"Disruptions associated with partial #mobilization and Russian setbacks on the battlefield likely contributed to increasing war weariness among #Russian public, as reflected in the polling."
The most recent poll referenced was conducted by the Federal Protective Service (FSO), a #Kremlin apparatus. Its results show a relatively-unchanged number of respondents are "in favor of peace talks" as compared to a similar poll conduced in October.
The mobilization protests, and subsequent polls, are informed by shifting underlying sentiments of the Russian public, even though a majority of them reportedly supported the war at its beginning.
That support required distance between ordinary Russians and the war, with government as the buffer.
Denis Volkov:
"Now, risks are greater, and people want to start talks. Still, a majority of people leave this to government: 'We’d like it, but it’s up to them to decide.'"
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What is particularly challenging is to accurately identify how or when "weariness" will transform into direct-action against the government, implying the buffer no longer exists, and the effects of war are having a raw and impactful effect on an already weary population.
What we can observe is parts of the Russian populace are beginning to see an undoing of the buffer between themselves and war, and early signs of the war's latent effects on their lives and communities.
In most cases it will simply take time for the deepest cracks to appear:
Perhaps ironically, polls and social media—and the public's reaction to them—only drive the #Kremlin to further clamp down on information distribution.
This was presumed likely, but depended on battlefield dynamics—now more clearly detrimental to long-term Russian interests.
On Thursday 01/12 the #GSUA stated in its daily report that individual Russian units & officials were repositioning, or evacuating, from the #Zaporizhzhia AO.
The statement conveys that Russian units & occupation admin. officials are leaving positions in public & private structures & spaces. It is specific to the point of naming the buildings that units are using.
There is no *official Russian response to claim (1) on Dec 1.
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Ukraine has deftly controlled their information space (in a way that will be studied for years), and through the backing of Western partners/supporters.
This includes not only promulgation of narratives, but also intelligence operations.
Russia does have tight control of the narrative internally, but the open-source nature of the war, and the sheer volume of Ukraine supporters processing available data, makes it a near-impossible task to contain info spread, or embed disinformation.
An expansive and comprehensive essay by @LawDavF illustrating the difficultly of the entrenchment of Russian leadership, and their inability to see the reality of the war's progression.
This brings me back to a discussion from @keithgessen featuring Hein Goemans on the elements that make up war termination theory, and how the war in Ukraine is a case where the forces at play make envisioning an end so difficult.
"As for domestic politics, Putin was exactly the sort of leader that Goemans had warned about. Despite his significant repressive apparatus, he did not have total control of the country.
"If he started losing, Goemans predicted, he would simply escalate."
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"Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin himself observed in October that #Wagner forces operating in the #Bakhmut area advance only 100–200 meters a day."
Bakhmut is a working case study on the rigid organizational frameworks that define Wagner, and its associated antagonists, enabling what can only be described as a phenomenally insane operational effort.
(a long thread on Wagner as an organization is in the works)
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Bakhmut has been the focus of relentless & mostly futile assaults by Russian forces (esp. Wagner) for months on end.
The sheer extent of unrelenting violence exhibited on a (relatively small) battlefield is telling of both armies' present momentum and objectives.
Some weeks back Dave asked a good question, and I've given some time to think on it. What I've arrived at is exploring how info is used, how I use it, and why context matters.
Spoiler: I'm not publishing a list. *You* need to define that.
First, it's important to ask the question "Why are we here?"
I suppose the answer comes in many forms: political leanings and motivations, military & conflict analysis, offering moral support, news updates, and an intrigue in events beyond one's borders.
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For any answer, what does that tell us about what information we seek, what it means, and where it comes from?
It would be foolish to assume everyone is out for the #facts. This flies in the face of personal & collective biases, and dampens the emotions that come with them.
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Either this is: very confusingly worded; is misstating the equipment used; or is based on information that few—if any—have in the open-source community.
One odd detail is the reported 10km distance SPG/s were transported.
The geography of the Danube Biosphere Reserve warrants waterborne transport (deltaic marshland), but the distance of a geolocated firing position from a presumed launch-point at #Vylkoev exceeds 10km.
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In theory, there can be a period between February and March when prevailing surface temperatures enable over-freezing of the marshlands, enabling cross-country transport.
But salinity in brackish marshlands, human-landscape influence, and few sand bars challenge this theory.
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