Some members of the SFRC are going to try to figure out what USG strategy in Yemen is, exactly. You can watch here: foreign.senate.gov/hearings/us-po…
As Corker and Menendez lay out origins of conflict, they (as many) forget to mention small but deleterious US role: stressing security assistance over economic support, kinetic counter-terrorism over political inclusivity, facilitating rent-seeking behavior by Saleh gov't.
I'm sure that Secretary Satterfield will provide hard evidence of how US support has reduced coalition civilian targeting in Yemen. General Votel didn't have any figures to provide to SASC last month, only a "trust us" argument.
The "4 USAID-funded cranes" have become a weird totem of US humanitarian engagement. Now that they're in place, clear they can't fully restore capacity of initial cranes bombed by US-supported intervention, & as long as access to Hudaydah is curtailed, their effect is limited
Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Saudi Arabia are contemptible and degrade the peace process. But Mr. Karem seems to imply that our "limited, non-combat support" is designed to deter this threat, when it began well before cross-border long-range ballistic missile attacks.
Cardin with the million dollar question: you don't track missions the USG supports, so where's your evidence that we're helping to reduce non-combatant casualties?
USG evidence: our military officers are "seeing" how KSA officers are "approaching the process." That is...an extraordinarily weak answer. And no response to UNSC Panel of Experts' assessment that coalition measures are "inadequate and ineffective" to reduce civilian casualties
Thankfully, Secretary Satterfield makes a clear statement that the USG does not see an attack on Hudaydah as a means of advancing negotiations. This has been "communicated" to the coalition.
And Satterfield also helpfully outlines Houthis' rent-seeking behavior. The longer the war goes on, the more that militias, including the Houthis, get rich from conflict.
Great to hear that aid pledges have materialized in UN bank accounts. Important to remember that all the billions in the world won't make a difference without full access to all ports and unobstructed passage within the country.
Sen. Young ups the ante: an attack on Hudaydah is against US policy, but is US support conditional on a non-attack? Sec. Satterfield deflects, calling it a hypothetical.
While this line of questioning is welcome, still elides the fact that the port was attacked multiple times, and that the coalition continues to bomb Hudaydah city.
Sec. Satterfield talked around this, so more plainly: there's an internationally agreed upon process to inspect cargo entering major ports under Houthi control, and the coalition obstructs these processes via duplicative inspections and secondary delays on cleared vessels
To review: Sec. Satterfield states that USG supports negotiations. USG has told coalition that military engagement unlikely to get Houthis to negotiate or shift battle lines significantly. Yet USG supports this engagement with weaponry, fuel, intelligence sharing.
The obvious contradictions of this "strategy" are a big reason why certain members of Congress have gotten traction w/ such dramatic, even unprecedented, measures, like last month's WPR legislation -- USG involvement is nonsensical.
Ah, yes, the DoD has classified info it can give the SFRC in a closed session that proves that support has reduced civilian casualties. This is the same DoD that apparently can't even track coalition missions CENTCOM is refueling from the missions in the Horn of Africa writ large
Why wasn't this classified info given to the SFRC during the joint res of disapproval over PGM sales last June? Or last month while WPR legislation was under consideration?
Also, still waiting for someone to ask Karem why DoD did not inform SASC senators about the cross-servicing agreement that governs US assistance to the coalition.
That hearing wasn't particularly enlightening, but now we at least have a rhetorical commitment from the State Department that the USG is actively discouraging an attack on Hudaydah. Also, State disagrees that coalition military activity helps push Houthis towards negotiations
As outlined above, the USG's public-facing "strategy" remains contradictory, which can be explained two ways. One, SFRC is being misled, USG supports military offensive as attempt to pressure Houthis to negotiate. This would be horrific policy but at least somewhat coherent
Or the US is simply not engaged at the strategic level, has given coalition more or less a blank check to pursue its objectives in Yemen with some occasional scolding, and is fine with status quo (or at least not so bothered that it will intervene more forcefully to end conflict)
Either way, senators who voted in favor of last month's WPR should feel vindicated, and those that did not should consider other ways they can affect the admin's strategic considerations, including by voting to block future arms sales to the coalition.
Meanwhile, the US continues to intimately support a war effort that exacerbates a humanitarian crisis, kills thousands of civilians, and entrenches the Houthi militias it is attempting to defeat.
