1) Two+ weeks of violence in #Shingal—following the Iraqi army mobilizing to force-implement the Sinjar Agreement—recently ended. Time for a THREAD on the reasons why the #Sinjar Agreement was unworkable from its inception, and why its implementation will harm the #Yazidi people. 
2) Recap—In the past month: Masrour visited Erdogan; Turkey then subsequently launched a new anti-PKK campaign in Iraq ; Kadhimi simultaneously ordered the Iraqi army to mobilize against the #YBŞ, which produced two weeks of hostilities; thousands of #Yazidis were displaced; >
3) Iraq imprisoned two foreign journalists visiting Sinjar; Iran-aligned militias shelled the Turkish military base near Ba‘shiqa & Erbil-based oil installations; Kadhimi appointed Nineveh’s governor as acting head of Sinjar District and then reversed the appointment.
4) After the clashes quieted, Yazidis in large numbers held peaceful demonstrations against the violence, blocking access to the army and to armed groups.
6) Amid this chaos, a delegation of U.S. officials (including Amb. Matthew Tueller; Dept. Asst. Sec. of Defense Dana Stroul; Dept. Dir. for Politico-Military Affairs, General Matthew Trollinger) met with Nechirvan. One discussed topic was "implementation of the Sinjar Agreement."
7) It's out of order to discuss Sinjar with KRG officials. What business does Nechirvan Barzani have speaking about Sinjar? The KDP has no legitimate claim to Sinjar and they should not be consulted regarding its status or future.
8) "Well, that sounds a bit extreme. Sure, there are various competing sides in this conflict, but surely the KDP is one of those sides whose position and claims should be taken into account, no?"
Absolutely not.
Absolutely not.
9) Let's do a brief review.
• The Barzanis believe that Sinjar is their property, that they are entitled to rule it
• But for the entire history of the modern state of Iraq, the Barzanis never controlled Sinjar—their opportunistic control began only after the U.S. invasion
• The Barzanis believe that Sinjar is their property, that they are entitled to rule it
• But for the entire history of the modern state of Iraq, the Barzanis never controlled Sinjar—their opportunistic control began only after the U.S. invasion
10)
• After the U.S. deposed Saddam, the KDP unilaterally occupied Sinjar with no consultation or agreement on the part of the local people
• The KDP ruled Sinjar for a decade before deliberately abandoning it to the Islamic State
• After the U.S. deposed Saddam, the KDP unilaterally occupied Sinjar with no consultation or agreement on the part of the local people
• The KDP ruled Sinjar for a decade before deliberately abandoning it to the Islamic State
11)
• For the entire duration of this decade, there was never a single legitimate election in Sinjar
• The KDP used violence and terror against Yazidis who joined local political parties
• For the entire duration of this decade, there was never a single legitimate election in Sinjar
• The KDP used violence and terror against Yazidis who joined local political parties
12)
• Local parties—which appeared once democratic processes began to emerge post-Saddam—did not embrace the KDP's agenda of annexation to the KRI, but instead sought democratic representation in the central government
• Local parties—which appeared once democratic processes began to emerge post-Saddam—did not embrace the KDP's agenda of annexation to the KRI, but instead sought democratic representation in the central government
13)
• The KDP used a range of tactics to suppress voting for local Yazidi parties
• It would control polling stations to manipulate outcomes or force illiterate people to vote against their preference
• And the KDP had something that local parties did not: its own militias
• The KDP used a range of tactics to suppress voting for local Yazidi parties
• It would control polling stations to manipulate outcomes or force illiterate people to vote against their preference
• And the KDP had something that local parties did not: its own militias
14)
• The KDP used Peshmerga and militarized secret police to imprison and beat countless ordinary Yazidis who joined local parties
• Journalists who reported on the frequent abuses would be kidnapped and tortured by secret police
• The KDP used Peshmerga and militarized secret police to imprison and beat countless ordinary Yazidis who joined local parties
• Journalists who reported on the frequent abuses would be kidnapped and tortured by secret police
15)
• KDP occupation of Sinjar allowed young Yazidi men to migrate to the KRI to work in hotels, restaurants, etc. The Yazidis were told that they should be grateful for the opportunity to secure menial work, but obtaining permits to work in the KRI often meant visiting a KDP >>
• KDP occupation of Sinjar allowed young Yazidi men to migrate to the KRI to work in hotels, restaurants, etc. The Yazidis were told that they should be grateful for the opportunity to secure menial work, but obtaining permits to work in the KRI often meant visiting a KDP >>
16)
< party center to first procure proof of KDP party membership.
• The KDP also gained control of hiring processes for most government institutions in Sinjar; this also allowed them to exert significant pressure on Yazidis to join the KDP if they wanted gainful employment.
