Thread by @Usherwood

Some thoughts on the UK's approach to the NI Protocol and what that might mean

Short version: UK wants to hold it in unstable situation, to avoid wearing costs of Brexit domestically, but this isn't a long-term strategy

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Let's start with how to understand UK HMG's approach to things right now

It seems like there are 3 main ways of looking at it

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First is the 'ugh' model: HMG doesn't like the Protocol and just wants it changed to something (maybe even anything) different

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Protocol evidently is a compromise, but maybe it's just a compromise too far, so HMG wants something to salve the wound, be that for material benefit or their self-image

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Problem with this is that 'the problem' isn't clear. As last week showed, this is a highly mobile target, which doesn't suggest this is simply about getting a scalp to show for it all

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So maybe it's the second model: 'ohhh'

Maybe the UK wants to change to some other specific model it has in mind

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This goes beyond the first model, since it comes with an alternative

And we know there have been lots of alternatives in the past [alternative arrangements, as it were]

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Surely a starting point for talking down what you have is a vision of what you want? Especially as if you have that vision, then you can use it to paint a picture for the other side

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So we can look for that vision

And not really find it. Not in the Command Paper, not in any of the various speeches, not elsewhere

Generic, sunlight uplands, sure, but not a concrete plan

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And that takes us to the final model: the 'err'

UK obviously doesn't like the Protocol, but doesn't have an alternative in mind, but chooses to hold things up in the air

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The aim here isn't to 'solve' the problem, but instead to hold the problem in a state of tension and instability

But why?

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Brexit is a negative sum exercise: it's about allocating the economic, political and social costs of withdrawal

As I've noted in the past (blogs.surrey.ac.uk/politics/2017/…) the Q was always what would happen when people noticed the costs they wear

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As I've also noted, Brexit costs fall mechanically much more heavily on the UK than the EU

https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1285863149422489600?s=20

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So we might suggest that UK is well aware of all this, so holding the withdrawal settlement in an unsettled position can be useful in reducing any blame for the subsequent costs

That needs some other things to be true to work

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Domestically, it needs a public that's not that bothered by the 'fine print' (and I doubt that GB is that bothered about NI, sadly), and an opposition that can't agree how (or whether) to challenge HMG's EU policy

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From the EU, it needs desire to keep things on track and not to escalate tensions, so HMG can do the regulating of the rhetoric/action

Broadly, that's the case, as EU is deeply fixed to making Protocol work

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Multiple upsides of this:
- keeps EU as bogeyman for domestic purposes ('we're trying to fix this, but they're stopping us')
- keeps Brexit alive as stick to beat LAB
- distracts from other stuff (take your pick)
- continues 'working to fulfil will of the people'

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It also largely obviates need to create an alternative plan that might replace Protocol, although it does also leave space for someone to come up with something

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So it's all good, right?

Not so much

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This approach is not a stable one, either in its use of keeping things in a high state of tension, or in the tools being used

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We've run through most of the practical problems of the Protocol's operationalisation already: the COM proposals last week more than cover those to make it hard to use that line as an on-going one for not negotiating

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Frost's comments on CJEU role were an effort to open a new, more fundamental line of problem that both sides know has no viable solution

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That keeps things unstable, but it also introduces the problem of how to proceed

UK can't easily back down on this one
EU won't negotiate on it

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That deadlock raises the chances of escalation to show that this is for real and not a bluff

UK using Art.16?
EU re-activating its dispute cases?

I leave it to others to sketch out the spiral that ensues

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So let's circle back

UK wants to avoid Protocol settled in, but its actions now risk rapidly multiplying problems

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It's hard to see how to avoid this

UK might climb down the ladder handed them last week by COM, but that collapses the 'err' model

EU could make another offer, but that'll just encourage UK to push again, for even more

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In sum: making it up as you go along remains bad diplomacy and bad politics (and only occasionally decent movies)

/end (but not the end, obviously)

And thanks to the tweeps offering various solutions to this

That's literally the point of the thread: if this model is correct, then solutions are not what's wanted, but just ways to keep things up in the air without kicking off [yes, a mixed metaphor]