Russian state nuclear power company #Rosatom stated that the former chief engineer of the #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (#ZNPP) has become the new director of the ZNPP. isw.pub/UkrWar113022
2/ Rosatom advisor Renat Karchaa announced on November 30 that Yuriy Chernichuk has become the new ZNPP director and the first deputy general director of the Joint Stock Company “Operating Organization of the ZNPP..."
...which is the entity that Rosatom formed on October 3 to essentially replace Ukrainian company Energoatom as the plant’s operator and to oversee the “safe operation” of the ZNPP and manage personnel activities within the plant.
3/ Karchaa also noted that the entire management company of the ZNPP is formed of existing members of ZNPP staff who have signed a new employment contract.
4/ Rosatom's direct role in ZNPP management is consistent with Russian efforts to install and maintain control of the ZNPP in a way that is likely intended to force the IAEA to de facto accept Russian claims over the plant by interacting with Russian-controlled ZNPP staff.
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Ukrainian and #Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces made localized breakthroughs southwest and northwest of #Kreminna on December 2. /1 isw.pub/UkrWar120222
A prominent #Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances in the forests south of #Kreminna and have reached the outskirts of #Chervonopopivka (about 10km northwest of Kreminna). /2 isw.pub/UkrWar120222
#Luhansk Oblast Administration head Serhiy Haidai vaguely noted that Ukrainian forces are “very close” to #Kreminna and stated that Ukrainian forces “visited” the Kreminska power substation in the vicinity of the settlement. /3 isw.pub/UkrWar120222
NEW: #Russia is attempting to capitalize on the Western desire for negotiations to create a dynamic in which Western officials feel pressed to make preemptive concessions to lure Russia to the negotiating table.
2/ #Putin held an hour-long telephone conversation with German Chancellor Olaf #Scholz on December 2 in which he falsely stated that Western financial and military aid to Ukraine creates a situation in which the Ukrainian government outright rejects talks between Moscow and Kyiv.
3/ #Putin called upon #Scholz to reconsider Germany’s approach regarding developments in #Ukraine to which Scholz stated that any diplomatic solution to the conflict in Ukraine must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory.
The Minister of Defense of #Belarus made comments likely in support of ongoing information operations, and some Russian sources reframed those comments so as to place further pressure on Belarusian officials to support #Russia’s war in #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar113022
2/ Belarusian Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on November 30 that the actions of bordering NATO members suggest that preparations are underway to conduct military operations in the eastern direction (i.e., against #Belarus).
3/ While Khrenin’s comments incorporate several possible types of military operations, Russian media and a milblogger reported his comments as saying explicitly that NATO is preparing for offensive operations in the eastern direction (which is a nonsensical accusation).
The #Kremlin continues efforts to stifle domestic dissent through legislation that broadens the definition of “foreign agents” and those amenable to foreign influence. isw.pub/UkrWar113022
2/ Russian media began reporting on November 23 that the Russian government approved new restrictions on the ability of those deemed “foreign agents” to post materials created by foreign-influenced sources and conduct public activities, which will enter into effect on December 1.
3/ The Russian Ministry of Justice expanded the list of “individual-foreign agents” on November 27 on the basis of those individuals conducting unspecified political activities.
NEW: #Russian efforts around #Bakhmut indicate that Russian forces have fundamentally failed to learn from previous high-casualty campaigns concentrated on objectives of limited operational or strategic significance.
2/ Russian forces have continually expended combat strength on small settlements around Bakhmut since the end of May; in the following six months, they have only secured gains on the order of a few kilometers at a time.
3/ As @TheStudyofWar has previously observed, Russian efforts to advance on Bakhmut have resulted in the continued attrition of Russian manpower and equipment, pinning troops on relatively insignificant settlements for weeks and months at a time.
A 🧵on ISW Afghanistan Researcher Peter Mills' just-released report on armed opposition to Afghan Taliban rule since the disintegration of the Afghan Republic more than 15 months ago. 1/6
Anti-Taliban groups fall into two main categories: Islamic State–aligned groups and non–Salafi-jihadi resistance groups.
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the primary Islamic State affiliate in South Asia. By 2019, US and Taliban offensives largely destroyed ISKP’s …
… ability to control territory in Afghanistan. Thus, ISKP’s attacks primarily aim to undermine the Taliban efforts to build a government and consolidate control over Afghanistan by targeting Taliban fighters, officials, and religious leaders. ISKP does not yet appear strong ...