< party center to first procure proof of KDP party membership.
• The KDP also gained control of hiring processes for most government institutions in Sinjar; this also allowed them to exert significant pressure on Yazidis to join the KDP if they wanted gainful employment.
17) In other words, KDP rule in Sinjar was the essence of an anti-democratic regime. While the U.S. was in Iraq under the stated purpose of promoting democracy, it empowered an armed political party to crush any fledgling expression of democracy in territories it controlled.
18) "But surely Sinjar must have benefited by KDP control!—After all, the KRI has been the only stable part of Iraq since 2003."
Absolutely not.
• Sinjar remained one of the least-developed districts in Iraq
Absolutely not.
• Sinjar remained one of the least-developed districts in Iraq
19)
• There was a massive disparity between development in the KRI and that in Sinjar
• Even the development that did happen was often politicized.
• For example, some villages were denied the introduction of electricity because they refused to join the KDP
• There was a massive disparity between development in the KRI and that in Sinjar
• Even the development that did happen was often politicized.
• For example, some villages were denied the introduction of electricity because they refused to join the KDP
20) Sinjar was an invisible backwoods where the KDP had free reign to exploit the people as a political resource (free votes through coercion), to profit from smuggling operations, and to expand the boundaries of the territory it planned to annex to the KRI.
21) "So considering its value to them, it was only natural that the KDP would fight to defend it, yes?"
No.
• After two months of IS controlling the lands surrounding Sinjar, the Peshmerga withdrew in organized, orderly fashion as the jihadist army mobilized to attack
No.
• After two months of IS controlling the lands surrounding Sinjar, the Peshmerga withdrew in organized, orderly fashion as the jihadist army mobilized to attack
22)
• The Peshmerga did not "flee" after their lines broke
• They never engaged the enemy but left prior to its arrival
• When Yazidis saw them withdrawing, they begged that weapons be left behind that they could use to defend their families—the Peshmerga refused
• The Peshmerga did not "flee" after their lines broke
• They never engaged the enemy but left prior to its arrival
• When Yazidis saw them withdrawing, they begged that weapons be left behind that they could use to defend their families—the Peshmerga refused
23)
• The Peshmerga did not defend the Yazidi people at all
• No cover was provided as civilians evacuated
• For over a month prior to the Genocide, KDP secret police in fact prevented families from evacuating, not allowing families to travel to the KRI
• The Peshmerga did not defend the Yazidi people at all
• No cover was provided as civilians evacuated
• For over a month prior to the Genocide, KDP secret police in fact prevented families from evacuating, not allowing families to travel to the KRI
24)
• This practice intensified in the days just prior to Aug. 3; Yazidi families attempting to evacuate were forced back to their homes by secret police at checkpoints
• After the deliberate prevention of evacuation, several hundred thousand people were then left defenseless
• This practice intensified in the days just prior to Aug. 3; Yazidi families attempting to evacuate were forced back to their homes by secret police at checkpoints
• After the deliberate prevention of evacuation, several hundred thousand people were then left defenseless
25)
• Peshmerga shot and killed Yazidis who tried to snatch weapons away from the departing forces so that they could defend their own families
• Jihadists were arriving with empty trucks & buses to load up captive women as Peshmerga were still driving away from the mountain
• Peshmerga shot and killed Yazidis who tried to snatch weapons away from the departing forces so that they could defend their own families
• Jihadists were arriving with empty trucks & buses to load up captive women as Peshmerga were still driving away from the mountain
26)
• To this day, the KDP has taken no responsibility for its role in these atrocities. Instead it has only delivered lies and excuses, and propagated myths: "the U.S. didn't give us enough weapons;" "it was a surprise attack;" "we defended until our lines broke."
• To this day, the KDP has taken no responsibility for its role in these atrocities. Instead it has only delivered lies and excuses, and propagated myths: "the U.S. didn't give us enough weapons;" "it was a surprise attack;" "we defended until our lines broke."
