Looking at the networks that support #Hemedti in #Sudan, an interesting carousel emerges with the #UAE in the middle

Network-centric statecraft at its best, involving #Libya, #Wagner and the War in #Yemen 2) starting with the #UAE's direct networks to #Sudan & the #RSF, Abu Dhabi has set up a well-oiled network of companies and financial institutions to support #Hemedti to bring gold to market and manage personal finances
globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/c…

Abu Dhabi has significant leverage over Hemedti

"With the sending of mercenaries to Yemen and the financial manna of gold smuggling for the #UAE, #Hemetti also became one of the richest and most powerful men in the country." #Sudan
rfi.fr/fr/afrique/202… The #UAE have used their role as a regional hub to build broad networks in #Sudan making it an indispensable facilitator for the #RSF
globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/c…

"The #UAE was the most likely foreign funder of the mercenary operation of #ErikPrince...The report points out that the mercenaries had offices, bank accounts and shell companies in the Emirates."
nytimes.com/2021/02/19/wor… "#MBZ has longstanding ties to Prince and is probably #Haftar's most important foreign backer...Last year, the #UAE poured tons of weapons into Libya in blatant disregard for the arms embargo..." - Abu Dhabi has still not responded to the #UN Report

There are a lot inaccuracies in here: the reason for contract soldiering in the #Gulf #GCC is NOT building a force that is more dispensable, or willing to take up arms against citizens - the primary reason is lack of indigenous capacity
carnegie-mec.org/2020/02/05/for… Staffing a military with just 300,000 nationals in #Qatar or 1,300,000 in the #UAE is impossible - plus the parallel militaries (Emiri Guard, Presidential Guard, National Guard) there to protect the state are always staffed with nationals NOT foreigners