With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #Afghanistan. 1/n
SEC. 1212. EXTENSION OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM.
Extends the program through through 2022 (and appears to expand the number allowed by 120 slots). 2/n
SEC. 1213. EXTENSION & MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES LED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.
Extends #DOD ability to provide funding to cover certain costs of participants in peace talks (which includes #Taliban) through 2021 & adds some restrictions. 3/n
SEC. 1214. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION OF COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM.
Extends CERP authority through 2021 but reduces threshold to $2M. 4/n
SEC. 1215. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS TO REDUCE DEPLOYMENT TO #AFGHANISTAN.
Requires SECDEF to provide a specific report to Congress before US troops in AFG can be reduced below the level when the bill is signed into law (or 2000, whichever is less). 5/n
SEC. 1216. MODIFICATIONS TO IMMUNITY FROM SEIZURE UNDER JUDICIAL PROCESS OF CULTURAL OBJECTS.
Allows for various cultural objects to be brought to the US (w/concurrence of #Afghanistan's govt) for various temporary reasons. 6/n
SEC. 1217. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES TALKS WITH #TALIBAN OFFICIALS AND #AFGHANISTAN’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROCESS
Requires SECSTATE to submit *all* documents associated with the US-TB agreement (including secret annexes) to relevant Congressional committees... 7/n
...also requires a new quarterly report that addresses #Taliban adherence to that agreement, along w/a host of other issues pertaining to #Afghanistan of interest to Congress. 8/n
SEC. 1218. STRATEGY FOR POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN.
Requires SECSTATE & @USAID to submit this strategy w/in 120 days after a final reconciliation agreement is reached between the Government of #Afghanistan and the #Taliban/ 9/n
SEC. 1219. MODIFICATION TO REPORT ON ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.
Requires #DOD's biannual report to add more info on #CIVCAS & include again the district control assessment that DOD discontinued for reasons I describe here👇 10/n warontherocks.com/2019/05/milita…
SEC. 1220. REPORT ON OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.
Requires a year-end summary report on OFS (the US-only operation in #Afghanistan) for FYs 2021 through 2023. 11/n
Allows SECDEF to accept equipment that was purchased for the #ANDSF but that they don't want. Requires no less than $10M (w/goal of $29M) to be spent on integration of women into the ANDSF.... 12/n
...requires #DOD to certify that the govt of #Afghanistan is making progress in a host of areas & if not, to withhold 5-15% of funding for #ANDSF. And strongly hints that Congress is not okay w/increasing provision of on-budget funding to the Afghan govt. 13/n
SEC. 4302. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
Sets #Afghanistan Security Forces Fund FY21 amount at $4.015B
END. 14/14
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So, I did a little more analysis on the lists of agenda items reportedly put forth by the government of #Afghanistan and the #Taliban (listed in this @TOLOnews article from yesterday). Some observations in this THREAD. 1/n tolonews.com/afghanistan-16…
In the table below, I tried to combine some of the like themes on each side & then compare them to each other--to identify areas of overlap & gaps. Areas of strong overlap include drugs, corruption, care for war disabled/wounded, & ceasefire. 2/n
Areas of moderate/limited overlap (which includes areas where one side was very broad but the other more specific) include type of future govt, future foreign policy, future of the #ANDSF, territorial integrity, education, and human rights. 3/n
With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #SOF. 1/n
SEC. 163. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ARMED OVERWATCH PROGRAM.
No armed overwatch aircraft for @USSOCOM in FY21 or @usairforce FY21-23. Seriously disappointing for @AFSpecOpsCmd, which has been pushing hard for this. 2/n
SEC. 165. AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, & RECONNAISSANCE ACQUISITION ROADMAP FOR THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.
Requires @USSOCOM & ASD-SOLIC to submit an acquisition roadmap to meet the manned & unmanned airborne ISR req'ts of #SOF by Dec 1, 2021. 3/n
Op-Ed here by the leads of @USIP’s #Afghanistan Study Group: “An abrupt withdrawal of US troops, as is now being contemplated by the Trump administration, would undermine the fragile but potentially transformational peace process.” 1/n washingtonpost.com/opinions/afgha…
“It would embolden the #Taliban, destabilize the Kabul government and allow terrorist groups to reconsolidate. A civil war could result, provoking a wider regional conflict and an inevitable humanitarian and migration crisis.”
They make 4 recommendations. 2/n
1. “We should make clear to all parties involved what the desired end state will be. In particular, a post-peace #Afghanistan must be able to either sufficiently control its territory to prevent the harboring of terrorists or accept international assistance to do so.” 3/n
I’m seeing lots of stratospheric-level discussion on US drawdown to 2500 troops in #Afghanistan & what it might mean, but let’s get operational for a moment in this THREAD. 1/n
The US is conducting 2 missions in #Afghanistan: counterterrorism (CT) & train/advise/assist (TAA) of the #ANDSF. It does so from a half-dozen major bases around the country. The TAA mission it does w/@NATO ally forces. CT it does unilaterally & partnered w/Afghan #SOF. 2/n
For the past few years, TAA has been at the level of the MOD & MOI (in Kabul) & the Afghan Army Corps HQs & Afghan Air Force at regional bases. That posture—which was sustainable even at 4500 troops—is heavily enabled by contractors. 3/n
I was thinking again this morning about the argument to rapidly withdraw from #Afghanistan (& #Syria, #Somalia...) emanating from the Trump White House & was reminded of a conference I spoke at last year, on the 30th anniversary of #alQaeda. 1/n
One of the audience Qs was "what events or developments might you predict would give #alQaeda the biggest boost in the future?" The other panelists--which included some of the US' best terrorism experts--gave great answers that covered a variety of possible contingencies. 2/n
Being by far the least impressive terrorist analyst of the group (& someone focused more on countering terrorism), I chose to focus on ourselves. My answer: "Another strategic blunder of historic proportions by the United States." 3/n
I’ve been asked several times over the past couple of days (given the Pentagon shake-ups) whether it would be logistically feasible to get all US troops out of #Afghanistan by Christmas as Trump supposedly wants. So, here goes a THREAD. 1/n
The answer depends on what you consider “withdrawal” of all the troops. Currently, the US has somewhere around 5000 troops in #Afghanistan & @NATO has about as many (& possibly slightly more). They are located on a small number (10 or so?) of bases across the country. 2/n
Those forces are supported by another 10-15k (maybe more?) contractors. If all Trump wanted was to get the uniformed personnel out, it’d likely be possible to do that in 2-3 weeks (a C-17 can carry ~200 people), so 10k troops = 50 C-17 sorties. 3/n