27)
• But instead of contrition, even more egregious KDP abuses began after the Genocide had started
• Angry that their PKK rivals had gained popularity by rescuing the Yazidis, the KDP worked to starve the recovery of Sinjar
• But instead of contrition, even more egregious KDP abuses began after the Genocide had started
• Angry that their PKK rivals had gained popularity by rescuing the Yazidis, the KDP worked to starve the recovery of Sinjar
28)
• The KDP blocked weaponry for fighters in Sinjar if they were unaffiliated with the KDP
• KDP secret police began to kidnap and imprison (sometimes for months) Yazidis who joined non-KDP groups to defend Sinjar against IS
• The KDP blocked weaponry for fighters in Sinjar if they were unaffiliated with the KDP
• KDP secret police began to kidnap and imprison (sometimes for months) Yazidis who joined non-KDP groups to defend Sinjar against IS
29)
• KDP secret police would arrest, interrogate, and terrorize destitute, powerless Yazidi IDPs in the camps if their children or grandchildren joined the YBŞ, and would expel them from the camps (and the KRI) if their family members refused to leave the YBŞ
• KDP secret police would arrest, interrogate, and terrorize destitute, powerless Yazidi IDPs in the camps if their children or grandchildren joined the YBŞ, and would expel them from the camps (and the KRI) if their family members refused to leave the YBŞ
30)
• At night KDP secret police would send masked men—appearing as jihadists—into the tents of Yazidi journalists living in the camps, if they had reported critically on KDP behavior, terrorizing and traumatizing their families
• At night KDP secret police would send masked men—appearing as jihadists—into the tents of Yazidi journalists living in the camps, if they had reported critically on KDP behavior, terrorizing and traumatizing their families
31)
• Yazidis who participated in demonstrations in the camps were arrested and tortured
• Some Yazidi journalists fled the country because the secret police would threaten to kill their family members if they continued to publish/post articles and material
• Yazidis who participated in demonstrations in the camps were arrested and tortured
• Some Yazidi journalists fled the country because the secret police would threaten to kill their family members if they continued to publish/post articles and material
32)
• KDP secret police were stationed inside every camp in Dohuk and would not allow Yazidis to hold their own Genocide memorial events—unless organized by the KDP itself—for fear of people speaking critically against the party or of the chance of demonstrations materializing
• KDP secret police were stationed inside every camp in Dohuk and would not allow Yazidis to hold their own Genocide memorial events—unless organized by the KDP itself—for fear of people speaking critically against the party or of the chance of demonstrations materializing
33)
• The KDP would shut down Yazidi charities if any of their members were seen holding the flag of a non-KDP fighter group
• Kurdish teachers were brought to the camps who would teach children to sing Peshmerga songs, praising the "bravery of the heroes who defended Shingal"
• The KDP would shut down Yazidi charities if any of their members were seen holding the flag of a non-KDP fighter group
• Kurdish teachers were brought to the camps who would teach children to sing Peshmerga songs, praising the "bravery of the heroes who defended Shingal"
34)
• The KDP had a vested interest in keeping the Yazidis in camps as long as possible
• IDP camps brought millions of NGO and UN dollars into the KRI's economy each month
• Resettling Yazidis outside of Sinjar would also make it easier to control in the future
• The KDP had a vested interest in keeping the Yazidis in camps as long as possible
• IDP camps brought millions of NGO and UN dollars into the KRI's economy each month
• Resettling Yazidis outside of Sinjar would also make it easier to control in the future
35)
• Most Yazidis never embraced KDP loyalism so the KDP needed to find ways to solidify control in Sinjar
• The Yazidi ancestral home of Sheikhan was converted to a Muslim-majority district by the KDP post-2003—the Genocide provided opportunity for a similar project in Sinjar
• Most Yazidis never embraced KDP loyalism so the KDP needed to find ways to solidify control in Sinjar
• The Yazidi ancestral home of Sheikhan was converted to a Muslim-majority district by the KDP post-2003—the Genocide provided opportunity for a similar project in Sinjar
36)
• So the KDP decided to starve Sinjar of aid and reconstruction because it was afraid that greater numbers of Yazidi returnees would bolster popular support for its rivals as well as undermining its goal of overcoming resistance to the resumption of its political hegemony
• So the KDP decided to starve Sinjar of aid and reconstruction because it was afraid that greater numbers of Yazidi returnees would bolster popular support for its rivals as well as undermining its goal of overcoming resistance to the resumption of its political hegemony
37)
• In 2016, as the YBŞ still defended the mountain and lost personnel to jihadist attacks, the #KDP began its blockade policy
• The blockade prevented Yazidi farmers from revitalizing their farms, prevented shop owners from stocking their shelves
• In 2016, as the YBŞ still defended the mountain and lost personnel to jihadist attacks, the #KDP began its blockade policy
• The blockade prevented Yazidi farmers from revitalizing their farms, prevented shop owners from stocking their shelves
38)
• The blockade stopped school supplies from reaching kids in schools, stopped irrigation equipment or tractor parts from reaching farms, stopped mechanics from stocking their businesses with car parts, blocked animal medicine from reaching veterinary businesses
• The blockade stopped school supplies from reaching kids in schools, stopped irrigation equipment or tractor parts from reaching farms, stopped mechanics from stocking their businesses with car parts, blocked animal medicine from reaching veterinary businesses
39)
• Families were not allowed to bring building materials to rebuild their homes—no generators, electrical supplies, or wellheads to replace those looted by Peshmerga after the north side had been cleared of IS in Dec. 2014.
