As we are starting to analyze and assess the Trump presidency, we should also start analyzing our own coverage of it, both academic and journalistic.
Much was predicted that didn't come true and much came true that wasn't predicted.
And, yes, I said "we". 👈
For example, until COVID-19 really hit, I thought Trump was going to be re-elected (again lose popular vote but win EC). Until November 3 I thought Biden would win in landslide but worried Trump would sneak out an EC win. 1/2
Also, I did not think Georgia would go blue yet in 2020. In short, I am as bad, if not worse, in predictions than most journalists and pundits. 2/2
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1. Even before Biden was crowned "president-elect" the different sides opened up the power struggle. Progressives mainly through social media, centrists mainly through traditional media.
2. Progressives argued that they had increased turnout, including in swing states (eg Omar in MN), and thereby won Biden the election.
It's three-year anniversary of deadly "Unite the Right" rally. Some quick observations. #Thread
1. The "Right" is as "united" as it was three years ago, i.e. not at all.
2. The "alt-right" was a hype, both as a concept and as a movement. It was yet another example of how most media were (unintentionally?) acted as booster of far right messaging.
These type of articles will always go viral, because they "confirm" received wisdom, but life is much more complicated, and most radicalization has important online AND offline components. #Threadnytimes.com/2018/11/24/opi…
1. Let me start with an important caveat: I am NOT expert on online radicalization or (far right) terrorism. But this article is about far right/white supremacy in general.
2. Obviously, Internet plays a major role in radicalization these days because, well, Internet plays a major role in all our socialization. Most people (part. youths) get almost all info from Internet.
Kudos to @jessphillips & @lisanandy (and others) for starting to address hard questions & realities that #Labour face after #GE2019 but I worry about strategy based on appeasing "Northern working class", many of whom hold fundamentally different values on socio-cultural issues.
1. Obviously, "the" working class does not exist, also not in the North. I worry that "the" Norther working class voter stands for the pro-Brexit (white) working class (man) in the North, who disagrees with Labour on many more fundamental issues than Brexit.
2. The future of social democracy in UK, and beyond, is in a broad coalition of precariat, working class, and lower middle class, men and women, white and non-white. It is at least as much in non-voters as in left-to-right voters.
This interview with former Dutch ambassador to US Henne Schuwer, published in Dutch newspaper @nrc , paints absolutely disastrous picture of WH and way (allied) countries deal with it. Hope they translate it. #threadnrc.nl/nieuws/2019/10…
1. To preface it, ambassador comes across as center-right, praising Dutch conservative Prime Minister Rutte repeatedly. Like many in Dutch foreign policy elite, he seems "Atlanticist", (very) pro-NATO and pro-US.
2. Schuwer has recently retired from the diplomatic service and can therefore speak freely. That said, he still seems measured and without any personal gripe. More astonished than disappointed or resnetful.
1.Although less prominently as in 2017, ÖVP is still very much the Kurz Party. Only party where leader is main reason for vote. Extremely strong mandate for Kurz, who can by and large do whatever he wants.
2. SPÖ only has its traditional base left. No inspiring leader, no campaign themes, no new blood. It barely profits from opposition to failed right-wing government.