Thread 🧵 on reports of personnel losses of #Russia in its invasion of #Ukraine. I am updating a thread on general loss claims. Russian personnel is so complicated it was going to derail that thread. Larger update w analysis coming later today. 1/
Original:
2/ Russian admitted to 1,351 KIA and 3,825 wounded in the RIA article on March 25. This sets up a minimum bound ria.ru/20220325/gensh…
3/ Ukraine claims 15,800 KIA and 47,400 in a simple 3:1 ratio. Note that because of updating issues, the UKR MOD graphic above notes 16,100 KIA. This sets a likely maximum bound minusrus.com/en as at 12 noon March 25
4/ American officials on March 22 said that a ‘conservative’ estimate puts the Russian military death toll at 7,000. This implies high confidence in the figure. nytimes.com/2022/03/22/wor…
5/ NATO officials have offered a range from 7,000 to 15,000 KIA and 30,000 to 40,000 total casualties. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/…
6/ When asked about this number, the US have not seen estimates “as high as NATO’s” and has “low confidence” in their assessments
7/ On March 21 @KPRU published an article quoting Russian losses at 9,861 KIA and 16,153 wounded. This was removed and it was claimed this information was falsely published due to hacking
9/ Other ongoing efforts to track Russian personnel losses include those of the BBC (557 at March 21) and Rob Lee, who both track reports of funerals and burials
10/ Russian casualties reports may not include DNR and LNR forces. On March 11, a local ombudsman reported 80 military KIA a 1,083 injured and 115 POW in Donbas interfax.com/newsroom/top-s…
11/ Prisoners of war have previously been claimed as 562 by Ukraine on March 19 and 500 by Russia some time prior to March 12
14/ Why is this hard? In May 2015, Vladimir Putin decreed that all military deaths will be listed as state secrets not only in times of war, in times of peace and, later, during special operations when no war has been announced theguardian.com/world/2015/may…
15/ Pressure on media and family not to report deaths
16/ Other complicating factors: The Russians may not know the true number of dead due to bad communications and failure to retrieve bodies. Intercepts suggest they may not have money for all funerals.
18/ Some argue that measuring individual losses is not as significant as looking at the number of battalion tactical groups Russia can field, on the basis that combat availability is not the same as combat effectiveness. 19/
US recently assessed Russia as below 90% combat power
22/ Can Russia quickly replace losses?
“the Russians do not have the capability to bring a lot of fresh effective combat power to the fight in a short period of time. Mobilizations the Russians are engaging in will [take] months at the earliest”
March 25 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Concept
When competing claims are made for losses, setting these claims against each other can narrow the range that actual numbers should lie within. Claims form a maximum and admissions form a minimum. NATO has stated that it uses a similar approach in forming its estimates
Examination of open source intelligence such as photos of equipment losses can further narrow the range or provide insight into which claims are closest to confirmable numbers. There are MANY limits to how much value this range has. This is not a predictive tool
#Moscow Exchange in #Russia reopens for limited trading in 33 most liquid shares for the first time since Feb 25. In opening minutes it’s up approx. 10%, with foreign sales and #short selling banned and the Ministry of Finance purchasing 1T Rubles (almost 10B USD) of shares
First day of #MOEX resumed trading finished up 4.4%, after giving up early gains that approached 12%
For context, the Moscow Exchange benchmark index is down approximately 27% year-to-date
I only see this making sense if it is a counter to some foreign suggestions of holding payments in escrow. Russia could cut the taps in response, but that might be too final a step. RU may think this props up Ruble even if payment held in escrow
Any way you look at it, this just seems like Russia limiting its own options
The upshot is boycott #oil and other #energy from #Russia. Tracking variables like a financial condition index are important to see if the economic measures being applied work. Quick explanation of the concept of a financial condition index below
Financial condition index is like the more standardized monetary condition index but uses variables such as currency price and asset price to make up the shortage of some conventional variables such as money supply and interest rate
Financial condition indices are usually proprietary and selection of appropriate variables requires consideration. The federal reserve prepares a US national FCI and analysts such as those at Goldman Sachs prepares various international FCIs
@calxandr Is there a role for Canada to play in attempting to win Brazilian cooperation on sanctions on sugar export? Who in Canada would attempt this?
Thread on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to committed and total forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT estimates
Interpretation
All approximations. Some sources update. Data taken March 19, 10 am EST. Not an expert. Biases exist in data sources. OSINT source relies on photo evidence and is an undercount. Local reporting is believed to report a smaller % of UKR losses. OSINT BDA has backlog