Thread by @JJSchroden

Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n

An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n

An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n

ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…

This means that if, for example, the US were to give #Afghanistan's Army a bunch of new vehicles right now...contrary to the intuitive belief that it would make the ANA better, it would actually be making the ANA *worse* by adding to the load of things it can't sustain. 4/n

And then there's this. 🤦‍♂️

#amateurstalktactics
#professionalstalklogistics

5/5

khaama.com/us-military-ha…