Thread by @ZimermanErik

Con't this prev thread.

Additionally, the increasing air superiority Russia enjoys in the east makes it difficult or impossible for large Ukrainian formations to move around in the east. Blown rail lines, bridges & incoming muddy season makes supply in the east difficult.

https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1510917731863961600

Russia has reversed many of its problems and heaped them on Ukraine by this withdrawal. It can regain the initiative and if it uses it intelligently, can deliver what is seen as a clear victory. However, it remains to be seen how drastic its withdrawal would be. Given the little

information available to me, compared to the Russian command, I would make this a fake withdrawal from the east bank. A sign that this at least being considered was the recent conquest of #Slavutych. Amazingly, the troops coming out of Belarus on the east bank could only approach

#Chernihiv from the north & not easily bypass it to move south towards Kiev and to link up with forces driving west from #Sumy. The forces and supply convoys that were trying to do that would come east from Belarus. There was no North-South corridor east of the #Dnieper.

#Slavutych is the crucial link for a North-South corridor east of the #Dnieper. Additionally, the double rail line from Belarus to #Chernihiv goes right through the town. Seizing this town right before the withdrawal might indicate that Russia was withdrawing from the west bank

around #Kiev but not the east. And that with the additional forces it hoped to finally properly encircle #Chernihiv & link up with the forces from #Sumy. This way #Kiev remains threatened from the east, and a large part of NE Ukraine can be completely cut off. This way,

the striking 400 kilometer drive from the Russian border to the eastern outskirts of Kiev by the 20th Guard Combined Arms Army is not wasted away. With the extra troops from the west bank, these areas and supply lines could be consolidated. It would also mean the Ukr troops freed

from western #Kiev, would still have this eastern front to contend with, rather than being free to help in Donetsk or the Kherson region. I would have imagined Russia would have preferred to do this partial withdrawal rather than a full one, especially since it seized #Slavutych

mere days before withdrawing. However, early indications is that the Russians are withdrawing completely from the #Chernihiv area and far west back towards #Sumy. The link up from the northern forces to those that drove west can be done around Chernihiv as described, but also at

any point further west such as at #Mena or even further west. This retains territory not critical to Russian ideology, that can be bargained away in negotiations. Maintaining only the territory Russia claims as Russian, will make the negotiations more difficult. #Zelensky needs

to show he is achieving Russian withdrawals in any deal, and Putin needs to show Russian territorial integrity was not compromised. So, we shall see how far this Russian withdrawal goes, if all the way north, and how far back east towards #Sumy. In either case, we can be quite

certain, we will be seeing those rested BTGs operating elsewhere, trying finish off the pincer movements and finish off cauldrons. Whether it is predictable moves out of #Izum southwards (where RU forces recently broke through) or more imaginative moves. Russia likewise seems to

have abandoned the flat areas east of the #Inhulets river in the #Kherson Oblast. From a manpower perspective, much easier to defend along the river. But they put Kherson itself (on the west side of the river) in danger and give up the ability for unpredictable fast drives across

perfect Tank country, and seem to prefer instead the slogging match in positions fortified for the last 8 years in #Donetsk. They must know things I don't.