Thread by @LaurenceBroers

#Armenia-#Azerbaijan ceasefire of 10/10 failed from the off. Stepanakert reported hit that night and 9 reported killed and dozens wounded in missile strikes on Ganja, AZ’s 2nd city; at least 2 civilians also reported killed during AZ operation in Hadrut, south NK, on 10/10. 1/11

These deaths affirm each side’s worst fears of the other: state-sanctioned terror and ethnic cleansing. Further radicalises societies and makes standing down more costly for leaders. 2/11

Humanitarian aspects of truce (prisoner x-change) not implemented, and intensive fighting reported resumed in NE and SE sectors of the front. Heavy bombardment of NK reported overnight, heavy fighting reported around Hadrut today. 3/11

Russian brokerage in crisis: 4-point doc affirmed existing Minsk Group structure and Basic Principles; suggests return to status quo ante, but faces a new situation: for first time AZ feels it has military advantage + external support from Turkey to press that advantage. 4/11

But sides still affirm the Minsk Group (which in wider format incl Turkey, Belarus, Italy, Germany, Sweden and Finland) and have not rejected the Basic Principles, incl, among other things, ARM withdrawals from territories around NK + interim status for NK + peacekeeping. 5/11

A lot of speculation, but not much verified data, out there on extent of shifts in territorial control. But fighting already reaching territory of NK proper (NKAO), and interim status (never accepted in NK) likely to be overtaken by ARM calls for remedial secession. 6/11

Key questions for the players at this point seem to me to be: For AZ, are territorial gains + strategic change sufficient to 1) have real leverage over any new negotiation; 2) survive any backlash once true extent of losses becomes public? 7/11

For ARM/NK, can an asymmetric fight be sustained long enough for 1) war fatigue/political costs; 2) Russian leverage; 3) winter to start acting on the AZ war effort? This and previous suggest that neither side has an incentive to de-escalate just now 8/11

For Russia, can Russian diplomacy retain credibility, and should Moscow work with Turkey or the Minsk Group to achieve this (ceasefire document suggests latter, but with US MIA, Russian leverage alone insufficient)? 9/11

For Europe, how can a humanitarian crisis on the edge of the continent be relieved and how to be relevant in a crisis on the edge of the continent beyond France’s Minsk Group co-Chair role (now criticised by AZ) 10/11

Interested in contrasting views and any ideas on what Turkey’s outlook currently is. 11/11