It takes a deep dive into Al-Shabaab's checkpoint 'taxation' system, drawing on over 800 'tax' receipts issued by al-Shabaab tax officials from July 2015 – Oct 2021. (thread) #Somalia
Such a large body of data allowed unique insights into Al-Shabaab's taxation practices. We were able to analyze tax rates over time and across different transportation routes.
Some highlights from the findings:
1) Al-Shabaab categorizes its checkpoint tax system into four streams:
🚚 Transit
📦 Goods
🌾 Agricultural produce
🐐 Livestock
2) Al-Shabaab is "commodity agnostic," meaning that it is the size of the vehicle that determines taxation rates, not the goods it is transporting.
3) Al-Shabaab’s taxation system is consistent, predictable and is only applied once over the course of a single journey. For those reasons, drivers often prefer transiting via al-Shabaab routes instead of facing repeated extortion along gov't-controlled ones.
4) Al-Shabaab employs three distinct ‘tax brackets’: the highest rates are charged on goods destined for #Kenya or to #Mogadishu for export by sea; the second rate to trade between gov't areas, and the lowest to goods coming in and out of AS-administered areas.
Al-Shabaab’s continued resilience can largely be attributed to the sophisticated taxation apparatus it has established throughout southern Somalia.
The group is believed to run a large budget surplus, allowing to maintain its insurgency indefinitely.
Checkpoint taxation by both AS and gov't forces are a burden for local communities. This burden is especially punishing at a time of drought and famine in #Somalia, compounded by rising food and fuel prices.
Opening 'trade talks' with Al-Shabaab, aimed at a mutual reduction in checkpoint taxation, might be a possibility given AS' professed humanitarian values.
The paper concludes with several other recommendations aimed at disrupting al-Shabaab’s revenue-collecting apparatus.
A recent development in the saga of the Marwan 1, an IUU fishing vessel that once was part of the "Somali 7" slave-fishing operation detailed by @ian_urbina.
A few days ago, it was caught smuggling weapons and ammunition. (thread)
On 1 Dec 22, the Marwan 1 was interdicted by the USS Lewis B. Puller in the Gulf of #Oman. Onboard were >1 million rounds of 7.62mm ammo; 25,000 rounds of 12.7mm ammo; nearly 7,000 proximity fuses for rockets; and over 2,100 kg of RPG propellant.
The Marwan 1 had been docked in Bandar Abbas, #Iran (27°08'49.3"N // 56°12'11.8"E) on 25 Nov 22 (sat imagery analysis courtesy of @IJM). Bandar Abbas has emerged as the preeminent loading point for weapons consignments destined for the #Houthis.
The research showed that assault rifles were priced approx. $90 higher in southern Somalia than in the north.
The pricing data constitutes tentative corroborating evidence of a north-south illicit supply chain, with weapons becoming more expensive the further south they travel.
Over 60% of documented weapons were of apparent #Chinese manufacture, with an additional ~20% manufactured in #Russia (Soviet Union).
My latest research on illegal fishing in #Somalia has just been published in @GI_TOC's Risk Bulletin #22.
It details the activities of the Liao Dong Yu vessels, a fleet of Chinese trawlers that have been pillaging northern Somali waters since at least early 2020.
(thread)
The Liao Dong Yu vessels are operated by Liaoning Daping Fishery Group, based in Dandong, #China.
Many abuse allegations surround the vessels, incl forced labour practices, deadly working conditions and ~20 violations of Somali and Chinese fisheries laws and regs.
At least three Indonesian crew members have died onboard the vessels since mid-2020.
@GI_TOC field researchers documented over 400 weapons in illicit markets across #Somalia. Almost 10% of these consisted of Type 56-1 rifles believed to have originated in arms transfers from Iran to the Houthis.
The Type 56-1 rifle is a Chinese-manufactured copy of the Soviet AKMS assault rifle, first produced in 1956.
Since August 2018, thousands of Type 56-1 rifles have been seized during maritime interdictions of arms-trafficking dhows believed to have been supplying the Houthis.
The report presents three case studies to illustrate the intersection between illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing networks and state corruption:
#1 - The environmentally destructive operations of gillnetters of Iranian origin off the #Puntland coast, abetted by a network of local agents and fisheries ministry officials.
In December 2020, less than a month and a half before a highly volatile electoral process was supposed to take place in #Somalia, Turkey delivered 1,000 G3 rifles and 90,000 rounds of ammunition to the Somali federal government.
The materiel was intended for use by the Turkish-trained Haramcad ("Cheetah") special police unit.
Haramcad has since been linked to crackdowns on demonstrators and attacks on opposition politicians.
Yesterday, the unit raided the Mogadishu HQ of independent media outlet @MediaMustaqbal, confiscating equipment and beating up a journalist.