• Families were not allowed to bring building materials to rebuild their homes—no generators, electrical supplies, or wellheads to replace those looted by Peshmerga after the north side had been cleared of IS in Dec. 2014.
40)
• Families were not even allowed to bring basic food staples to their homes: rice, flour, sugar, cooking oil. By preventing people from rebuilding their lives, the KDP was turning the camps into perpetual prisons while suppressing the recovery of Sinjar.
• Families were not even allowed to bring basic food staples to their homes: rice, flour, sugar, cooking oil. By preventing people from rebuilding their lives, the KDP was turning the camps into perpetual prisons while suppressing the recovery of Sinjar.
41)
• In addition to the restrictions on goods and supplies, KDP personnel manning the checkpoint used verbal abuse and humiliation as an additional deterrent to discourage movement between Dohuk and Shingal. Yazidis would report being treated "as though we were not human."
• In addition to the restrictions on goods and supplies, KDP personnel manning the checkpoint used verbal abuse and humiliation as an additional deterrent to discourage movement between Dohuk and Shingal. Yazidis would report being treated "as though we were not human."
42)
• When the blockade was in full swing in 2016, Nechirvan Barzani publicly lied and said that Yazidis were not returning home because of "the PKK presence." In fact, Khanasor (the main YBŞ stronghold) had the highest rate of civilian returnees at that time.
• When the blockade was in full swing in 2016, Nechirvan Barzani publicly lied and said that Yazidis were not returning home because of "the PKK presence." In fact, Khanasor (the main YBŞ stronghold) had the highest rate of civilian returnees at that time.
43)
• Though IS killed several thousand Yazidis, the blockade has done more long-term damage to Yazidi survival in their homeland. Thousands of children have spent their entire adolescent/teenage lives in tents on gravel because the KDP chose to inhibit Sinjar's recovery.
• Though IS killed several thousand Yazidis, the blockade has done more long-term damage to Yazidi survival in their homeland. Thousands of children have spent their entire adolescent/teenage lives in tents on gravel because the KDP chose to inhibit Sinjar's recovery.
44)
(It should be mentioned here that the blockade was a virtually unreported phenomenon and the UN and the international NGOs remained silent about it. >
(It should be mentioned here that the blockade was a virtually unreported phenomenon and the UN and the international NGOs remained silent about it. >
45)
NGOs know that criticism of KDP policy results in the prevention of their work—nevertheless, a responsibility to speak out against ongoing patterns of flagrant abuse remains. >
NGOs know that criticism of KDP policy results in the prevention of their work—nevertheless, a responsibility to speak out against ongoing patterns of flagrant abuse remains. >
46)
The humanitarian players will maintain that "advocacy is not our mandate," but problematically, the abusive political conditions that perpetuate displacement form the very structure that upholds the raison d'être of the NGO milieu. >
The humanitarian players will maintain that "advocacy is not our mandate," but problematically, the abusive political conditions that perpetuate displacement form the very structure that upholds the raison d'être of the NGO milieu. >
47)
It is impossible for this to not impact NGO priorities.
The excuse that "we don't engage in politics" can conveniently disguise a lack of incentive to strive toward resolving the crisis.
Note that defending human rights is always political.)
It is impossible for this to not impact NGO priorities.
The excuse that "we don't engage in politics" can conveniently disguise a lack of incentive to strive toward resolving the crisis.
Note that defending human rights is always political.)
48)
• Until the KDP left Sinjar completely (for the second time) in 2017, it attempted to block humanitarian aid to civilian families if they did not support the KDP
• KDP officials would direct NGOs away from civilian areas with a YBŞ presence
• Until the KDP left Sinjar completely (for the second time) in 2017, it attempted to block humanitarian aid to civilian families if they did not support the KDP
• KDP officials would direct NGOs away from civilian areas with a YBŞ presence
49)
• The goal was to ensure that aid distributions only reached families supporting the KDP/Peshmerga
• Just one example involved a shipment of tents being distributed through the Nahiya Shamal -->
• The goal was to ensure that aid distributions only reached families supporting the KDP/Peshmerga
• Just one example involved a shipment of tents being distributed through the Nahiya Shamal -->
50)
• A witness described to me how an official in the Nahiya office went down the list of people on top of Sinjar Mountain who needed tents and crossed off the names of every family that did not belong to the KDP
• Such practices were commonplace
• A witness described to me how an official in the Nahiya office went down the list of people on top of Sinjar Mountain who needed tents and crossed off the names of every family that did not belong to the KDP
• Such practices were commonplace
51)
• The KDP would also block aid to the camps if it originated with the PUK
• They did not want the Yazidis to be helped if it didn't enhance KDP political capital
• The KDP would also block aid to the camps if it originated with the PUK
• They did not want the Yazidis to be helped if it didn't enhance KDP political capital
52)
• In one case, a PUK Peshmerga commander was prevented from bringing a truckload of medicine and aid, which had been sent from Europe, to Shingal
• In one case, a PUK Peshmerga commander was prevented from bringing a truckload of medicine and aid, which had been sent from Europe, to Shingal
53)
• The policies described here culminated in 2017 with the KDP Peshmerga Rojava, supported by Turkey, attacking the YBŞ directly, killing Yazidis with German- & American-supplied weapons. This also reflected the new Trump admin's greenlighting of Turkish aggression in Sinjar.
