Soft & hard info mainly on energy geopolitics & geoeconomics/Russia Ukraine/Turkey/eye on some strategic issues. Purveyor of food for thought. Me in the header
Jul 15, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
➡️ Folowing the ECJ's decision, it'll be difficult for Nord Stream & #NordStream2 to be ran at full capacity, simultaneously.
The combined capacity of OPAL, EUGAL & NEL is not sufficient to allow NS1 & NS2 to operate at full capacity #ONGT
That would hamper larger diversion +
from Ukraine and Yamal routes as up to 28 bcm might not be shipped via NS1 and NS2.
It's a decision that could potentially impact the pattern of Gazprom's supplies to Europe : not only regarding the utilization/choice of routes, but also the delivery points , which could be +
Jul 13, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
📌 In the midst of Germany-US negotiations on NS2 , and ahead of : i) Merkel's meeting with Biden ; ii)announcement of imminent completion of pipeline (late August)
➡️How could #NordStream2 be leveraged in the context of low gas inventories ? #ONGT google.com/amp/s/amp.dw.c… +
A view from Deutsche Welle
"Either grant an operating license for Nord Stream 2 (...) or face major gas supply problems during the winters".
And a view from Russia's state news agency Novosti, quoted by DW ⬇️
"Russia withholds its supplies (...) to accustom Western partners +
Aug 24, 2020 • 16 tweets • 6 min read
Now, that the fever of #Turkey's gas finding has cooled off (or not?), time for a (long) THREAD on challenges and implications #OOTT#ONGT
➡️ The gas is in ULTRA-deep waters: mark this term, it bears important outcomes
Tuna-1 well is located in 2115 meters water depth 1/
and the gas reserves were hit 1400 meters further, at nearly 3500 m water depth.
Total depth of drillings is expected to reach 4525 m where two more layers of gas are likely to be found (accord' to Fatih Donmez)
*Currently 500 m is considered the threshold for "deep waters" 2/
Jul 21, 2020 • 14 tweets • 5 min read
As #NDAA on the House and Senate floors this week (!), the opportunity for a THREAD on #NordStream2 and #Turkstream has arisen
1️⃣ Modification of Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA to allow sanctioning of NS2 and second line of Turkstream (#Balkanstream) aims 1/
>>to give entities involved in the two projects leeway to wind down their participation before theCongress sanctions (NDAA) would hit on
>>as paradoxically as it may seem, to reduce some of the impact and scope of Congress sanctions 👉potentially, to avoid retroactive 2/
Sep 11, 2019 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Theoretically, any third party
In practice, it remains to be seen how many third parties will have available gas at Greifswald entry-point to pump into #OPAL pipeline. Pertinent to mention that OPAL's underutilised capacity was the core argument that Gazprom put forward when 1/
it fought to be allowed to use more than 50% of OPAL capacity > because there's a track of consistent underutilization of the pipeline, aka of the other 50% capacity that had not been previously exempted.
If the ECJ ruling would stay as such, and if BNetzA wouldn't intervene 2/
Sep 4, 2019 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
This agreement between #China & Iran is one of most important #geopolitical developments of the year & its outcomes will reverberate beyond the geopolitics of energy field
▪️ $280bn to be invested by China in #Iran's oil, gas & petrochemicals sectors 1/
petroleum-economist.com/articles/polit…
- China will get minimum guaranteed discount of 12% to any oil, gas & petchems products that it'll buy; plus another 6 to 8%
-China to speed up development of #Phase 11 of South Pars gas field -from which Total had withdrawn, in response to US sanctions
-Also, production from 2/
