Lately I’ve had a bunch of people coming at me to say that I’m wrong about various things pertaining to #Afghanistan. So, a brief THREAD about being wrong. 1/n
I *wish* I was wrong about the things I write here & elsewhere about #Afghanistan. I *wish* the Afghan govt wasn’t a kleptocracy. I *wish* the #ANDSF weren’t failing operationally & institutionally. I *wish* the #Taliban weren’t ascendant. I *wish* the US was good at COIN. 2/n
I *wish* I would stumble into a trove of reported facts that would convincingly show the Afghan govt as competent; the #ANDSF as successful protectors of Afghans; the US as effective at COIN; & the #Taliban as willing to contest their politics nonviolently. 5/n
In short, I *wish* those haters were right & I was WRONG. 6/n
But here’s the thing: I’m an analyst. I’ll go where the facts lead. And the facts show that the Afghan govt is shamelessly corrupt; the #ANDSF are failing to protect Afghans; the US is shockingly bad at COIN; & the #Taliban are murderous narcojihadist thugs. 7/n
If you’ve got FACTS that prove me wrong—BRING THEM ON. Seriously, show them to me & I’ll update my analysis accordingly. I’ll even admit I was wrong if need be. I’m not too proud to do so. But if you don’t have the facts, maybe think a bit about who’s *wrong* before you post. 8/8
Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n
An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n
An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n
I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n
First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n
Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n
I have now seen several op-eds (including this one) argue that the US could “punish” the #Taliban for, or “deter” it from, violating its obligations in the US-TB Agreement via offshore kinetic means following a full US troop withdrawal. 1/n washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/biden-…
That suggestion is usually made in an off-hand way toward a paper’s end, like it’s a given it would work. But would it? If the #Taliban are willing to host members of #alQaeda w/US troops still in #Afghanistan, why would offshore threats change that? 2/n wsj.com/amp/articles/k…
And didn’t the Clinton admin already provide empirical demonstration that lobbing missiles from the Indian Ocean against terrorist training camps in #Afghanistan doesn’t accomplish much? This was a primary reason for the innovation of arming drones, as I understand it. 3/n
I take issue w/the interpretation of things I’ve said in this article on #Afghanistan as “deferential to the #Taliban.” My view is *not* the one this article attributes to me: that the US has a one-sided obligation in the US-TB Agreement. 1/n brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Rather, I believe—as the author does—that the #Taliban have not met their commitments per the deal. But I also believe—as I tweeted earlier today—that the US will have difficulty showing this b/c the TB’s commitments aren’t objectively & publicly verifiable. 2/n
Which means that any attempt now to argue “conditions” with the #Taliban will be difficult & may result in the collapse of the peace process—something the US very much wants to avoid. 3/n
I've seen some #Afghanistan commentators argue recently that the US-#Taliban Agreement is a bad deal b/c it gave too many concessions to the TB while getting too few in return for the US. In this THREAD, I'll state why I think it's a bad deal from an assessment point of view. 1/n
To do that, let's walk through each of the things the US & #Taliban committed to in the agreement & answer the Q: "Is this objectively & publicly verifiable?"
Why is that Q important? B/c a good deal is one where both sides can reliably & transparently determine compliance. 2/n
Let's start w/the US: 1. Within 135 days...The US "will reduce the number of US forces in #Afghanistan to 8,600 & proportionally bring reduction in the number of its allies and Coalition forces."
I’ve been debating since the report came out whether to provide a proper critique. As a senior advisor to the #AfghanistanStudyGroup I feel some decorum toward the effort is warranted. But I also don’t fully agree with where the plenary group ended up. 2/n
So, rather than provide a full critique of the entire report as I might normally do, here I’ll focus on two main points that have been bugging me. #AfghanistanStudyGroup 3/n