@GI_TOC field researchers documented over 400 weapons in illicit markets across #Somalia. Almost 10% of these consisted of Type 56-1 rifles believed to have originated in arms transfers from Iran to the Houthis.
The Type 56-1 rifle is a Chinese-manufactured copy of the Soviet AKMS assault rifle, first produced in 1956.
Since August 2018, thousands of Type 56-1 rifles have been seized during maritime interdictions of arms-trafficking dhows believed to have been supplying the Houthis.
The report cross-referenced serial numbers of Type 56-1 rifles found in Somalia against those of over 5,000 rifles seized in four separate maritime interdictions.
It concludes that most, if not all, of the Somalia rifles shared a common origin, most likely Iranian state stocks.
Serial number proximity among captured weapons, the use of similar packaging, GPS tracks of seized arms-trafficking dhows, and human intelligence from within smuggling gangs all supported an Iranian origin.
One arms-trafficking dhow seized by the US Navy had a GPS device onboard indicating it had been present at a small anchorage near Jask, which hosts an Iranian naval base. Its "home" was saved as the as the Yemeni port of Mukalla, a well-known arms smuggling hub.
Iran, of course, is only one party fuelling the conflict in #Yemen. @GI_TOC researchers viewed dozens of G3 rifles that had been trafficked from Yemen, one of which bore #Saudi markings.
Why do the findings matter?
Access to a plentiful maritime arms pipeline could greatly benefit Al-Shabaab militants in Puntland and Galmudug, and ISIL militants in Puntland.
If in future these militant groups gain access to heavier weaponry available through this pipeline (e.g. machine guns, sniper or anti-materiel rifles, or even ATGMs), it could potentially alter the balance of power with gov't and other armed forces in Somalia.
Second, Type 56-1 rifles derived from the Iran-Yemen supply chain were documented in several towns bordering eastern #Ethiopia and #Kenya. The possible cross-border flow of arms has destabilizing implications, particularly given the ongoing civil crisis in Ethiopia.
Third, political tensions in Somalia over a long-delayed presidential election may drive a higher demand for arms in the south. Such arms flows could fuel political violence, such as we saw in #Mogadishu in April.
To sum up: while traditionally viewed through the lens of the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry, this report reveals one dynamic of how the #Yemen war has rippled out into the Horn of Africa.
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The report presents three case studies to illustrate the intersection between illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing networks and state corruption:
#1 - The environmentally destructive operations of gillnetters of Iranian origin off the #Puntland coast, abetted by a network of local agents and fisheries ministry officials.
In December 2020, less than a month and a half before a highly volatile electoral process was supposed to take place in #Somalia, Turkey delivered 1,000 G3 rifles and 90,000 rounds of ammunition to the Somali federal government.
The materiel was intended for use by the Turkish-trained Haramcad ("Cheetah") special police unit.
Haramcad has since been linked to crackdowns on demonstrators and attacks on opposition politicians.
Yesterday, the unit raided the Mogadishu HQ of independent media outlet @MediaMustaqbal, confiscating equipment and beating up a journalist.
The Financial Governance Committee (#FGC) has issued a damning advisory note concerning the #FGS Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources' (MPMR's) oil & gas licensing efforts.
Current approach provides "poor value for money...that may last for 40 years or more."
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The FGC raises concerns over "incomplete compliance with the FGS legal framework, and inadequate protection of FGS’s financial interests." Current MPMR approach risks "future legal and/or compensation claims against FGS."
The FGS makes seven principal recommendations. #7: "PSA negotiations do not prioritise short-term revenue (i.e. signature bonuses) at the expense of longer-term value."
The dhow Al Bari 2 was seized in the Gulf of Aden by the #Saudi Navy on 24 June 2020. It was discovered to be carrying a consignment of arms reportedly destined for the #Houthi administration in #Yemen.
Here's a full list of the seizure contents:
The head of the network responsible for the Al Bari 2 smuggling operation is Mohamed Omar Salim, a Somali national based in Bosaso. Salim's network has links to #Somaliland, Yemen, the #UAE, and Iran.
@GI_TOC issued a detailed statement earlier today in response to Amal Express's claims (attached below). But in my personal capacity as the author of the report, I will respond here with some additional thoughts.
In its 9 October 2020 press release, Amal Express disputed the authenticity of an October 2019 remittance receipt published in my report. The receipt detailed the transfer of $19,500 by an arms dealer in Bosaso to an individual under US Treasury (OFAC) sanction. (2/14)
Amal's statement contained several inaccuracies, but the most personally damaging was the claim that I had ignored evidence the company had presented to me proving this remittance slip to be a "forgery." (3/14)