Thread by @Minalami

Thread on 9/11 anniversary, based on @BBCMonitoring analysis. It looks at the state of jihad, particularly that of al-Qaeda, in the context of the current geopolitical developments, esp the Taliban's return to power: monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c202vk… 👇

Jihadists are celebrating the 20th anniversary of 9/11 as a double victory. It coincides with the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan, seen as a coup for jihad, and the departure of all US troops from the country /1

Al-Qaeda has been at the forefront in congratulating the Taliban on their "historic victory", saying it foreshadows jihadist gains elsewhere. Jihadists are largely interpreting Taliban's return to power as a divine sign from Allah 2/

They see it as heralding a new era in which Western powers are fatigued by involvement in conflicts abroad, and in some cases bowing to jihadist force, or leaving ill-equipped local governments to deal with domestic militancy /3

The anniversary also comes at a time when Western countries are reducing or ending their military presence in conflict zones in Muslim-majority countries - a move jihadists have been pushing for and are now watching with anticipation /4

Western air power, especially US fighter jets and drones, are the bane of jihadist existence, and without US air support, these groups expect they will have a good chance to overpower local forces /5

Over the past year, and since the outbreak of the Covid pandemic, as well as race protests & political polarisation in US, jihadists have read the events as indicating that US would be too busy with its internal problems to bother with jihadist-struck conflict zones abroad /6

Commenting on these events, al-Qaeda in 2020 called on its followers to "get ready" and to "make preparations" for the coming phase /7

Many jihadist groups are hoping to emulate the Taliban model by engaging in relentless jihad to have leverage. The sticking point is that following the Taliban model demands a level of flexibility and pragmatism which can be at odds with hardline principles /8

The opposite model is represented by IS, with its bloodthirsty, uncompromising campaign of attacks on hard and soft targets, combatants and civilians, and its inflexible stances. Jihadists have come to see IS's model as one of short-lived "victory" /9

But jihadist flexibility and pragmatism is a thorny subject that can significantly discredit a group in the eyes of the wider jihadist community, even if it brings political gains /10

Despite their high praise of the Taliban, jihadist hardliners are closely watching how strict its application of Sharia will be. Jihadist hawks will not keep quiet if Taliban is deemed to have committed clear Sharia transgressions or goes too far in its flexible stances /11

Going back to al-Qaeda and its threat today, it's worth noting that in recent years the group has suffered successive blows to its leadership and operations /12

This has caused some of its branches, such as AQIM in North Africa, AQAP in Yemen, Hurras al-Din in Syria and AQIS in South Asia, to largely restrict their activity to issuing statements and online propaganda, with occasional bursts of mostly low-profile militant activity /13

Al-Qaeda has not even been able to challenge with evidence rumours since last year that its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had died of natural causes or had become incapacitated /14

Nevertheless, al-Qaeda is far from eliminated as a jihadist threat. This is partly owing to its two lethal African affiliates- JNIM in Mali & al-Shabab in Somalia- and its ongoing agenda of seeking to inspire, incite & orchestrate jihadist attacks in the West and against Jews /15

Its threat can also be linked to its efforts to capitalise on subjects that strike a chord with many Muslims, such as the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, over which al-Qaeda has heavily incited revenge attacks, and the Palestinian issue, which is at the heart of al-Qaeda messaging /16

For example, despite its low activity on the ground, al-Qaeda's Yemen branch (AQAP) continues to incite "lone wolf" attacks. Its notorious "Inspire Guide" in Jun urged Muslims in US to take advantage of favourable gun control policies to carry out mass shootings /17

Al-Qaeda's number one enemy appears to still be the US, but France now appears to be a close second if not shares that position /18

Since September last year, al-Qaeda and its branches launched a coordinated and persistent campaign of incitement against France and its citizens. This was over the subject of the controversial Prophet Muhammed cartoons as well as France's anti-jihadist operation in the Sahel /19

The string of deadly attacks in France in late 2020 linked to the cartoons have not been claimed by al-Qaeda or its rival IS, but were cheered in their messages and hailed as examples to follow. They were also preceded by al-Qaeda incitement online /20

In fact, over the past year, it has been al-Qaeda, rather than its more violent rival IS, that has been persistently inciting lone actor attacks in the West /21

IS, on the other hand, seems more preoccupied with rebuilding its local strength in new and old areas of activity in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and other non-Western regions, in an effort to revive its global caliphate project /22

Despite jihadist jubilation & hopes over the return of Taliban to power, and despite intl. fears that Afghanistan will once again become a haven for jihadists, it's currently unclear, perhaps even to jihadists, what level of support they may or may not get from Taliban /23

So far, both al-Qaeda and the Taliban have remained deliberately vague about the current status of their old ties. Al-Qaeda has much to gain from its alliance with the resurgent Taliban, but the Afghan group potentially has much to lose if it again harbours hardline jihadists /24