@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist Perhaps. There is surely a change in tactics. But it is more likely due to a recognition that fractures are developing in the movement. These fractures could originally be seen in the telegram channels created for Operation Dawn and older more radical channels THREAD 1/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist For University Channels see groups like 中大學生會消息發佈 created on Nov. 4th ,理大綜合資訊頻道 Nov. 13th, Polyu哨站Channel Nov. 15th, 暴大保安组 was created for CUHK on Sept. 2nd but its peak activity began on Nov. 10th. 2/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist For radical channels see 糖水Channel and 抗爭前綫戰況直擊, 抗爭行動交通頻道 was also good to follow to understand how police movements and situations at road blocks influenced the debates surrounding strategy. There are many more, but these I have studied closely so far 3/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist The following is a bit of context that is important for understanding the fractures in the movement, Using the information available, I see CUHK as the turning point and others have noted many of these same issues that developed on campus m.facebook.com/story.php?stor… 4/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist 1. On Nov. 12th after the police retreated from 二号桥 non-CUHK protestors began stealing vehicles around campus causing multiple accidents. The CUHK student union channel began issuing warnings that only people with valid drivers licenses should be driving the vehicles. 5/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist The vehicle accidents continued the evening of Nov. 13th receiving another rebuke within the CUHK student union channel. I also saw the damaged buses and vehicles spread throughout campus on Nov. 14th. One bus was just left sideways in the road 6/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist 2. In the early hours of Nov. 13th抗爭前綫戰況直擊 shared a message recommending certain chemicals that could be used for weapons. Not long after, laboratories on campus were broken into, which I was told made many CUHK students very uncomfortable. 7/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist On Nov. 14th, just inside the Main Entrance I saw the road littered with glass bottles, chemicals and flammable substances. It was not possible to learn how many CUHK and non-CUHK students were involved with this, both were present, but ID checks at the gate had already begun 8/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist 3. On Nov. 13th, Frontliners from beyond CUHK who were guarding entrances and roadblocks around campus began using the 抗爭前綫戰況直擊 channel to actively request that they be replaced by CUHK students. Some argued it was more important to go to PolyU. 9/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist I was told this was also due to disagreements over strategy at CUHK. I experienced one disagreement first hand in the late afternoon of Nov. 14th when hardcore Frontliners began preventing anyone from entering or exiting the area along Taipo Road heading towards 火炭…10/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist but they were overruled by CUHK students resulting in a 30-minute screaming match that was anything but rational. The use of鬼佬 to describe foreign students trying to leave was the 1st time I had heard the term at CUHK, leading me to think these were not our students 11/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist 4. These fractures played out more prominently at CUHK later in the evening of Nov 14th, when 500 Frontliners held a public forum to discuss strategy. After three hours of debate, consensus was not achieved on a firm strategy going forward. 12/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist But then at 3 a.m. a group of three protestors claiming to represent 100 Frontliners protecting the 二号桥 held a press conference stating that they would open the Tolo Highway at 5 a.m.
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@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist Not long after, the CUHK student union issued a statement claiming they had no previous knowledge that the press conference would be held. All of this was widely discussed in the media on Nov. 15th. 14/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist But what was not discussed, was the fact that non-CUHK Frontliners issued a vicious response against CUHK in the 抗爭前綫戰況直擊 Channel. The result was a mass exodus of radical Frontliners towards PolyU in the early morning of the 15th. 15/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist I do not want to dig too much into the PolyU material because I was only there on Nov. 11th and then not again until Nov. 25th, and others have already pointed out that what happened at these two campuses tested the limits of support for violence theconversation.com/hong-kong-viol… 16/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist There is one thing to note. As radical Frontliners and PolyU students abandoned their defensive positions, on Nov 21st 抗爭前綫戰況直擊issued a long statement defending themselves that they had not posted the escape routes out of PolyU which may have led to arrests. 17/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist The Channel has been silent since Nov. 21st. In other words, the Frontliners themselves began to recognize that the cops are following the Telegram Channels closely. That also means the cops are well aware of the fractures within the groups. 18/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist In that sense, perhaps it is not necessary for the cops to take aggressive action against protests. Like @Comparativist I too am skeptical that the cops achieved some magical threshold of arresting a few thousand Frontliners, which has resulted in less violent protests. 19/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist Rather the cops probably realize they have achieved a level of paranoia and distrust within the Frontliners making it no longer necessary to use aggressive tactics because the movement is far less organized and far less united than it was in November. 20/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist This is likely a result of protestor violence. We can also see this more empirically within a recent PORI survey, where 39.1% of people felt the protestors also bear a large brunt of responsibility for the violence in the city.