• The policies described here culminated in 2017 with the KDP Peshmerga Rojava, supported by Turkey, attacking the YBŞ directly, killing Yazidis with German- & American-supplied weapons. This also reflected the new Trump admin's greenlighting of Turkish aggression in Sinjar.
54)
• While besieged by the Peshmerga Rojava on the north side of the mountain, IS renewed its attacks on the YBŞ on the south side. The YBŞ continued defending against jihadist attack, while the KDP attacked it on the north.
• While besieged by the Peshmerga Rojava on the north side of the mountain, IS renewed its attacks on the YBŞ on the south side. The YBŞ continued defending against jihadist attack, while the KDP attacked it on the north.
55)
• During this period, the KDP brought Kurds from other areas into Shingal to support the offensive against the YBŞ, because Yazidis in the KDP Peshmerga refused to participate in the fight against their fellow Yazidis
• During this period, the KDP brought Kurds from other areas into Shingal to support the offensive against the YBŞ, because Yazidis in the KDP Peshmerga refused to participate in the fight against their fellow Yazidis
56)
• The Peshmerga Rojava also kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured the sixty-year-old leader of an independent (not PKK-affiliated) militia that had been active on the mountain since the Genocide began
• The Peshmerga Rojava also kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured the sixty-year-old leader of an independent (not PKK-affiliated) militia that had been active on the mountain since the Genocide began
57)
• During this occupation, the KDP Peshmerga Rojava fired on civilian demonstrators, killing at least one and wounding at least ten
• The very next month, the U.S. State Department announced nearly $300 million in new weapons for the Peshmerga
• During this occupation, the KDP Peshmerga Rojava fired on civilian demonstrators, killing at least one and wounding at least ten
• The very next month, the U.S. State Department announced nearly $300 million in new weapons for the Peshmerga
58)
• Though the U.S. had worked closely with the YPG in Syria, and though the YBŞ had built a strong coalition with Shammar Arabs liberating many villages from IS control, the U.S. would barely acknowledge the YBŞ
• Though the U.S. had worked closely with the YPG in Syria, and though the YBŞ had built a strong coalition with Shammar Arabs liberating many villages from IS control, the U.S. would barely acknowledge the YBŞ
59)
• YBŞ leaders could not effectively engage U.S. authorities because the KDP would arrest and imprison them if they attempted to visit the U.S. consulate in Erbil. The KDP could inhibit access to the most important regional sponsor, and the U.S. did little to address this.
• YBŞ leaders could not effectively engage U.S. authorities because the KDP would arrest and imprison them if they attempted to visit the U.S. consulate in Erbil. The KDP could inhibit access to the most important regional sponsor, and the U.S. did little to address this.
60)
• When the Hashd al-Sha'bi liberated the south side of Sinjar in May 2017, the KDP was furious. They wanted to be the only ones responsible for Sinjar's liberation—no matter that Yazidis had begged them to pursue this liberation for several years while they did nothing.
• When the Hashd al-Sha'bi liberated the south side of Sinjar in May 2017, the KDP was furious. They wanted to be the only ones responsible for Sinjar's liberation—no matter that Yazidis had begged them to pursue this liberation for several years while they did nothing.
61)
• The KDP reacted in anger by expelling civilian families from the Dohuk IDP camps (and the KRI altogether) if a family member, enthusiastic to participate in the struggle to liberate their homeland, joined a Hashd militia
• The KDP reacted in anger by expelling civilian families from the Dohuk IDP camps (and the KRI altogether) if a family member, enthusiastic to participate in the struggle to liberate their homeland, joined a Hashd militia
62)
• Once the Hashd had liberated the south side, a new route (i.e. via Mosul) was available for Yazidis to bring goods to their homes, circumventing the KDP's blockade. But the KDP used its influence over the Nineveh governor, based in Mosul, to implement similar policies.
