1. #Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov contradicted the pre-war Kremlin justifications for the war by asserting that the Russian “special military operation” began as “a conflict between #Russia and Ukraine.” isw.pub/UkrWar051123
2. Two #Kremlin sources told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Kremlin saw #Prigozhin’s attempts to blackmail the Russian MoD on May 5 as a “serious threat” and that Prigozhin is not acting in the Kremlin’s interests.
3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied official Ukrainian and US reports that a Patriot missile defense system shot down a #Kinzhal missile on the night of May 4.
4. Russian occupation authorities seized the cathedral of the Orthodox Church of #Ukraine in #Simferopol as oppression of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church continues in Russian-occupied #Crimea. isw.pub/UkrWar051123
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🧵RU milbloggers & other voices in the pro-war info space are responding to recent UKR counterattacks with varying degrees of caution & anxiety. The overall #Russian info space response appears to be focused on the idea of avoiding spreading panic. (1/10) isw.pub/UkrWar051223
2/ Many milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian activity around #Bakhmut marks the official beginning of the anticipated spring counteroffensive and speculated about where #Ukraine’s main effort will take place.
3/ Several prominent Russian voices, however, urged caution and restraint in responding to the counteroffensive, suggesting that some milbloggers are trying to apply lessons from the information space meltdown during #Ukraine’s successful Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives.
ISW has reindexed its map layer for reported UKR counteroffensives as of May 12, 2023.
We removed reported UKR counteroffensive coded before May 1, 2023, in order to delineate more clearly new UKR territorial gains from gains secured in previous UKR counteroffensives. (1/4)
2/ ISW retained a few reported Ukrainian counteroffensives polygons from before May 1, 2023, specifically on the Dnipro River Delta south of Kherson Oblast, to preserve context in that complex area of operations.
3/ May 1, 2023, is an arbitrary date and does not mark the beginning or end of any assessed Ukrainian or Russian effort.
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct successful but localized counterattacks around #Bakhmut on May 11, likely constraining Russian offensive efforts in the city. isw.pub/UkrWar051123
2/ Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from a section of the T0504 #Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar highway in southwestern Bakhmut.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of #Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) after Russian forces retreated from positions north of Khromove.
The deployment of low-quality #Russian forces on the flanks around #Bakhmut suggests that the Russian Ministry of Defense has largely abandoned the aim of encircling a significant number of #Ukrainian forces there. 🧵(1/8) isw.pub/UkrWar051123
2/ The Russian MoD likely began a broader deprioritization of the #Bakhmut effort by January 2023 when the MoD cut off #WagnerGroup penal recruitment efforts...
3/ ... which likely prompted #Prigozhin to ramp up the Soledar-Bakhmut effort in January and publicly complain about the lack of MoD support for his efforts starting in February 2023.
NEW: Ukrainian forces likely broke through some Russian lines in localized counterattacks near #Bakhmut, prompting responses from #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
2/ Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces retreated up to two kilometers behind Russian lines in unspecified sectors of the #Bakhmut front.
3/ Syrskyi’s confirmation of Ukrainian gains prompted a response from #Prigozhin, who claimed that Ukrainian forces have started the counteroffensive and recaptured three kilometers of ground in and around #Bakhmut.
Pervasive issues with #Russian combat capability, exacerbated by continued attritional assaults in the #Bakhmut area, are likely considerably constraining the ability of Russian forces in this area to defend against localized #Ukrainian counterattacks. 1/
The Russian military command’s apparent commitment of elements of the 72nd Brigade—a formation that has suffered 2 successive defeats—to the #Bakhmut axis alongside already attrited Wagner forces likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit w/ limited counterattacks. 2/
The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade itself is emblematic of many of the endemic force generation issues constantly faced by the #Russian military. 3/