#Russian Foreign Ministry has published its proposals on security guarantees as submitted to the US and #NATO: "Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 9 articles mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol… 1/x
2/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees", 8 articles, mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol…
3/ Excellent thread by @walberque below although I disagree with the overall conclusion: The NATO-Russia agreement proposal goes way beyond the 2009 European Security Treaty in at least three main respects:
4/ (a) no futher NATO enlargement, (b) no NATO military activity (any!) in Eastern Europe, Central Asia/South Caucasus, (c) no land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.
5/ Point (c) is very interesting indeed: This would essentially also mean - no Iskander in Kaliningrad, the Western and Southern Military districts! No 9M729 in the European part of Russia. Unbelievable.
6/ As a stand alone measure, this is easily the most comprehensive proposal on disarmament and military restraint since the CFE treaty. But since there is no talk about verification or even a sequence but simply a declaration, this proposal is hardly serious. A smokescreen.
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We don’t need #Yalta 2.0 or #Helsinki 2.0 in #Europe now. We need #Stockholm 2.0: The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe 1984-1986. Crucial at the time, largely forgotten today. A thread. 1/14
2/For context: Before Stockholm East-West relations had hit rock bottom. In 1976, the SU started to deploy SS-20. In 1979, it invaded Afghanistan & NATO took its double track decision. In Sep 1983 the SU shot down Korean aircraft 747. In Dec 1983 Pershing II arrived in Europe.
3/In response the SU walked out of the ongoing bilateral talks with the US on INF missiles in Geneva and stopped negotiating conventional arms control (MBFR) with NATO in Vienna. But at the same time Moscow agreed to talks in Stockholm. The conference opened in Jan 1984.
Russian MFA publishes a list of demands the West must meet to defuse tensions & ensure Russian security: It wants legal guarantees from NATO not to expand to the East and a formal renouncement of the 2008 Bucharest summit decision on Georgia & Ukraine 1/x mid.ru/foreign_policy…
2/It also wants NATO members to legally guarantee that they will not deploy weapons (strike-systems, probably long-range) that pose a threat to Russia on the territory of neighboring countries, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not.
3/In seeks reactions by NATO on previous proposals to reduce tensions by limiting military exercises in the border zone, clarifying safety distances for warships in the Baltic and Black Sea, and the return to direct mil-to-mil dialogue, Russia-NATO, US-NATO.
Now public: On 22 December Russia send a verbal note to #Openskiestreaty members stating that w/o written guarantees until 1 January 2021 on data non-proliferation & territorial access, it might be forced to initiate withdrawing procedure. 1/5 sueddeutsche.de/politik/luftue…
2/5 Negative answer by 16 foreign ministers, including Heiko Maas and Jean-Yves Le Drian, followed on 30 December. They are ready to organize an extraordinary OSCC meeting but otherwise want to discuss the Russian initiative at the next ordinary session on 25 January.
3/5 Translated quote from SZ (not original): "We believe that the new condition expressed in your verbal note reflects a preference on your part as a necessity". Indeed, it is unclear, why Russia is forcing the review process of decision No. 9/02 that itself initiated in November
The #Openskiestreaty docs published by #Russia yesterday also include the manuscript by S. Ryabkov from the state conference on July 6. His speech (in Russian) includes one surprisingly blunt remark and three practical issues that will come up soon 1/10 mid.ru/en/foreign_pol…
2/10 Ryabkov takes issue with Georgia's position. Remember that Tbilisi ended its treaty obligations towards Moscow in April 2012 in response to Russia implementing the treaty's 10 km border rule to non-member states with respect to Abkhazia/South Ossetia (since 2010).
3/10 This status conflict (unrelated to the treaty as such) in consequence stopped the treaty's implementation in 2018, because Russia succeeded in making a bid for a flight over Georgia. In turn, Georgia refused to give its consent to the entire quota distribution that year.
On 21 May the #Trump administration announced the U.S. #withdrawal from the #OpenSkiesTreaty. It will take effect in November. Tomorrow the 34 member states hold a virtual state conference to decide the future of the treaty. Can they save it? Bottom line: Yes, they can! 1/15
2/15 The US could theoretically still reverse its position and remain in the treaty. In May #Pompeo stated that “if #Russia returns to full compliance” the US may reconsider. BUT: This won’t happen! The US has already stopped implementing the treaty. No more US flights this year.
3/15 There are three major issues: First, what about the other member states? Will they remain or follow the U.S. by withdrawing? Second, how will Russia/Belarus react? Third, how does the U.S. withdrawal affect the treaty on a technical level? Let’s look at them one at a time.
Amb. Kelin makes six claims about alleged U.S. 'breaches', most of which are difficult to access without more detailed information. Yet, if "US grievances over Russian ‘non-compliance’ relate to trivial matters", the same is true vice versa. 1/12 rusi.org/commentary/ope…
Half of these claims are new to the public. Several of them are deliberate, official retaliatory measures introduced in September 2017 to “encourage” Russia to return to full compliance with the Treaty. 2/12
1. Failure to ensure safe arrival at the point of entry/exit, by refusing to provide the required number of intermediate airfields /// Term "intermediate airfields" is unclear. Decision No 2/05 is about transit flights and flights from the border to the point of entry. 3/12 ///