As Lebanese protestors gear up to take the streets again today to protest the dire situation (on all levels), an ever-going debate was re-opened around #Hezbollah’s weapons. Some groups demand that weapons are incorporated within the military as a key step towards a solution.
A second group thinks that this is not a pressing issue to deal with atm, given poverty & unemployment rates are soaring and quick solutions/reforms must be enacted and the country should be set on a path of reform which later on addresses #Hezbollah’s weapons.
A third group, mostly leftist, believe that weapons need to stay in order to ensure a deterrence effect with #Israel’s IAF, especially that tension is building up on the souther border.
However, back to today’s protests, #Hezbollah’s propaganda massively capitalized on the anti-weapon rhetoric and succeeded in dividing the ranks of the different groups that were participating together in the popular protest movement that succeeded the Oct17 moment.
Interestingly, the video (shared above ☝🏽) is being dispersed on social media (mainly WhatsApp, most effective comms tool in 🇱🇧), displaying #Hezbollah’s advanced missiles while mocking any slogan that opposes said weapons.
Personally, this is the first time I see such advanced weapons with the hezb, something we’ve heard about and read about before knowing that these specific missiles are #Israel’s major concern nowadays as they’re supposed to be the precision guided missiles.
Question is: why would the party to go to new lengths in order to sow divisions within #LebanonProtests? I think the reason is mostly socio-economic. The dire situation already affecting the masses. Any movement in the streets will only invite people to go down and protest.
🇱🇧 is more like a power-keg & #Hezbollah being in control, can not afford mass protests similar to the ones witnessed in previous months. That would be fatal, especially if the party’s community starts voicing its pains & concerns - something we are starting to see glimpses of.
What next? Following the easing of lockdown measures, people have nothing left but to protest, however, they’ll be faced with more divisive questions (which they should have answers to) & a harsher police/military crackdown given the ruling political parties have no margin left.
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#Iraq's fiscal break-even oil price will be above $90/bl in 2024. Here's why per the @IMFNews who concluded last weekend its 2024 Article IV consultation with #Iraq authorities:
-Economic growth is projected to continue amid fiscal expansion... #oott
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-but medium-term vulnerabilities to oil price volatility have increased significantly
-significant fiscal adjustment required, through controlling public wage bill, to ensure fiscal sustainability & reduction of oil dependence
-Int'l reserves increased to $112bn.
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-while expansionary budget was under-executed in 2023, fiscal balance declined from surplus of 10.8pc of GDP in 2022 to a deficit of 1.3pc in 2023, due to lower oil revenues and an increase in expenditure (mostly a result of salaries and pensions).
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Fun fact about #Lebanon's newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs:
A battle over the Lebanese embassy in DC took place in 1989, when Abdallah BouHabib was the ambassador. The Taif Agreement had gone into effect and Elias Hraoui was elected President in December of that year.
Hraoui, immediately fired Michel Aoun from all his self-proclaimed posts, removed #Lebanon’s veteran ambassador to Washington, Bouhabib himself, and handed control of the embassy to the No. 2 diplomat at the time, Sleiman Rassi.
Yet Aoun - who was holding out with 20,000 troops at the presidential palace in Baabda refusing to recognize the Hraoui gov't - sent Bouhabib a telegram ordering him to stay put.
BouHabib, a staunch Aoun supporter, continued to occupy the ambassador’s office and residence.
Many fallacies are often perpetuated in media [esp. Arab] about alliances & geopolitics in the MENA region, mainly for propaganda purposes. For instance, since penning the normalization deal with #Israel, state-sponsored media in the #UAE insists that #Iran & #Turkey inch closer.
However, here’s a microcosm of how intricate the relation of the two is:
🇹🇷 & 🇮🇷 are at the opposing ends in: 🇮🇶, 🇸🇾 & now Azerbaijan/#Armenia; they overlap in #Libya & on Palestine. One could argue that if Ankara was to invest more in #Lebanon, it’ll be at odds with Tehran.
#Iran has remained largely silent on the dispute between Turkey & others in the East Med.
With Syria in mind, developments in Armenia [which I predict will be contained] could lead to another front of Russian-Iranian alignment in face of Turkey.
Mustafa Adib is not the hero some people are portraying him to be. But Adib, banking on French support & the suffocating situation on the ground, had a stronger hand in negotiating his government formation process - unlike his predecessors. The PM-designate though that:
•parties will cave-in following the Aug 4 explosion & Int’l pressure, resulting in them facilitating the formation of a gov’t that can enact certain reforms and tap into some $$s.
However, reality hit hard. #Lebanon, as usual, is just another piece of the regional chessboard.
Hence why, regional patrons of the sectarian ruling mafia decided to “freeze” the situation until November 3rd. When the Iranians [Hezbollah] and the Saudis [economic support: CEDRE/IMF] figure out who will occupy the Oval Office next, concessions & compromise become possible.