Thread by @TimInHonolulu

1. Drones are not the same as combat aircraft. In the war in #Donbas it soon became apparent that modern air combat strategies would not play a role in the conflict. After the July 2014 #Russian Buk shoot down of #MH17 with some other combat air loses around that time, the air

2. over Donbas was seldom scene of combat operations. The war became like WWI but with even less air combat. I can't think of another protracted modern war since the #Chinese civil war where air power figured as little as it did in 2015 in #Ukraine. Mostly artillery like #China.

3. At the time of the heaviest fighting we were giving the #Ukrainians very little material support. Some intel but for the most part they were on their own. Like now they needed #counterbattery radars & better howitzers. HIMARS ideally but at least the radars & our M777 155mms.

4. I would have hoped that our few training missions with Ukraine gave their crews training on our guns but with reports of imminent Russian attack once again the Ukrainians are going to have to hold out with what they have.
I recall the Ukrainians had some Konkurs wire guided

5. #ATGMs that were a big help in the battle around #Mariupol. Having a ton of #Javelins & #NLAWS should make Russian tank & BMP crew nervous. In typical modern warfare the anti-tank infantry would be targeted by combat aircraft bombing sorties. But with systems like S-300 I've

6. serious doubts that Russian combat air support will be a decisive factor. Russian capabilities in a battle space where they don't face sophisticated SAMS that I have reported on for years in Syria does not give me a sense that Russia will be able to establish uncontested

7. skies within which to attack Ukrainian ground forces. Once the infantry realize they can kill tanks at will the Russian advance will likely halt and Putin will attempt another frozen conflict. A well armed infantry force with superior missiles might disrupt the Russian plans

8. long enough to prevent them from digging in and holding. The part of the battle that I simply don't have a clear understanding regarding capabilities is the Ukrainian armored force. I have not been able to find numbers that I trust regarding the Ukrainian tank force

9. nor do I have any understanding of their current deployment. Well-armed infantry with good US comms and intel, and a motivated Ukrainian tank force could bring surprising results. Especially with Russia's lack of armored infantry vehicles. Canvas covered trucks full of

10. Russian infantry riding into a battle against an infantry defending their homes stocked full of high-end western ATGM's is a possible script for Putin's personal Waterloo. That's why I remain with my assessment in December that Putin's strategic objective is Belarus that is

11. about to be annexed with NATO looking on, neither willing, nor able, to do anything about it.