There’s been a lot of discussion lately about the level of #Taliban control in #Afghanistan, so this is a brief THREAD on that topic. 1/n
The debates about district control go back a long time. I was first involved in these during my time @CENTCOM circa 2009. At that time, ISAF was producing district control maps, as was CENTCOM & @DefenseIntel (among others). None of them agreed on methods or results. 2/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel Later, while with ISAF & at the command’s request, I wrote an internal memo laying out the challenges with the various methodologies involved with assessing "control" at the district level in #Afghanistan. 3/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel Some of the more significant issues w/it entail: What does “control” really mean & how should it be characterized? What are the appropriate indicators & data sources for assessing it? Are districts the best (or even a meaningful) unit of measure for it? 4/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel These Qs have never been fully resolved & so the discussion continues today. IMO, “control” is a fraught concept for a bunch of reasons. But its conceptual simplicity to lay audiences makes it nonetheless appealing & so it persists in popular forums. 5/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel@billroggio@WarOnTheRocks It’s a credit to @billroggio that he stuck w/it while others packed it in. While his maps suffer from the imperfections of the “control” concept as described above & limits of his sources/methods, the consistency of his work over time nonetheless provides something useful. 7/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel@billroggio@WarOnTheRocks It's interesting now, however, to see a bunch of different control maps emerging again. Not surprising w/the #Taliban offensive + US withdrawal in the news, but interesting nonetheless. Here is one published by the BBC recently. It differs markedly from @billroggio's map. 8/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel@billroggio@WarOnTheRocks@mansfieldintinc@BBC@AANafgh The point of all this is: 1) “Control” is not a well-defined or consensus concept—different analysts/sources differ on what it means; 2) None of these maps should be viewed as precise—I would put a ROM estimate of +/- 10-15% error bars on control %s derived from any of them. 11/n
@PentagonPresSec MR. KIRBY: @SecDef & the Chairman were proud & delighted to greet GEN Miller earlier this morning when he arrived at Andrews Air Force Base. I think you saw some of the coverage of that. & the Secretary, I think, will have a little something more out today... 2/n
@PentagonPresSec@SecDef ...but @SecDef deeply appreciates GEN Miller's leadership, not only over the last three years in #Afghanistan but over the long course of his career. Certainly there's very few military officers who have as much experience as he does in AFG over the last 20 years &... 3/n
@PentagonPresSec MR. KIRBY: Earlier today, you know there was a transition of authority ceremony held at Resolute Support HQ in Kabul, #Afghanistan, marking the transition of command authorities from GEN Scott Miller to the commander of @CENTCOM, Gen Frank McKenzie... 2/n
@PentagonPresSec@CENTCOM ...As the secretary approved earlier this month, and as we outlined to you on July 2nd, Gen McKenzie will now lead the US mission in #Afghanistan, and that's focused on 4 things: 1) protecting our diplomatic presence in country; 2) enabling the safe operation of... 3/n
"Last autumn, with the departure of American troops from #Afghanistan looming after the US signed a withdrawal deal with the #Taliban, several of the most senior security officials in Kabul urged President @ashrafghani to make some hard choices." 1/n
@ashrafghani "The Afghan army & police needed to retrench, figures incl the then defense minister, Assadullah Khalid, told Ghani. Remote outposts & rural areas where troops held little more than the cluster of govt & security buildings that make up a district center should be abandoned." 2/n
@ashrafghani "Troops & ammunition drawn back from these areas could focus on the fight for more important assets, such as key roads & border crossings, as forces adapted to the loss of the US air force & other technical support that had been critical to fighting the Taliban, they argued." 3/n
A number of people have been asking my thoughts on recent developments in #Afghanistan. Now that I’m back from a week of sandcastle building, a THREAD to that effect. 1/n
1st, a few thoughts on recent #Taliban gains. That the TB are suddenly gaining ground in rural areas shouldn’t have been a surprise to anyone. eg, I predicted the group would have a slight military adv post-US withdrawal in a @CTCWP paper back in JAN: ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s… 2/n
@CTCWP The #Taliban have—for years—been employing a strategy of capturing rural areas IOT generate position & resources to threaten more populated areas, as we @CNA_org described in our independent threat assessment for Congress back in 2013 (cna.org/cna_files/pdf/…). 3/n
Q: A couple things on the president speech on #Afghanistan. Can you say what, if any, progress DOD is making on the over-the-horizon negotiations? & can you talk a little bit about the #Taliban and what progress they've made on district takeovers? 2/n
How far do you think they've gotten? I've heard over a hundred. At this point can you talk a little bit about what the situation is on the ground with the #Taliban?
MR. KIRBY: So, on over-the-horizon capabilities, we continue to explore additional OTH capabilities... 3/n
Q: A question about #Afghanistan and trying to understand the sequence of events as the US military winds up its activities. When Gen Miller leaves, will that mark the end of Resolute Support mission or will there be some sort of interim period between the next several days… 2/n
…or weeks and September, when there will be some other commander or some other mission follow on?
MR. KIRBY: I don't want to get too far ahead of process here. Resolute Support is a NATO operation, so it's really more appropriate for NATO to speak to the future of it… 3/n