I read many (opposing) comments about the supposed or real influence of Alexander #Dugin. I made some myself on several TV and radio stations today.
He was certainly not Putin's Rasputin, nor his director of conscience. But was he without influence?
Let's try to find out.
1/14
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I don't think you have to be on one side or the other. Things are more subtle and there are methodological points to consider.
The binary opposition of the two theses makes no sense.
2/14
1 First of all, yes, Dugin's books and articles were not equivalent in Putin's ideological system to the Communist Party Manifesto or Marx's Capital in Soviet references or Mao Zedong's Little Red Book. Here me on Putin's ideology.
3/14 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/what-does-vl…
2 He wasn't close to Putin, nor a member of his first circle. He wasn't his master mind & the Kremlin kept him at a distance (too unpresentable!).
Putin's ideological references are multiple, complex & also instruments.
Read The Road to Unfreedom by @TimothyDSnyder on this.
4/14
3 Should we say that Dugin is for all that accessory to Putin's own ideological system? Putin has taken up certain references (notably the idea of "Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok" forged by Dugin and present in Putin's 2010 article in @SZ).
5/14 sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/put…
4 Dugin's theses form the ideological substratum — but not exclusively — of Putin's radical theses, which he did not always express so brutally (at least before 2021).
They partly feed his most extreme propagandists (including on Kremlin channels).
6/14
We see similar theses taken up by extremist movements in support of his crimes against humanity in Ukraine (and before).
Just because Putin has not always EXPRESSED (before) extreme things does not mean that this extremism is alien to him.
Putin actually DID extreme things.
7/14
One should read the sublime book also by @mashagessen (already mentioned here - an absolute #mustread) "The Future is History. How Totalitarianisme Reclaimed Russia" where Dugin appears.
Read it - I won't sum it up now.
8/14
5 Secondly, it has been said a lot: Dugin has served a great deal to spread the ideology defended by Putin abroad (see his relays in the extreme right-wing movements in Europe and in France in particular).
9/14
It is not because he was not the expression of the official ideology that he did not serve the interests of the Kremlin.
To think of strategies of influence (Russian or any other) in terms of linearity is to understand nothing about them.
10/14
6 Dugin isn't so important now. His ideology exists, has permeated people's minds, even if it isn't his ideology alone (it's an indigestible syncretism of abysmal intellectual poverty).
With or without him, it will continue to exist.
He's part of #Russia's Zeitgeist.
11/14
In this respect, the man Dugin is probably no longer of major importance (which is not to say that at times he was not one of the Kremlin's rather convenient tools).
Now his existence does not matter to the Kremlin.
Making it a major player today makes no sense.
12/14
7 In this, even if he is not the chief ideologist of the Kremlin (there is none), it does not mean that he isn't part of the Russian so-called "soft power", national and international (more important than ever).
One cannot think of it in terms of the old communist ideology.
13/14
By dint of being in binary opposition, one does not understand anything about the way the Kremlin propaganda operates.
I would not dare to suspect that this is intentional.
14/14
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A necessary reminder of the obvious: to think that #Ukraine, as the usual propagandists, Zakharova and others, say, is behind the murder of #Dugin's daughter is totally inane & inconceivable.
The origin is obviously internal, not external.
Hence a brief #thread on this story 1/7
1 First of all, I unreservedly condemn this assassination.
I think that Dugin should be tried in an international criminal court, just as Julius Streicher was. He is guilty of multiple calls to murder. This does not justify the attempt to kill him.
It's a matter of principle. 2/7
2 The relative sophistication of the operation hardly suggests the action of an improvised opposition group.
It is highly doubtful that elements of the Russian security services (which ones? that the question) were not involved. 3/7
I agree 100% with what President @ZelenskyyUa stated again.
There can be no discussion, let alone negotiation, with Putin's #Russia until its forces are driven out of the entire #Donbass and #Crimea.
Some elements in this recap #thread.
1/11
1 First, any proposal by Putin in this sense is a ruse—he is stalling in #Ukraine and he knows it. He's trying to hold on to what he has, before replenishing his forces and going on the offensive again.
Let's not give in.
2/11 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/we-must-save…
2 Given the massive crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine by Putin, accepting negotiations would implicitly mean wiping the slate clean on these imprescriptible crimes.
This is Putin's goal—we gave in to #Syria. Let's not do it for #Ukraine.
3/11 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/russian-mass…
We are at a decisive moment where #Ukraine can win. It must. I can't imagine any decent person thinking otherwise.
This means that Putin's regime must be defeated radically, totally, as I had expressed here. 2/6 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/we-must-save…
Western leaders must have total clarity on our war aims: #Russia must be defeated, for #Ukraine, because more crimes against humanity are intolerable, unacceptable, and for the world. This is a responsibility before history, eminent among all. 3/6 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/russian-mass…
Peskov, Putin's spokesman, denied the existence of any #agreement on "de-escalation" (I repeat, not a goal in itself) nor anything in terms otherwise contemptuous of France.
This was totally predictable.
Quick #Thread #Russia 1/6 theguardian.com/world/2022/feb…
1 There could be no agreement, and indeed I would have been somewhat concerned if there had been. It would have meant that @EmmanuelMacron would have accepted concessions. He didn't actually.
But there cannot and should not be any, not now, not later. 2/6 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/why-the-west…
2 There was talk of "commitment" - just vague commitment to continue the discussions. Nothing more. No commitment not to attack #Ukraine, one way or another, no commitment by Moscow to implement the Minsk agreements (not really).
Moscow will continue. 3/6 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/fogs-of-war-…
I note with concern that this interview of @EmmanuelMacron with @leJDD raises a lot of concerns, not unfounded, among our Allies.
I also wonder if it was entirely appropriate on the eve of a discussion with Vladimir Putin. #Thread 1/8 lejdd.fr/International/…
1 First, on the process, was it appropriate to publicly state his positions? Is it not, unintentionally of course, giving the enemy an advantage? This is also a problem of diplomatic #communication.
Something that I stresed here. 2/8 tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/how-well-can…
2 Secondly, while our Allies remain distrustful & suspicious, this text risks increasing their distrust & thus the division of the EU on this subject. This may increase our fragility. It would have been wise to give the opposite signal.
My @cepa piece. 3/8 cepa.org/does-france-ha…
The court ruled that my comments "are part of a value judgment fed by the research of the author of the message (...) in a recurrent polemic relating to the editorial dependence (...) of the channel (...) on the Kremlin".
2/8
The Court also ruled that "the accused author must be able to express himself all the more freely as his analysis is at the heart of the mechanism of freedom of expression, whose limits are not exceeded in this case." #Freedomofexpression
3/8