Thread by @LaurenceBroers

Yesterday 19/7 there were reports of gunfire, along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, in the area of Sadarak / Yeraskh. Azerbaijani social media subsequently suggested reports of advances by Azerbaijani forces.

If true would likely be in the no man’s lands that still obtain between the lines of actual control in this area. (In summer 2018, Azerbaijan also reported advances in this area, meaning advances into no man’s lands: cacianalyst.org/publications/a…)

aysor.am/en/news/2021/0… On 20/7 local Armenian community head in Yeraskh Rudik Oghikyan was reported wounded by Azerbaijani fire, on the same day that Ilham Aliyev is meeting Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss implementation of Armenia-Azerbaijan agreements so far.

These ceasefire violations follow earlier incident 14/7 when an Armenian soldier was killed near Nakhchivan, and previous incidents in other border areas. Why do ceasefire violations continue despite the ceasefire agreement of 9/11/2020?

Baku is seeking to avoid a repeat of the 1990s – where the militarily victorious side, then Armenia, was not able to consolidate its victory into a favourable peace from a position of strength.

Azerbaijan is consequently seeking to maximise pressure on Armenia to force it into a comprehensive peace agreement, for which – from Baku’s perspective – there will never be a better time than now.

Tensions also put pressure on Russia to ‘deliver’ on agreements reached so far, especially on what Azerbaijan refers to as the “Zangezur corridor”, a right of safe transit across Armenia’s southernmost Syunik region conceded by Nikol Pashinyan in the 9/11/2020 CF declaration.

valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/h… This would ostensibly be a crucial link in the opening up of regional connectivity, but as I argued in this piece for @valdaitweets, this will remain illusory for as long as coercive bargaining tactics prevail.

Beyond military pressure, Azerbaijan is pressuring Armenia with purported claims on Syunik, expressed through territorial revival of what was originally a Russian tsarist-era administrative unit, the Zangezur uezd, as a modern economic region + historical Azerbaijani ethno-space.

The logic seems to be “two can play at that game” and aims at establishing parity between Karabakh and Zangezur as contested spaces and a quid pro quo dynamic: if Armenia “renounces” Karabakh, Azerbaijan will “renounce” Zangezur.

This comes simultaneously with a visit by an Azerbaijani delegation to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, amid speculation that Azerbaijan may be ready – since it considers its own conflict solved – to recognise the TRNC.

That would be a stark reversal of Azerbaijan’s role as defender of the territorial integrity norm over the last 25 years. Promoting the "Zangezur" concept, Azerbaijani think-tankers are using the same kinds of territorially expansionist messages + tropes they condemned for years.

Contesting Armenia’s territorial integrity also shapes perceptions of what is actually in conflict, keeping the focus on the inter-state dimension + the regulation of borders between ARM and AZ, rather than the governance of majority-minority relations within the same state.

Current tensions therefore serve to maximise pressure on Armenia, remind Russia of its obligations, keep Azerbaijan mobilised around the axis of the conflict and keep the focus off discourses of self-determination.