High time to think about how a possible 'reset' of EU-UK relations can be politically achieved. The EU should be open for this, but I fear the political commitment to make post-#Brexit relations work needs to come from both sides, including the UK government.
5 factors were crucial, incl the dynamic nature of the TCA, still close economic links and the co-responsibility for NI.
Others, like @Mij_Europe and @CER_Grant, were far more sceptical, stressing the pol dynamics at play in London (and to a lesser extent the EU) would continue to burden the relationship. So far, they have been proven right, with a confrontational rather than a cooperative dynamic.
Since then, scepticism has also risen in EU MS, with again serious questions whether the UK is interested in a coop relationship and keeping its commitments.
A reset therefore requires first of all an acknowledgement by UK gov of what it has signed up with the TCA + NI protocol.
This needs to be coupled with a positive agenda - areas where UK + EU benefit from cooperation as distinct partners, rather than just contentious implementation of the TCA.
Main candidates for me are climate/COP26 and - requiring a u-turn in London - foreign/security policy.
Finally, the NI protocol needs to be turned from a point of tension to a shared responsibility of EU+UK - just like the GFA is a shared responsibility of Ireland and the UK. This requires the UK gov to publically accept, implement defend the compromise it signed.
Politically, the direction of travel in London with Frost appointment, using the art. 16 debate and little pushback against ERG demands is not going in this direction.
But it is not impossible, and would benefit both sides. /Ends
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UK public discourse seems to be even growing in furore over the Art. 16 debacle. But even if you acknowledge the EU Commission made a mistake, it is time for much needed perspective:
The EU Commission got under quick pressure from Ireland and corrected the mistake within a few hours. Further internal pressure will now lead to safeguards around the NI protocol.
While the UK gov is today threatening to trigger art. 16, last year threatened to violate the NI protocol with the Internal Market Bill and got the House of Commons to vote twice for that explicit violation of the UK's legal commitments.
Rumours are flying wild on how close we are to a #Brexit deal. My sense is that a deal is still possible, but the necessary compromises have yet to be made and time is running out soon.
To me it is therefore high time to think also about the political ramifications of no deal.
In this analysis, I look at three political scenarios: 1. Friendly no deal - in which EU and UK seemlessly continue negotiations and try to limit no deal fallout via unilateral actions and mini deals. Ruled out by the EU, though the temptation will be there in some member states.
2. A 'grown-up no deal' - in which the no deal consequences come, but after some confrontations both sides get back to negotiation table quickly. Preferred by EU, likely will be supported by US, but does not square with UK politics which will need to blame EU for no deal fallout.
Always interesting for EU nerds to look at the bilaterals around an #EUCO and what they say about the power dynamics and conflicts between member states.
Out of curiosity, I put together who @eucopresident met around the #EUCO on the MFF/Recovery Fund negotiations in July /1
@eucopresident A few interesting findings:
- Most meetings were with Macron, Merkel and @vonderleyen
- Michel met Merkel and Macron always together, highlighting the Franco-German push on the MFF
- More active EU policy of Sanchez and Conte got them into the inner circle
/2
@eucopresident@vonderleyen - The most involved smaller MS were the 'trouble makers'
> Rutte/NL as informal leader of the frugal four
> Orban/HU as the leader with most resistance against the rule of law provisions.
- Only EU MS with no participation at the 'balcony diplomacy' were Romania + Cyprus
/3
Today will be the 70th #Königswinter Conference, the annual British-German exchange that brings together great people from the respective governments, parliaments, industries and academia.
It is also a good time to reflect on British-German relations four years into #Brexit.
The good: Foreign and Security Policy has been mostly shielded from Brexit, even during the most difficult negotiations.
The E3 cooperation is going strong, and Germany and the UK continue to cooperate closely in other international fora such as the G7 or the UN.
The bad: From a German perspective, the EU was the most important framework to engage with the UK.
Trade has already suffered, even before the UK has left the transition period.
On many issues the UK is now not in the arena most relevant for German economic policy.
This morning @vonderleyen will give her first "State of the Union" speech to the European Parliament.
Admittedly, even as an EU nerd I have yet to get attached to the tradition. I would struggle to name a single #SOTEU speech that made a lasting impact.
Could this year be different? Expect a positive outlook after a difficult year, with a focus on Green Deal, digitalisation, the EU coming together over the recovery fund, migration and a touch on European strategic autonomy.
#Brexit will likely not be a major issue, besides a call to the UK to keep its commitments and a declaration of willingness to strike a strong partnership.
1. The debate about the #InternalMarketBill is about the UK adhering to what it has already agreed, not about what it should agree with the EU.
This why even some ardent Brexiteers oppose it, as it is a question on how the UK stands to the international rule of law.
2. The UK has already left the EU in January 2020, the mandate from the Brexit vote has been discharged. There is neither a short route nor a credible political force in the UK paving the way to reverse the UK's exit from the EU.