• Once the Hashd had liberated the south side, a new route (i.e. via Mosul) was available for Yazidis to bring goods to their homes, circumventing the KDP's blockade. But the KDP used its influence over the Nineveh governor, based in Mosul, to implement similar policies.
63)
• Over the subsequent years, the Nineveh governorate has often served KDP policy by impeding access to Sinjar for humanitarian organizations, impeding the restoration of governmental services and education, and slowing the progress of reconstruction.
• Over the subsequent years, the Nineveh governorate has often served KDP policy by impeding access to Sinjar for humanitarian organizations, impeding the restoration of governmental services and education, and slowing the progress of reconstruction.
64)
• The KDP also introduced new policies to make it difficult for Yazidis to leave the camps. These include requiring families to apply to the secret police for permission documents to be allowed to return home. Such policies converted the camps into veritable prisons.
• The KDP also introduced new policies to make it difficult for Yazidis to leave the camps. These include requiring families to apply to the secret police for permission documents to be allowed to return home. Such policies converted the camps into veritable prisons.
65)
• I began this list with the legacy of election fraud in Sinjar. But similar practices are continuing in the present, targeting the IDPs in the camps and the local Yazidi communities of the Dohuk area.
• I began this list with the legacy of election fraud in Sinjar. But similar practices are continuing in the present, targeting the IDPs in the camps and the local Yazidi communities of the Dohuk area.
66)
• A Yazidi man recently described to me how, in last year's parliamentary election, KDP secret police came to his home and took his ID to go and "vote for him." They said, "don't worry, we'll take care of it for you."
• A Yazidi man recently described to me how, in last year's parliamentary election, KDP secret police came to his home and took his ID to go and "vote for him." They said, "don't worry, we'll take care of it for you."
67) He said to me: "See? This is why I will leave #Iraq, because I'm not even free to vote in my own country." He is not an IDP, he is from Dohuk, and he has a position of stature. If they can target him in this way, consider how much more vulnerable the camp-based IDPs are.
68)
• Minorities under KDP control are used as an exploitable political resource. They are not equal citizens inside the KRI, let alone in territories that the KDP occupies and seeks to annex. And this fuels minority emigration and the decline of their populations in Iraq.
• Minorities under KDP control are used as an exploitable political resource. They are not equal citizens inside the KRI, let alone in territories that the KDP occupies and seeks to annex. And this fuels minority emigration and the decline of their populations in Iraq.
69) From the many examples listed above—which merely represent the tip of the iceberg—can you understand why a delegation of U.S. officials meeting with the Barzanis to discuss Sinjar constitutes a massive insult? A slap in the faces of those who endured this genocide?
70) The Belgian ambassador @filipvdbulcke likewise had a recent meeting discussing the Sinjar Agreement—not with Yazidi farmers in Sinjar, not with YBŞ leaders, not even with the Baghdad officials who should be crafting a healthy Sinjar policy—but with Nechirvan Barzani.
71) Returning to the current situation and Sinjar Agreement: The real problem isn’t the prospect of the YBŞ passing its role to the Iraqi military; the danger is that the disarming of the YBŞ represents a potential first step towards facilitating a re-occupation of KDP Peshmerga.
72) Stability in Sinjar means that healthy state security and governance apparatuses should replace the control of partisan militias: And it is crucial to note that this criterion applies equally to the Peshmerga as to any Iran-aligned or PKK-affiliated group.
73) Considering the abject neglect and silence of Baghdad throughout the eight years of this genocide, there is no guarantee that it will fulfill the responsibility of the state to protect Sinjar and not eventually pass it to Erbil as a bargaining chip.
74) The bottom line worst case outcome for this Genocide would be a return of KDP Peshmerga to Sinjar. Considering the legacy outlined above, it should be clear why it would be IMMORAL for the KDP to return to Sinjar.
75) And this is the real problem with the Sinjar Agreement—the foot-in-the-door opportunity that it provides the KDP to again pursue hegemony there. Many Yazidis recently quoted by media have emphasized that the agreement was made with zero involvement from the community. >
76) But there has been little discussion of what is problematic about the agreement's provisions. The agreement specifies that Sinjar's security should be entirely under the authority of the central government. In principle, this should be a good measure and a necessary step >
77) for the return of stability. The problem is that the agreement gives the KRG a joint role in appointing Sinjar's administrative figures. This is absolute nonsense and its implementation would be a disaster.
78) Observers simply do not understand how the KDP operates. It is not programmed to share. It will relentlessly work, step by step, toward the resumption of its dominance in Sinjar. It will violate any agreement and take advantage of Baghdad's laziness to pursue its objectives.
