#Russian officials are preparing for further covert mobilization efforts even as the fall #conscription cycle is underway, likely further flooding the already overburdened Russian force generation apparatus.
2/ Russian Telegram channels actively discussed indicators on November 18 that the #Kremlin is preparing for a second mobilization wave...
...and circulated an image of a draft summons received by a citizen of St. Petersburg who was reportedly told to appear for mobilization in January 2023 despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the formal end of partial mobilization on October 31.
3/ An independent Russian outlet published an investigation on November 18 showing that state structures and enterprises are continuing to prepare their employees for mobilization by sending them to various training programs and mobilization-related educational courses.
4/ Another Russian outlet noted that the Odintsovo garrison military court in Moscow Oblast inadvertently confirmed that mobilization is continuing despite its formal end.
The court reportedly accused a mobilized soldier of beating his commander on November 13 “during the performance of his duties of military service or in connection with the performance of these duties during the period of mobilization,”
...which indicates that the court is operating on the legal basis that mobilization is still underway.
Russian nationalist milbloggers additionally circulated claims that general mobilization will begin in December or January.
5/ The continuation of covert mobilization efforts and potential preparations for another mobilization wave in tandem with the current fall conscription cycle is likely adding substantial strain to an already over-burdened Russian force generation apparatus.
6/ As @TheStudyofWar previously assessed, #Putin likely ordered the end of partial mobilization in order to free up bureaucratic and administrative capacity for the November 1 conscription class.
7/ However, it is evident that Russian authorities never fully halted mobilization efforts, which means that a limited number of mobilized recruits are still being forced through the training system at the same time as conscripts are going through their own training cycle.
8/ This will likely lead to even lower quality training for both mobilized recruits and conscripts as they compete for insufficient training capacity.
9/ Another wave of mobilization in the coming months will only worsen the situation and likely degrade the overall quality of the Russian troops that will be funneled to the frontline in #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar111822
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that it doesn't recognize the illegal Russian seizure & operation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant or the illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory, a sharp escalation in IAEA rhetoric isw.pub/UkrWar111822
2/ On November 17, the IAEA’s Board of Governors called on Russia to “immediately abandon its baseless claims of ownership of the plant” and to withdraw “military and other personnel” from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) due to “grave concerns” over its integrity.
3/ The IAEA issued a statement on November 18 that Russian strikes on November 17 partially or completely cut power to Ukraine’s Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Power Plant and Rivne Nuclear Power Plant...
New from @criticalthreats: "The conflict is unresolvable as long as Putinism rules the Kremlin. Negotiations won’t change that reality. They can only create the conditions from which #Putin or a Putinist successor will contemplate renewing the attack on #Ukraine’s independence."
2/ "The West should help Ukraine liberate the areas that are strategically vital to its security and economic well-being and then build up the Ukrainian military and economy to a point that deters future Russian invasions."
3/ "The current lines are thus neither defensible nor acceptable. Ukraine must push on, and the West must help Kyiv create conditions on the ground that are sustainable over the long term."
2/ Prominent Russian milbloggers began circulating a multi-part documentary series on November 9 featuring several Ukrainian children from Donbas after being adopted into Russian families.
3/ The documentary series claims that Russian officials have evacuated over 150,000 children from Donbas in 2022 alone. It is unclear exactly how Russian sources are calculating this figure, and Ukrainian officials previously estimated this number to be 6,000 to 8,000.
A cessation or prolonged slowing of combat operations in #Ukraine over the next few months is very unlikely, and any attempt at a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities at this time would overwhelmingly favor #Russia.🧵
2/ The Russians are emphatically not attempting to establish and strengthen defensive positions all along the line but are rather renewing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.
The Ukrainians will almost certainly continue their counter-offensive operations already underway.
3/ Both sides are already fighting in very muddy conditions. They will not likely stop fighting when winter freezes the ground and makes it even more conducive to large-scale mechanized maneuver warfare. Combat is more likely to intensify than to slacken as temperatures drop.
#Ukraine will also likely recoup combat power from western #Kherson and redeploy it to other areas for both defensive and counter-offensive operations.🧵
2/ The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) could conceivably try to chase the Russians across the #Dnipro River at various points but is unlikely to do so because the logistics of supporting a Ukrainian lodgment on the eastern bank are very daunting.
3/ The UAF is therefore more likely to consolidate its control of the western bank, leave enough force to deter any Russian attempt to cross the river again, and reallocate forces to other areas.
Russian offensive operations in #Donetsk Oblast of #Ukraine will intensify in the coming weeks as additional mobilized servicemen arrive along with forces withdrawn from western #Kherson Oblast.🧵
2/ Ukrainian forces in the area will find themselves hard-pressed, and #Kyiv will very likely have to divert troops to defend against these renewed Russian offensives.
3/ The Russians are not likely to make operationally significant gains despite their renewed efforts, although they could conceivably take #Bakhmut over time at enormous cost.