Thread by @Charles_Lister

.@frontlinepbs's documentary on #HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani begins at 10pm EST tonight -- it's already caused shockwaves in the jihadist world.

I've been studying #HTS (& its predecessors) & Jolani's leadership for 10yrs -- the story has profound analytical implications.

@frontlinepbs Few could have imagined in 2012-13 that Jolani's Jabhat al-Nusra would years later have a new name & be speaking in quasi nationalist tones; running a semi-technocratic "govt"; proactively engaging w. international NGOs & media; & seeking to establish dialogue w. Western govts.

@frontlinepbs The path between '12 Nusra & '21 #HTS is complex & strewn with inter-factional conflict; vicious internal strife; geopolitical manipulation; and above all, the impact of #Syria's nationwide uprising.

In breaking from #AlQaeda, #Jolani sparked a massive intra-jihadist debate.

@frontlinepbs Locally-focused jihadist struggle is far from a new thing -- but in this latest generation of jihadist activity, the #Nusra-to-#HTS evolution has challenged the very basis upon which the old guard has devoted so much of their effort for decades: fighting the 'far enemy.'

@frontlinepbs But locally-focused jihadism is not *not* a threat -- it merely poses a different challenge, and frankly, it's one we're thus far ill-equipped & unsure how to confront.

To me, #HTS is the result of 20yrs of lessons learned since 9/11 -- they're not "good," they're different.

@frontlinepbs #HTS remains deeply distrusted by much of #Idlib society -- and for good reason, given their track record.

And yet the best chance for stability for the 3.5 million crammed into NW #Syria is -- remarkably -- a continuation of today's status quo (#HTS control). So they matter.

@frontlinepbs #HTS is the result of a great deal of opportunism on Jolani's part, but also the steady impact of local pressures on a once globally-oriented jihadist movement.

In my 10yrs of work on the group, some of what I've written illustrated some of those overlapping influences at play:

"An Internal Struggle: #AlQaeda’s Syrian Affiliate Is Grappling With Its Identity" (May 2015)

- On Nusra's wavering between "moderation" & revolutionary integration & reversion to hardcore extremism as it balanced #Syria with the #ISIS challenge to AQ.

huffpost.com/entry/an-inter…

As #Jolani & his loyal circle began to realize (amid #ISIS challenge) the urgent need to deepen roots & consolidate influence, I revealed its early efforts to consult w. social & religious leaders about a new entity (May '16)

It was a major effort.

foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/al-…

In addition to breaking news of their plans to rebrand, I detailed before they did so a series of internal challenges (including a threatened mass defection) that forced #Jolani's hand, coercing him into dissolving Nusra & establishing JFS. (July 2016):

huffpost.com/entry/under-pr…

Soon after JFS was established, it was clear it'd sparked massive strife with #AlQaeda -- and the evolution itself illustrated a broader trend to do with localism & AQ's decentralization that had ripple effects globally (Sept 2016, for @CTCWP)

ctc.usma.edu/the-dawn-of-ma…

For a thorough but readable profile of Jabhat al-Nusra's time in existence (including hints at the rebrand that was to come), see my 50-page @BrookingsInst profile from July 2016, full of exclusive info:

brookings.edu/wp-content/upl…

Once JFS had evolved into #HTS, the break with #AlQaeda was official & the implications significant -- with AQ pushing back vocally & organizationally, with new rival factions.

That dynamic set the stage for the months & years to come (= AQ lost).

mei.edu/publications/a…

When #Turkey sent troops into #Idlib, they did so with an #HTS escort, after extensive mediated consultation with #HTS leadership.

That TSK entry into NW #Syria has come to define much of what's happened since -- and it's constrained/shaped #HTS too.

warontherocks.com/2017/10/turkey…

Once it was was clear that #HTS had become something altogether new & #AlQaeda had confirmed so, I wrote an in-depth cover story for @CTCWP dissecting how the very public breakup occurred & what it meant for the future.

ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-…

Zooming out a little more, I also put together an in-depth look at #AlQaeda's (leadership) struggles worldwide, much of which emanated from #HTS's emergence & the evidence that "going local" was a viable path for AQ affiliates detached from AQC:

hudson.org/research/15533…

What #HTS represents today is hard to define -- it's a hodgepodge of several strands of jihadist, revolutionary & Islamist effort.