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@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist Of course, those numbers are 2x as high for the police and the government, but ultimately we can't assume that all citizens are in alignment with radical Frontliners. Rather, the problem is不割席 has made it socially untenable to communicate dissatisfaction with violence. 22/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist One last point I think is important to mention, because it became central to many of the final conversations I had just before I left Hong Kong on Dec. 7th. There is now an overwhelming fear that anyone who is arrested (not convicted, but just arrested) will lose their job. 23/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist These stories have spread far enough that citizens, who may have been willing to break some bricks in November, are worried that it could lead to an arrest and loss of a job today. @HongKongHermit was quite insightful about this point recently: 24/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit I am not certain how this police strategy will work in the long run, but it does seem to have had an impact on whether protestors are willing to participate in activities that are more likely to lead to their arrest, thus why Monday’s 三罷 action was non-existent. 25/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit However, we should be careful here. With factions developing while the 不割席 discourse is still effectively in place, this means radical groups are not often in dialogue with their less radical compatriots who might convince them that unprovoked violence is not the answer…26/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit …but at the same time far too few are publicly condemning unprovoked violence (such as this recent clip) meaning the radical groups will still feel justified in engaging in such violence. 27/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit The level of emotion and lack of concern for facts on all sides is the most concerning problem here and it is directly related to the factionalism that exists within the movement despite the fact that it is buried deep and unacknowledged because of the 不割席 discourse. 28/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit I have been reluctant to speak much about these issues and my own experiences publicly because I am not sure what good it will do since it is difficult for people to talk about factionalism within the movement without getting emotional or falling back on不割席 29/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit However, in terms of police strategy, I think we need to take into account that: 1) The police are obviously aware that the movement is not as united as it once was and they are taking advantage of that by reducing their own levels of violence. 30/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit If that was an intentional strategy, then it is quite possibly an important step to gaining trust and frankly maybe it wouldn’t be a bad idea for people to support this, which I think is @hcsteinhardt point in a way, yes? 31/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit 2) The police are obviously following Telegram (and I am sure LIHKG, but I can’t follow that anymore myself, the uber-masculine and bigoted language there occasionally makes me nauseous) more closely than we previously gave them credit. 32/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit It is still an important digital tool for organizing peaceful marches, but we probably need to reassess whether such tools are allowing the movement to remain heterarchical. I was skeptical and my experiences at CUHK confirmed there are leaders on the ground barking orders. 33/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit This means Telegram only gives the appearance that decisions are made through consensus while simultaneously discouraging people to ask “who’s idea was this in the first place” and “who decided this idea should be voted on within a channel or group”. 34/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit The Police are likely aware that Telegram only provides a superficial sense of heterarchy and they will use whatever digital means they can to exploit the deepening fractures within the movement. 35/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit 3) Despite little data to prove this, I think we must accept the possibility the movement has been infiltrated by the police. The media has caught disguised officers making arrests and there is good reason to assume officers have accessed protestor circles offline. 36/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit This would also mean that they are probably equally aware of the factions developing in the movement and I would venture to say they are using every means possible to exploit those fractures offline as well. 37/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit 4) If Chris Tang is instructing officers to tone down their violence against peaceful protestors but at the same time to make regular focused arrests to discourage protestor violence, then non-violent actions like the million person march this weekend are the best response. 38/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit The city needs to de-escalate and perhaps Chris Tang is offering a needed olive branch even if it is crudely done. It makes sense for the movement to take it. But that also means condemning any future unprovoked violent acts against individuals including towards police 39/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit Radical Frontliners should not be provided support and legitimacy through the 不割席 discourse. The violence needs to end and further violence is not the answer unless the movement wants to become the regime that it seeks to replace, which is exactly what became of the CCP. 40/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit Finally, there is much hay being made out there about “outsiders” telling protestors what they should and should not do. foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/05/hon… Hopefully people who read this wouldn’t use that argument here, that would be disappointing. 41/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit Yes, I have an American passport. Yes, I am white and that makes me privileged in many contexts. Yes, I just moved back to Oslo for a new job. I am probably not alone in thinking though that I am still apart of this 42/n
@hcsteinhardt @Comparativist @HongKongHermit We do have skin in the game. We have been to the Frontlines, we have been teargassed, we’ve chanted slogans, we hum the “anthem” as we walk because its buried in our brain. We are and forever will be a Hong Konger…well, or at least a Sichuanese Hong Konger ;-p 43/n
