Increasingly regular Russian drone & missile strikes are likely part of a new Russian air campaign in #Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive offensive operations in the near term. 🧵on the current air campaign ⬇️ isw.pub/UkrWar051423
2/ Russian forces have conducted at least 10 series of strikes throughout #Ukraine, particularly in rear areas, since April 19.
3/ Russian forces have used significantly fewer high-precision missiles in these latest series of strikes in comparison to their failed campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure from the fall of 2022 through the winter of 2023.
4/ ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely expended a significant proportion of their precision missiles in the previous air campaign, and the current Russian air campaign may be using far fewer of these missiles in an effort to conserve the limited remaining stocks.
5/ Russian forces have instead relied heavily on launching large numbers of Iranian-made #Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, but Ukrainian forces have been more effective in shooting down Russian precision systems than during the previous Russian air campaign.
6/ The new Russian air campaign appears to be focused on Kyiv and alleged Ukrainian military-industrial and logistics facilities in deep rear areas.
7/ The more limited air campaign has so far been more regular than the previous broader Russian campaign against critical infrastructure.
8/ ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may be attempting to conduct an almost daily series of strikes to portray themselves as successfully constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. isw.pub/UkrWar051423
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#Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-#Svatove line on May 14. Russian and #Ukrainian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks near #Kreminna. isw.pub/UkrWar051423
2/ A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that "sluggish" fighting continues b/w Novoselivske & Kuzemivka (13km NW of #Svatove), & that elements of the RU 1st Guards Tank Army have established first lines of defense along the eastern side of the rail line near Novoselivske.
3/ The milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Novoselivske on an unspecified date because the settlement is destroyed and not worth defending, and emphasized that Russian forces still control Kuzemivka. isw.pub/UkrWar051423
Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around #Bakhmut on May 14. Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around the city as of May 14. isw.pub/UkrWar051423
2/ Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces captured over 10 Russian positions on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut over the course of the day on May 14.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked towards Berkhivka, Klishchiivka, and Kurdiumivka and took up new unspecified positions near the settlements and additionally advanced towards Yahidne from the direction of Bohdanivka.
🧵RU milbloggers & other voices in the pro-war info space are responding to recent UKR counterattacks with varying degrees of caution & anxiety. The overall #Russian info space response appears to be focused on the idea of avoiding spreading panic. (1/10) isw.pub/UkrWar051223
2/ Many milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian activity around #Bakhmut marks the official beginning of the anticipated spring counteroffensive and speculated about where #Ukraine’s main effort will take place.
3/ Several prominent Russian voices, however, urged caution and restraint in responding to the counteroffensive, suggesting that some milbloggers are trying to apply lessons from the information space meltdown during #Ukraine’s successful Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives.
ISW has reindexed its map layer for reported UKR counteroffensives as of May 12, 2023.
We removed reported UKR counteroffensive coded before May 1, 2023, in order to delineate more clearly new UKR territorial gains from gains secured in previous UKR counteroffensives. (1/4)
2/ ISW retained a few reported Ukrainian counteroffensives polygons from before May 1, 2023, specifically on the Dnipro River Delta south of Kherson Oblast, to preserve context in that complex area of operations.
3/ May 1, 2023, is an arbitrary date and does not mark the beginning or end of any assessed Ukrainian or Russian effort.
1. #Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov contradicted the pre-war Kremlin justifications for the war by asserting that the Russian “special military operation” began as “a conflict between #Russia and Ukraine.” isw.pub/UkrWar051123
2. Two #Kremlin sources told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Kremlin saw #Prigozhin’s attempts to blackmail the Russian MoD on May 5 as a “serious threat” and that Prigozhin is not acting in the Kremlin’s interests.
3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied official Ukrainian and US reports that a Patriot missile defense system shot down a #Kinzhal missile on the night of May 4.
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct successful but localized counterattacks around #Bakhmut on May 11, likely constraining Russian offensive efforts in the city. isw.pub/UkrWar051123
2/ Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from a section of the T0504 #Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar highway in southwestern Bakhmut.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of #Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) after Russian forces retreated from positions north of Khromove.