@PentagonPresSec Q: On the SIVs, the flights. do you have any updates? They were supposed to come in on the 29th. Have they landed? Processing at Fort Lee? Anything? 2/n
@PentagonPresSec MR. KIRBY: I’m going to have to refer you to the State Dept for that. I don’t have any updates for you. As you know, when this first group of special immigrants do get to the US, they will be temporarily housed at Fort Lee. 3/n
@PentagonPresSec ...That is all still moving right along. And we're certainly pleased to be able to contribute to this effort. But our focus really is on the temporary housing of this first group, and I would let the State Dept speak to process beyond that. 4/n
@PentagonPresSec Q: Do you know, are there, are there any plans for any other bases or any other temporary housing kind of in the works outside of Fort Lee? 5/n
@PentagonPresSec MR. KIRBY: Right now the focus is on Fort Lee. We don't have a specific request from the State Dept to pursue another installation. Obviously, this is a State led effort and should there be that need, we will certainly take into consideration... 6/n
@PentagonPresSec ...But right now there's no additional request for assistance in terms of U.S., domestic U.S. installations. 7/7
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@SIGARHQ Data from @USFOR_A shows that enemy-initiated attacks increased significantly since the signing of the US-#Taliban Agreement. During the past quarter (March – May 2021), USFOR-A reported 10,383 enemy-initiated attacks and 3,268 effective enemy-initiated attacks. 2/n
@SIGARHQ@USFOR_A Most ANA corps refuse to execute missions w/o spt from the ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), according to NSOCC-A. When ANASOC forces do arrive, they're misused to perform tasks intended for conventional forces such as route clearance, checkpoint security, & QRF. 3/n
There’s been a lot of discussion lately about the level of #Taliban control in #Afghanistan, so this is a brief THREAD on that topic. 1/n
The debates about district control go back a long time. I was first involved in these during my time @CENTCOM circa 2009. At that time, ISAF was producing district control maps, as was CENTCOM & @DefenseIntel (among others). None of them agreed on methods or results. 2/n
@CENTCOM@DefenseIntel Later, while with ISAF & at the command’s request, I wrote an internal memo laying out the challenges with the various methodologies involved with assessing "control" at the district level in #Afghanistan. 3/n
@PentagonPresSec MR. KIRBY: @SecDef & the Chairman were proud & delighted to greet GEN Miller earlier this morning when he arrived at Andrews Air Force Base. I think you saw some of the coverage of that. & the Secretary, I think, will have a little something more out today... 2/n
@PentagonPresSec@SecDef ...but @SecDef deeply appreciates GEN Miller's leadership, not only over the last three years in #Afghanistan but over the long course of his career. Certainly there's very few military officers who have as much experience as he does in AFG over the last 20 years &... 3/n
@PentagonPresSec MR. KIRBY: Earlier today, you know there was a transition of authority ceremony held at Resolute Support HQ in Kabul, #Afghanistan, marking the transition of command authorities from GEN Scott Miller to the commander of @CENTCOM, Gen Frank McKenzie... 2/n
@PentagonPresSec@CENTCOM ...As the secretary approved earlier this month, and as we outlined to you on July 2nd, Gen McKenzie will now lead the US mission in #Afghanistan, and that's focused on 4 things: 1) protecting our diplomatic presence in country; 2) enabling the safe operation of... 3/n
"Last autumn, with the departure of American troops from #Afghanistan looming after the US signed a withdrawal deal with the #Taliban, several of the most senior security officials in Kabul urged President @ashrafghani to make some hard choices." 1/n
@ashrafghani "The Afghan army & police needed to retrench, figures incl the then defense minister, Assadullah Khalid, told Ghani. Remote outposts & rural areas where troops held little more than the cluster of govt & security buildings that make up a district center should be abandoned." 2/n
@ashrafghani "Troops & ammunition drawn back from these areas could focus on the fight for more important assets, such as key roads & border crossings, as forces adapted to the loss of the US air force & other technical support that had been critical to fighting the Taliban, they argued." 3/n
A number of people have been asking my thoughts on recent developments in #Afghanistan. Now that I’m back from a week of sandcastle building, a THREAD to that effect. 1/n
1st, a few thoughts on recent #Taliban gains. That the TB are suddenly gaining ground in rural areas shouldn’t have been a surprise to anyone. eg, I predicted the group would have a slight military adv post-US withdrawal in a @CTCWP paper back in JAN: ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s… 2/n
@CTCWP The #Taliban have—for years—been employing a strategy of capturing rural areas IOT generate position & resources to threaten more populated areas, as we @CNA_org described in our independent threat assessment for Congress back in 2013 (cna.org/cna_files/pdf/…). 3/n