79) The KDP recently violated its longstanding agreement with the PUK by trying to remove the Iraqi president and install a KDP member into that post. Its stated reason was that it “no longer needed the strategic agreement.”
80) The KDP has no business being involved in selecting Sinjar's administration and it must not be given a foot in the door. Non-military, administrative influence is the first step toward the KDP reintroducing a military presence in Sinjar. It did this after 2003 and can again.
81) The KDP shares partial responsibility for allowing this Genocide to happen. To force their rule back upon the Yazidi homeland would be analogous to telling holocaust survivors to submit to an administration run by perpetrators.
82) Imagine how much buy-in for a Sinjar agreement could be generated on the part of the Yazidi community if they just had this simple guarantee that the KDP would not return! If they could believe that negotiations over Sinjar were actually in good faith >>
83) < rather than portending the next inevitable betrayal!
Let’s now turn to the role of Baghdad now and gaze in awe at its unfathomable disregard and neglect.
Let’s now turn to the role of Baghdad now and gaze in awe at its unfathomable disregard and neglect.
84) The Sinjar Agreement calls for the creation of a security force administered by the central government whose ranks would (apparently) be drawn from the local population. This is exactly what the majority of the Yazidi community have been BEGGING for since Aug. 3, 2014!
85) The way that this idea has typically been articulated by Yazidis is that the many active Yazidi fighters belonging to various groups who have been defending Sinjar against jihadist attack over the course of these years would be brought into the new Sinjar security force.
86) This security force would not be linked to any political party but would be administered by the appropriate ministry in Baghdad (either defense or interior).
87) The obvious question, therefore, is: Why has Baghdad made zero effort to pursue the development of this objective? And even more perplexing: Why has Baghdad suddenly mobilized against a Yazidi militia on its own payroll, without ever attempting a transition to the new force?
88) Since the genocide began, responsibility for Baghdad's "Sinjar file" has been held by a total of 6 different men; in these 8 years we’ve never seen any of them do anything. None of them have exhibited even minimal visibility in engaging the Yazidi community on the issue.
89) When has Baghdad ever announced an intent to pursue talks with the YBŞ to negotiate a transition? If Baghdad wants to implement the Sinjar Agreement, why would it suddenly attack the YBŞ without any prior public effort to pursue a roadmap to administrative/security stability?
90) We’ve never seen any official talks whereby the Iraqi government has sat down with the YBŞ, Yazidi Hashd, and other groups to discuss the future and propose plans for a security transition.
91) In contrast with the KDP's rampant abuses and human rights violations, Baghdad's track record throughout these years has been silence. Its policy stance toward Sinjar has often been unclear, ambiguous, or palpably indifferent.
92) Part of this is due to the fact that Baghdad is a house divided against itself. As Hashd al-Sha'bi militias launch attacks on the Turkish base near Ba'shiqa, the Iraqi army attacks the Hashd Body member and Hashd-funded YBŞ.
93) Will the army battle proper Hashd militias next? What kind of civil conflict could this unleash?
94) Last August, Turkey assassinated a Yazidi leader on his way to meet with Kadhimi, while Kadhimi was visiting Sinjar for the first time. Kadhimi made no statement about the incident. And the recent mobilization of the Iraqi army against the YBŞ was clearly at Turkey's behest.
95) If Kadhimi is so eager to please Erdogan, couldn't he have pursued an effort to restore administrative normalcy and develop a unified functional security entity for Sinjar before resorting to attack the Yazidi militia that has been most effective in maintaining security?
96) But there is another player that holds significant responsibility for this never-ending impasse (and the extended years that Yazidis are spending in camps, as well): the U.S., the silent partner of the KDP, Baghdad, and Turkey.
97) The U.S. conveys verbal concern for minorities but consistently avoids direct involvement in resolving the abusive dynamics that jeopardize their survival, preferring instead the status quo conditions maintained by whichever partner enjoys political ascendency.
98) This recent, urgent article illuminates some of the ways that the Trump and Biden administrations have been presiding over the literal destruction of Christianity in Iraq:
newlinesmag.com/argument/iraqs…
newlinesmag.com/argument/iraqs…
99) The U.S. can pretend that it is not its responsibility or place—or within its capacity—to take an active role in resolving these dilemmas, but this is belied by: a) the fact that it bears responsibility for the destabilization that continues to threaten minority survival;
100) b) that it owes a debt to communities that made sacrifices to serve the U.S. military when it overturned the previous order in Iraq; c) that it wields significant influence over its partners and can exercise pressure when it wishes; d) that it does direct outcomes and >>
101) < does hold the hand of its partners when it considers a particular objective important enough. So why isn't the post-genocide recovery, stability, justice, and survival of Yazidi people one of these priorities?
