those MRAP teams vs tanks and other artillery. Anti-Armour mines are important as they could be laid by SOFs or Partisans. While MRAP groups have enough Javelins+ATGMs vs dispersed tanks.
103 - One of the main question that made my mind busy is why not Western states still did not want to provide tanks to #Ukraine? Claiming the tank as an offensive weapon that could lead to a escalation is not a sufficient answer. The strategic answer for this could be that... Image
104 - Tanks almost double IFVs and AFVs costs while harder to replace in the Western inventory with current inflation. #Ukraine is still in the process of manuever warfare where they try to level down Russian advantage in quantity. Many Western strategist thought that using... Image
105 - IFVs and AFVs combined with HIMARS and anti-tank guns could overrun Russian tanks mobility and efficiency. It was a success for now. Most NATO states (especially Eas. Europe) lack sufficient amount of tanks. So whole alliance depend upon American, British and German tanks. Image
106 - After the end of maneuver phase in this war, (when 🇺🇦 levels the quantity gap with #Russia) the West could provide main battle tanks to #Ukraine as they would be assured that 🇷🇺 tank inventory is not enough to attack NATO and losses could be matched with domestic production Image
107 - You can see it in this table, #Ukraine had much more tanks than the most NATO states before the war. US have 6333 tanks while #Russia have 12,950. It is almost double, now add #China and North Korea. Direct competitors of the US have almost 24.000 tanks compared to 6333. Image
108 - Russian forces targeted a Fire Department in #Kherson. It was a deliberate targeting of emergency services as they play huge part in war resilience. The immoral targeting is for increasing the impact of incendiary munition attacks against the city by #Russia.
109 - Many people were too mesmerized by Bradleys. There are huge amount of artillery shells and anti-armour mines. But the US also supply RIM-7 missiles for SHORAD and SAM purposes. Sea Sparrows are effective against sea-skimming naval missiles. Also there are 4000 Zunis. Image
110 - Possible loss of #Soledar by #Ukraine would be a set-back. It would increase the pressure on #Bakhmut, this is why the town is important and why civilians were evacuating from Bakhmut. But we should remember that this front has attritional effort.
END - Positional Defence is hard to sustain. There could be set-backs and #Ukraine has already planned a second position for a new line of defence. Even this, the goal is still same but this increase the urgency for counter-offensive to relieve Donbass.
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More from @ArveloaMert

Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Sep 17
It's worth reading this impressive initial report from the Financial Times. It is linked to Israel and is quite significant in terms of offensive cyber operations. Lets analyze, #Israel's large scale cyber operation against #Hezbollah in #Lebanon.
ft.com/content/dbaac6…
1) Firstly, the attack was designed to cause real damage using cyber/virtual tools vs a strategically important network (communication infrastructure). It was carried out in a very organized manner, but it is also stated that the attack was not heavily based on 'remote intrusion'
2) Another observation is based on the fact that the batteries of pagers are unlikely to cause this level of injury. Lithium-ion batteries are dangerous and flammable, but the condition of the injured suggests the possibility that the batteries were designed to be more explosive.
Read 15 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Oct 21, 2023
Lets start the twelfth and the newest thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that will cover fall offensives. #Avdiivka #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Robotyne #UkraineWar #Kherson #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Berdyansk #Verbove #Novoprokopivka #Tokmak Image
1) Here is the previous thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that includes issues like information warfare, Allied trainings for Ukraine, situation in #Avdiivka offensive and #Kherson counter offensive, Zaporizhzhia and modern day fortified wars and other issues.
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Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Aug 23, 2023
Lets start our tenth and the newest thread on the strategy of Russo-Ukrainian War which will cover operations during the late August and early fall. #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson Image
12) Few words on #Tokmak. We have to carefully asses the claims that state #Russia’s defences in the town is in the brink of imminent collapse. The town is one of the #Ukraine’s critical operational goals with Melitopol. Its South has key railroad link that makes the land bridge. Image
12) #Tokmak is heavily fortified town which increasingly become a target of #Ukraine’s long range strikes. But still the town is main position for #Russia to hold-on. Leaving Tokmak without a fight is highly irrational for 🇷🇺 as it would not only risk the theatre but entire war. Image
Read 92 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jul 15, 2023
Here is the ninth and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Zapoizhzhia #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) Mistrust increasingly become visible after the #Wagner's mutiny within the Russian Command. After General Surovikin (who is the most senior officer that disappeared), Major Generals Popov and Vladimir Selivestrov were dismissed from their duties.
Read 45 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jun 19, 2023
Here is the eight and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Zaporizhzhia #Ukraine #Bakhmut #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
13) The Attacker could use firepower to prevent this laying process. But just like the first aspect, defenders could increase their fire power which would decrease the operational pace. Russian decision to relocate troops from Kherson and further risking of air power shows this. Image
14) But different from what Malthus claimed, just like population all this laying and firepower increase process has a limit of production, resupply and logistics. In long run with long-range strikes #Ukraine could balance this rate if they can achieve to protect their equipment. Image
Read 97 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
May 28, 2023
Here is the seventh thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early summer. Russia took the control of #Bakhmut while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) British MoD underlined that, as planned, #Wagner is now withdrawing from the center of #Bakhmut. The defence of the town will be transferred to so-called DNR forces combined with VDV units. This shows that Wagner will not be in defensive efforts.
Read 62 tweets

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