I was the military advisor @UNCoISyria war crimes commission & documented the use of #cemicalweapons in the war in #Syria. We have UNVERIFIED accounts of #Russia using these weapons in #Ukraine. Perhaps the Syria experience can help inform. Russia NEVER used them in Syria. /1
There was NO USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS by #Russia in #Syria that we know of. There were dozens of chemical weapon strikes by Syria. Please see extensive analysis by @bellingcat and this report where I wrote multiple sections and contributed throughout: ohchr.org/Documents/HRBo… /2
This is NOT an apologist thread. We are seeing manifold #WarCrimes in Ukraine. But we must not invent crimes. Just as the reports of use of White Phosphorus in Ukraine turned out to be thermite it is highly likely the reports of CW use are something else. No need for hysteria. /3
A Syrian Air Force Su-22 dropped a Russian bomb containing Sarin on Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April 2017, killing 83 and injuring 293 civilians. There were more than 20 attacks by Syria using chlorine against civilians. The Sarin had precursors showing it was manufactured in Syria /4
The chemical weapon attacks on 4/4/17 were followed by Syrian and Russian strikes on hospitals in the area, greatly complicating medical treatment. We often saw Syrian chemical weapon strikes used to support Russian attacks in Syria, though not always. /5
Here you can see the impact of the OFAB carrying the Sarin along with the spread of the gas. We modeled it using wind patters and the slope of the ground. Unfortunately as the population was hiding from airstrikes in basements and Sarin is heavier than air many died hiding. /6
It is incorrect to state Russia ever used chemical weapons in #Syria. Yes, they struck hospitals and violated #IHL, but the evidence shows only Syria used chemical weapons there. Please see reporting by @bellingcat and follow @DanKaszeta who is an expert on chemical weapons. /END
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Twenty years ago the invasion of #Iraq began with airstrikes on Dora Farms in an attempt to kill Saddam Hussein. I was the Chief of High Value Targeting (HVT) in the Pentagon. We conducted 50 airstrikes on #Saddam and the "deck of cards" and never killed a single one of them. 1/
HVT cells were at the Pentagon (DIA), CIA, NSA, and CENTCOM forward. The war was to begin two days later yet Bush changed the plan & struck a massive palace complex on Dora Farms in Baghdad. CIA had HUMINT reporting of Saddam being there so the war might be ended swiftly. 2/
As we tried to discern if Saddam had been killed the Joint Targeting List (JTL) was RAPIDLY altered. The targeting community had spent a week at Shaw AFB meticulously planning the opening strikes of what would later be known as "shock and awe." Now it had to be redone. 3/
CIA, DIA, NSA, CENTAF, CENTCOM, UK, etc - went to the Outback steakhouse in @CityofSumter outside Shaw AFB to watch the AFC playoff game in a then dry county. The next day we started our macabre task. We plotted DMPIs on hundreds of buildings, worked with weaponeers, finalized 2/
the Joint Targeting List - all for naught as the eventual decision to hit Dora Farm scrapped the JTL and we started the targeting process anew and on the fly. Then I switched to leading High Value Targeting and the hunt for Saddam... I had helped create the "Black List" 3/
The @DeptofDefense just released their annual 1057 report on #CIVCAS, admitting to killing 12 civilians and injuring 5 during operations in 2021. After a quick, admittedly cursory read here are my thoughts 1/ media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/27/20…
The report leans heavily on the CHMRAP at times noting that there are extra steps that will be taken based on that plan in the future that may not have been available for this report. 2/
There are 12 civilian deaths and 5 injuries reported. Hoping @airwars will check the DoD numbers against their database but they reported VERY LOW numbers for Baghuz when compared to open source reporting. 3/
My thoughts on the @amnesty report on #Ukraine. These are my personal thoughts and not affiliated with any of the orgs I work for. They got the law wrong. Protocol 1 states militaries shall to the maximum extent feasible AVOID locating military objects near populated areas 1/
Ukraine can place forces in areas they are defending - especially in #urbanwarfare. There is no requirement to stand shoulder to shoulder in a field - this isn’t the 19th century. Ukraine still has an OBLIGATION to protect civilians - but they are taking steps to do so like 2/
helping civilians relocate. The info environment is complex but when I train Ukrainian #WarCrimes teams I always tell them they must investigate alleged violations of ALL parties to the conflict. 3/
Thoughts on the #Dronestrike in #Kabul that killed an #Afghan family. For background I was the Chief of High Value Targeting on the Joint Staff 2002-03, led UN war crimes investigations in #Afghanistan in 2011, and in 2015 assisted in a study of airstrikes while deployed on the
USS Theodore Roosevelt while working for @CNA_org. There are two types of airstrikes - deliberate and dynamic. Deliberate are planned long in advance, have numerous checks, use a pattern of life analysis, and have a relatively low incident of civilian casualties. Dynamic strikes,
such as Time Sensitive Targeting, are when the attacker has a small window of opportunity to engage a mobile target that is of high value. In a TST there is rarely time for a pattern of life analysis, structured collateral damage estimate, and all the checks normally conducted.
A thread on targeting: Bottom line is there are many checks in the targeting cycle to ensure targets are lawful, necessary, can be struck in a lawful manner, do not unduly risk lives, and are the proper course of action for the requirement. 1/
In all the missions I was part of there was NEVER a thought to actively target sites that were on their face unlawful. It was against your oath, training, and immoral, let alone unlawful. I never saw reprisals. Ever. 2/
I was an intelligence officer in the position of military planner and targeter at DIA and on the Joint Staff from 1997-2003. I provided recommendations to military planners and policy makers for both contingency planning and operational planning, produced target lists, 3/