102) Why have 3 successive U.S. administrations failed to form a Sinjar taskforce to address the limbo that poses an existential threat to a people who served the U.S.' war effort? Why hasn't the U.S. led the formation of an international commission to resolve the Sinjar dilemma?
103) Why hasn't the U.S. led the formation of an "International Commission to Resolve the Sinjar Crisis"? A commission that could be formed—with buy-in from Baghdad—to assist the central government (and hold it accountable) in building Sinjar's security and administration?
104) A Yazidi man once told me—as we stood together surveying one of the IS-destroyed towns in Sinjar:
105) "When the U.S. invaded Iraq, our community gave over 400 of our young men to serve the U.S. army as translators. Not a single U.S. soldier ever died from a Yazidi bullet. We had hoped that when our hour of need came, they would have remembered us and done more to help us."
106) The sad truth is that the U.S. has been nearly as neglectful as Baghdad. The frequent absence, silence, and invisibility of the U.S. amid these years of instability is absolutely staggering.
107) The U.S. can stand aloof and point at the dysfunction of local actors, community divisions, and broken political systems, but this is merely a distraction from its own unfulfilled obligations. It is increasingly clear that it is part of the problem, rather than the solution.
108) That the U.S. accepts harmful status quos rather than taking a moral stand to change them, as well as its passivity and silence as the KDP commits innumerable human rights violations, gives it a share of complicity in delaying the end of this Genocide.
109) The consistent Yazidi demand since Aug. 3, 2014 has been: A Sinjar that functions as part of the Iraqi state (like any of its governorates); free of external, armed political parties; with a local security force under the authority of the state.
110) Why is it so difficult to work toward this objective? Why do the U.S. and UN fail the community by continuing to validate the abuser, rather than invest in a new reality that could help protect an endangered culture and foster the recovery of survivors?
111) #Turkey is upset about #PKK use of the Syrian border; #Israel is upset about #Iran's use of the border. If the interests of these states take priority for the U.S., why hasn't it—for 8 years—worked toward the stabilizing solution called for by the local community?
112) The ever-lurking suspicion that everyone harbors is that sooner or later the U.S.—through its support of misguided initiatives like the Sinjar Agreement—is going to return Sinjar to KDP control.
113) Its silence in the face of Turkish aggression, lack of will to spearhead proactive solutions, and its pattern of enabling abuse through the financial support and weapons provision that prop up the KDP, have all rendered the U.S. untrustworthy in regards to this situation.
114) It offers no objection to Turkey bombing the YBŞ on the basis of PKK affiliation, despite the YBŞ being no different than the U.S.'s partner in Syria, the #YPG (whom the Trump administration likewise betrayed after years collaboration and joint cooperation against IS).
115) The U.S. is prioritizing the temporary, realpolitik interests of the moment (i.e. its current chapter of friendship with Turkey and enmity with Iran) over its moral obligations, over the survival of a people at a pivotal juncture in their much longer history.
116) This is why it's a disaster that political scientists, rather than historians, formulate foreign policy. A historian's perspective considers the sources indicating that the late-medieval distribution of the Yazidi population stretched from western Iran to the Mediterranean.
117) Over several centuries, this population has shrunk to just a few, tiny enclaves; and even the last ones are being slowly destroyed by the relentless conquest of the Barzani family's political machine—a process facilitated by the KDP's Western partners, the enablers in chief.
118) I wish that U.S. officials—and those of the UK/Europe/UN—could understand that the tapestry of diversity in Iraq is being destroyed by reckless opportunism, and that the #NGO industry, #UN agencies, and Western governments uphold the processes by which this is taking place.
119) Final word: The YBŞ should only ever be disbanded IF and WHEN a real guarantee is obtained that KDP militarized control will not return, nor will KDP administrative control—i.e. its annexation agenda—be reinstated. Anything else is premature.
120) And the Sinjar Agreement should be scrapped. There is no legitimate basis for the KRG to be involved in any agreements or negotiations over Sinjar's status or future administration.
121) Also see this recent thread from @EzidiPress that contains many points similar to those I've made above:
https://twitter.com/EzidiPress/status/1517895604755705858
122) Also read one of the only good articles on the Sinjar Agreement amid all the ignorant trash floating around—from @_____mjb: nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/iraq…
123) Incredibly, Iraq still hasn't released the two foreign journalists. You can find a lot of info on that situation at this account: @AnjaFlach, by searching this hashtag: #freemarleneandmatej, and on this website:
freemarleneandmatej.org
freemarleneandmatej.org
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
