Let's think a bit about Frost's speech today and the use of threats in negotiation
1/
To be clear, this is negotiation, given that there is a live process of interaction between EU and UK, both on the narrow issue of making the Protocol work and more generally on the overall relationship
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Threats in negotiation are simply the mirror of promises: things that might be in the future, depending on whether the other side do or don't do the thing you want
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Three simple tests for a threat/promise to stick, broadly speaking:
- it is credible?
- it is proportionate?
- will you actually do it?
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Obviously a bit of overlap, but each criterion speaks to a different aspect
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Credibility is a function of how much the threat/promise matches the problem to be solved, and how much it improve that problem for the threatener
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Proportionality is about whether the threat/promise matches the size of the problem: underkill produces a shrug; overkill increases chances of counteraction
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And finally, are you realistically going to do what you say you threaten/promise? The emptier your words, the less credible it is
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On Art.16, Frost isn't in the clear on any of the three dimensions
It doesn't solve the problems he sees; it's not a proportionate step; and if it's clear it can be used, why hasn't UK used it?
Remember that Art.16 is designed to deal with temporary situations, so it can't be a permanent tool (we'll leave the review and cross-linkage aspects for now), so essentially UK can use it only 2 purposes:
- easing pressure on NI
- raising pressure on EU to renegotiate
2/
On easing pressure,l on NI, the only limit to disapplication of Protocol is that which is under UK control (ie can't stop EU doing what they do)
That means - at most - full disapplication w/in NI/rUK
3/
Thought I'd check how much COM Presidents have actually talked about Brexit in #SOTEU, following VdL's complete silence yesterday
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Yes, this is the first #SOTEU that has unambiguously avoided the topic since 2013 (note, no speeches in 2014 or 2019), but 2016 also made no direct reference (although certainly can read entire content that year as repost to #EURef)
2/
2015 was easily the longest absolute text, reaffirming value of UK membership
2017 was very passing
2018 & 20 were about need to conclude negotiations
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tl;dr the UK isn't credibly able to pursue this option, but that doesn't seem to stop its periodic reappearance
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Today's variant is essentially the same, but instead of you being the madman, someone else is, and you're trying to use that to leverage concessions from your counterpart
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So #UACES2021 is a wrap. Another excellent demonstration of the strength of European Studies and convening power of @UACES (plus of what a lovely bunch of people you all are)
Huge thanks to UACES office for their hard work to make this all happen, @emlinne, Melina & Emma
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The end of #UACES2021 also means I take up my role as @UACES Chair. @NicholasStartin has been a model of leadership and collegiality during an even-more-than-expected period of disruption and I hope to build on his many good works
2/
.@UACES has always been my 'home' association and it's always been a place of support and encouragement and I look forward to making sure that continues for all our members, alongside my fellow officers @JocelynMawdsley@DrKathrynSimps@RGuerrina
3/
I'm going to go through this once again, today mainly because 'we didn't realise how the Northern Ireland Protocol would work in practice' is no grounds for trying to get out of your treaty commitments