1/ In the context of the clashes between the #Iraq|i army and the #Ezidi YBŞ, voices are being raised that the #YBŞ should lay down its arms for the good of the civilian population and hand over all bases to the Iraqi army. At first glance,
2/ this may sound reasonable, and in the short term it could lead to an easing of the overall situation in #Shingal. The Iraqi government has so far failed to address Ezidi security concerns,
3/ such as integrating Ezidi men and women in the ranks of the Ezidi fighting units into official security structures (Police, Federal Border Guard, Army, etc). In the long term, however,
4/ abandoning the YBŞ and the other Ezidi units would mean a return to the status quo of 2014. Once again, the Ezidis would have to rely on promises of security from the Iraqi government and army, which already broke their backs in 2014 when the Iraqi army fled Shingal.
5/ All the efforts of the past years for more say and a substantial political right of co-determination would be gone overnight. Yes, the YBŞ was founded by the Kurdish YPG, trained by the PKK/HPG and is ideologically deeply rooted in their dogma. Nevertheless,
6/ thousands of Ezidis are now under arms and have the opportunity to defend themselves if, as in 2014, no one else is willing to do so. Neither the Iraqi government nor the international community has offered an alternative. In the long term,
7/ the security situation in Shingal will be as fragile and vulnerable as it was in 2014. The ideology of the YBŞ may not appeal to every incl. Ezidis. Ultimately, however, an unloved ideology is better to risk allowing another genocide.
8/ The Ezidis can no longer rely on promises if they want to protect and save their last homeland. Iraq is still far from ensuring the safety of the Ezidis through its security policy and too weak to oppose Turkey's ideological war mania in the region. In the long run,
9/ the Ezidis in Iraq will face the same question as the Ezidis from Turkey once did: to save their own lives and leave their homeland behind or to stay and die. Thousands and thousands of Ezidis still live as IDPs in refugee camps,
10/ and the Iraqi government has actually managed in eight years to form no perspective at all. If Ezidis are still treated as third-class people in Iraq, what incentive is there to submit to the Iraqi military and Iraqi state organs?
11/ What efforts has Iraq made to free enslaved women and children? All enacted measures came after pleas and entreaties from Ezidi activists, politicians, and foreign organizations. Whether it is the YBŞ, the HPÊ, or other Ezidi fighting organizations.
12/ If the Ezidis agree to be disarmed by the Iraqi military in Shingal - as they did in 2014 - without receiving widespread political as well as economic concessions in return, the way is paved for another genocide in the future.
13/ The question of disarming the Ezidis in Shingal is therefore not an ideological question, but a question of existence. Whether they are associations close to the PKK, independent, pro-Iraqi, etc. the result of disarmament remains the same.
14/ If the Iraqi state and military leadership is bothered by the existence of the YBŞ and its ideology, what reasonable alternatives has it offered the Ezidis? The answer is: none. For Iraq, the Ezidis remain a renegade, disliked population group. Unfortunately,
15/ even the numerous Iraqi activists who have sacrificed themselves for the Ezidis in recent years cannot change this. The question of the existence of the YBŞ cannot be considered separately from the question of the general existence of the Ezidis in Iraq.
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