1/n Still a lot of confusion about European Council conclusions on #ClimateNeutralEU. It's a prime example of 'constructive ambiguity'
But clear indications Poland stood not in the way of agreeing on EU-wide target but simply says they're not going to be at net-zero by 2050 #EUCO
2/n During negotiations, Poland explicitly demanded to reach net-zero only in 2070, much later than whole EU. Didn't get that far. But #EUCO conclusions allow POL government to sell result at home as not really applying to POL but only to rest of EU (they tried that 2014 as well)
3/n POL position puts other countries under pressure since it would mean they have to do more by 2050 (i.e. going below zero). NL prime minister Rutte rejected that interpretation immediately.
So who's right? They all are, to some extent. That's how 'constructive ambiguity' works
4/n It's important to recognize that #EUCO doesn't do legally binding 'decisions' on #climate, it just gives guidance for the coming process. So it is in fact unclear how this will all play out in 2020. Even EU insiders disagree politico.eu/article/polish… euractiv.com/section/climat…
5/n It's indeed hard to grasp what the mention of June 2020 will result into. I guess that COM will now table its (much more important & contentious) proposal for a strengthened EU 2030 target by June, which will result in another heated EU #climate target debate at June #EUCO
6/n Some commentators think that Poland's reluctance doesn't matter much since COM will now table its 'climate law' in March, setting #ClimateNeutralEU by 2050 target, with qualified majority voting. But this 'law' will be largely symbolic and only 'enshrine' the 2050 vision
7/n #EUCO conclusions on #ClimateNeutralEU mention another related process, which could emerge as next battlegroud: submission of EU mid-term decarbonisation strategy to #UNFCCC, due in 2020. Usually, Environment Council decides unanimously on international climate policy issues
8/n But back to distributional consequences of #ClimateNeutralEU#EUCO decision.
With ~half of EU emissions under harmonised trading scheme, it's impossible for Poland to set an exact later date for reaching net-zero, and it would certainly not be 20yrs later than EU average.
9/n At the same time, Rutte's claim that NL & GER won't do more because POL wants to do less is misleading. With prolongation of current differentiation of national ESR targets, North-Western Member States would probably need to go net negative in 2050 swp-berlin.org/en/publication…
10/n Much more important than 2050 target will be the battle on the new 2030 target, where there is much more opposition among Member States against a substantial increase.
If MS 'effort sharing' targets don't start to converge soon, we'll face an ongoing split in 2050 as well
11/n Here comes post-#Brexit bonus piece:
if UK leaves EU2030 NDC then EU-27 numbers go down, which doesn't make a difference on the ground but matters symbolically
Add 3 percentage points to the bill when you strive for increased 2030 ambition of 50-55% swp-berlin.org/en/publication…
12/end
In the future, claims will be made that a @ClimateNeutralEU by 2050 wouldn't be consistent with the #ParisAgreement. I think it would.
Most people confuse net-zero CO2 and net-zero GHG when talking about target years or fair budget shares for EU swp-berlin.org/en/publication…
add. 1/
If there was any doubt left whether Poland accepts EU net zero target 2050, today's EU Environment Council clarified this europa.eu/!kX64Fd
For POL, the main issue is the 'collective' nature of 2050 target (see #EUClimateLaw), leaving more time for some countries
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As promised, now more on the topics I was deeply involved in as #IPCC#AR6 Synthesis Report author, both in the Summary for Policymakers & the so-called 'Longer Report':
overhoot, net zero, mitigation pathways (incl. CDR)
Let's start with "Overshoot" (B.7), where I was responsible for drafting and 'negotiating' in plenary, but of course not alone (mainly together with @chrisd_jones, with whom I worked on corresponding section 3.3.4 in underlying report) #IPCC#AR6#SYR ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/ 2/n
Unfortunately, the UN Secretary General still doesn't understand difference betw net-zero CO2 and much more ambitious net-zero GHG targets. The famous 2050 is net-zero CO2 for 1.5C, net-zero GHG only some decades later, as per #IPCC WG3 & Synthesis Report politico.eu/article/climat…
UN Secretary General has been ill-advised by his own high-level expert group on net-zero, which also confuses net-zero CO2 and net-zero GHG.
After 3 yrs of hard work & a long approval plenary, we got the #IPCC#AR6 Synthesis Report published today, consisting of the Summary for Policymakers and a full report version ➡️ ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/
An ongoing 🧵, starting with SPM fig 1 on adverse climate change impacts 1/n
Today we publish the 1st edition of the "State of Carbon Dioxide Removal" report, a global assessment of the current #StateofCDR, and the gap we need to close to achieve the Paris temperature goal.
Full report➡️stateofcdr.org
An ongoing 🧵
[1]
This report compiles a first estimate of the total CDR being deployed (2 GtCO2/yr).
Almost all comes from "conventional" CDR on land, via afforestation, reforestation & forest management.
"Novel" methods don’t contribute much yet. #StateofCDR
[2]
We provide a calculation of total gross CDR in #IPCC-assessed pathways to keep warming below 1.5C and 2C, including all methods. All pathways involve substantial cumulative CDR volumes (450-1100 GtCO2 by 2100) - in addition to immediate & deep emissions reductions #StateofCDR
[3]
The @UN#HLEGReport on Net-zero Emissions Committments is out
The problem though: #IPCC 1.5C pathways don't reach net zero GHG emissions by "2050 or sooner", but by the end of the century. The famous "net zero by 2050" (better "early 2050s) is CO2 only un.org/en/climatechan… 1/
You might be in disbelief, but have a look at the #IPCC AR6 WG3 Summary for Policymakers, Table SPM.2:
For 1.5C with no or limited overshoot (category C1), pathways reach net-zero CO2 in 2050-2055, but net-zero GHG in 2095-2100 ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3… 2/n
The difference between net-zero CO2 and net-zero GHG can be explained by the dominant role of non-CO2 GHGs (methane, nitrous oxide, f-gases) in residual emissions and the dominant role of CO2 in removals
➡️Only 6 out of 97 scenarios in the #IPCC#AR6 WG3 category C1 ('no to limited overshoot') never cross 1.5C
➡️91 out of 97 cross 1.5C temporarily, and then go back to 1.5°C by 2100
If you read the Summary for Policymakers of IPCC AR6 WG1 (Aug. 2021), this cannot come as surprise
Below the numbers from #IPCC#AR6 WG1. Not sure if this knowledge was conciously included in "keeping 1.5C alive and within reach" messaging around #COP26.
'Overshoot' pathways (= exceedance & return) didn't make it onto the high-level #UNFCCC agenda yet ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1…
The overshoot logic might also a little bit hard to detect in this #IPCC#AR6 WG1 SPM figure. That's because overshoot is quite small (0.1°C) for SSP1-1.9, while at the same time all standard RCP levels (1.9-8.5) are shown in one figure ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1…