But what's clear is its changed & that change has arguably revealed a "3rd way" for jihadists worldwide; one that appears intelligent & viable.

#HTS's Salvation Govt runs a highly effective campaign against #ISIS across #Idlib (100s killed & arrested) & it's decimated #AlQaeda's affiliate, Huras al-Din. The latter accuses HTS of feeding intel for U.S. drone strikes.

But it also suppresses civil society & activist media.

It's an incredibly complex issue that no Twitter thread can hope to explain without leaving many holes -- but the above tweets are intended to underline the unique nature of #HTS & what it represents.

And for now, Western governments appear baffled as to how to respond.

As @frontlinepbs confirms, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani's real name is Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa... something I got from 4 sources back in 2016.

His DoB remains debated: 1982-1984.

https://twitter.com/charles_lister/status/758682433051095041?lang=en

@frontlinepbs Good to see @frontlinepbs going into detail about #Assad's all-out facilitation of the jihadist effort against U.S. troops in #Iraq.

I covered that over several chapters in The Syrian Jihad -- literally 1,000s were bused, trained & armed by #Syria military intelligence.

@frontlinepbs Jolani traveled to #Iraq 2-3 weeks before U.S. troops invaded -- he was in #Baghdad when "Shock & Awe" began.

He claims he opposed AQI/#Zarqawi's killing of civilians in #Iraq -- but he never quit the resistance.

@nadabakos confirms CIA knew of him as a non-top tier commander.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos "Around 2005" Jolani was arrested by U.S. troops in #Mosul & he spent "most of the following 5yrs" in Camp Bucca.

During his detention, he wrote a 50-page "research paper" about how to expand the jihad into #Syria.

He wasn't released until shortly before the Arab Spring.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos #Jolani sent his "Research paper" to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi laying out how to bring the jihad to #Syria 'without sectarianism.'

Jolani confirms what I wrote 6yrs ago in The Syrian Jihad: he entered #Syria with 6 AQI commanders, after stiff resistance from some of AQI/ISI command.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos .@frontlinepbs goes on swiftly to illustrate how #Nusra grew support amid [some of] #Syria's opposition -- but what's missed out is just how *unpopular* it was at first, from late-2011 to late-2012.

The shift in perception took some time - it wasn't by any means from Day 1.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos .@frontlinepbs pins Jolani down on his attacks on rivals, but he only appears to answer for his turning on #ISIS (not the FSA, Ahrar etc.).

He only says such confrontations were "a long story" & "inevitable."

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos In addition to taking @frontlinepbs's Martin Smith around #Idlib in his personal car, #Jolani also took PBS on a tour of #Idlib city.

PBS then rightfully highlights #HTS record of torture & detention; and the case of civilian activist Samer al-Salloum.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos At the close of the @frontlinepbs show, Amb. Jim Jeffrey (former U.S. #Syria Envoy) confirms for the 1st time that he *did* receive messages from #HTS, via intermediaries requesting dialogue/relationship -- to which he refused to respond.

The #Biden admin refused to comment.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos "I repeat and reiterate that the era, our involvement with #AlQaeda in the past was an era, and it ended."

-- #HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-#Jolani

We as analysts have known this for years now, but for someone like Jolani to utter those words at all is no insignificant act.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos Lots more details in @frontlinepbs' full transcript of the #Jolani interview.

He spent time in Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper & al-Taji Prison. He was released as #Syria's uprising began -- the ISI's northern emir helped #Jolani sent a 50-page "research paper" to Baghdadi.

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos #Jolani met #Baghdadi before going to #Syria in late-2011:

- "Honestly, I was a bit surprised by him. He didn't have a great competence to analyze situations. He didn’t have a strong personality."

#Baghdadi gave #Jolani $50-60,000 per month to purchase weapons "buried in sand."

@frontlinepbs @nadabakos NEW -- #Jolani says that after #Baghdadi's release from Camp Bucca in #Iraq, he went immediately to #Syria & spent "3-4 years" there.

That'd mean he was based in #Syria from [roughly] 2005-2009.

That's a huge new allegation to add to #Assad's facilitation of ISI's insurgency.