Thread by @nicholadrummond

“WHAT IS THE ARMY FOR?”
(A thread about the Integrated Review))

I keep hearing the above expression and dislike it very much. Some people like to suggest that the Army has lacked any sense of purpose since the end of the Cold War. This is codswallop.

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The real problem the Army faces is that ground force deployments are complex and expensive. Armies are not like warships or combat jets, where crews just get in, go and get the job done.

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Generating a brigade with all of its supporting assets is like assembling an orchestra. Look at the UK deployment to Afghanistan. Camp Bastion in Helmand Province covered 32 km2, an area larger than Reading, while air operations made it the UK’s fifth busiest airport.

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Counter insurgency operations are not a quick fix either. British forces were officially deployed from June 2002 until December 2014. Today, a small contingent remains in theatre. This is why deployments to places like Iraq and Afghanistan are controversial.

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No one wants to see body bags arriving at Brize Norton Without a damn good reason. It's why British politicians have become reluctant to commit our armed forces to overseas interventions without strong justification and goals that are achievable and affordable.

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For the above reasons, it is 100% right that the forthcoming defence review is integrated with a foreign policy review. The real question we need to answer is: “WHAT IS OUR FOREIGN POLICY FOR?”

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Good foreign policy is about deciding who our friends and allies are. It's about recognising that our enemies’ enemy is our friend. It's about soft power that builds relationships, negotiating trade, preserving the rules based int'l order, and being a good neighbour.

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When we've decided what our foreign policy goals are, we can decide how to resource all three services appropriately. This isn't just about equipment, it includes personnel. Right now, all three forces are overstretched due to the headcount cap imposed in 2010.

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We are not going to attract the men and women we need unless we give them decent accommodation, training facilities and, ultimately, the professional fulfilment that makes the arduous nature of military life appealing versus a civilian career.

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An evolved foreign policy will almost certainly encompass potential UK interventions overseas, but we are still left with the problem that Army is difficult to deploy. This is why it needs to be expeditionary by design: more mobile with a reduced logistical footprint.

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We need to ensure that our Armed Forces are equipped to act below the threshold of conflict. But Defence & Security academics are right to point out that cyber and hybrid warfare capabilities are no substitute for hard power.

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It is why we need the ultimate sanction of nuclear weapons. We also credible maritime, land and air and other conventional forces, so that we do not immediately need to threaten annihilation to secure our political objectives.

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We have not invested in conventional forces since the end of the Cold War. Plans to renew many capabilities were put on hold by Iraq and Afghanistan. Then the global financial crisis of 2008 led to deep cuts in 2010.

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The degree to which our armed forces have maintained high standards despite the austerity imposed on them is astonishing, but it does not come without cost. The constant exodus of experienced and trained personnel is slowly bleeding all three services dry.

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With the evolved range of threats we now face, the time has come for recapitalisation. Those who work in Defence realise that there is no magic money tree. But we have to lay a new long-term foundation that equips us to face the challenges that lie in front of us.

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Ultimately, we need to be smarter about how we spend our defence pounds, but if the Integrated Review is merely about how to save £1.5 billion this year and next, then it will be an abject failure.

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