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@TheStudyofWar

Sep 7

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s report on the situation at the #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant described numerous ways in which Russian occupation authorities and the #Russian military are jeopardizing the safe operation of the plant.

isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…

The moderation and apparent neutrality of the IAEA's report can overshadow the extremely clear articulation of the Russian activities undermining the plant’s safety and the fact that the report attributes no dangerous actions to Ukraine. 2/

The #IAEA’s report on the situation at the #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is thus a coded condemnation of Russian moves that have created and are perpetuating the danger of nuclear disaster in #Ukraine. 3/

isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…

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ISW

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 6

Assessment Highlight:

Vladimir Putin publicly praised DNR and LNR forces (and denigrated the Russian military) on September 5, likely to motivate proxy recruitment and reframe Russian coverage of the war. /1
isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on September 5 that personnel in the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the armed forces of the DNR and LNR) are fighting better in Donbas than professional Russian soldiers and insinuated that he is unhappy with the performance of the Russian MoD. /2

Putin’s comments are likely intended to promote recruitment and force generation in the DNR and LNR and refocus coverage of the war in the Russian media space away from the fighting in southern Ukraine. /3

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ISW

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 5

Southern Axis Update:

The #Ukrainian liberation of #Vysokopillya ignited critical discussions among some #Russian milbloggers while the Russian Defense Ministry maintained that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct “unsuccessful attempts” to advance. /1
isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…

Southern Axis Update:

Reports of #Russian shelling of Novovoznesenske and claims by milbloggers that elements of Russian airborne forces also withdrew from Novovoznesenske may indicate a #Ukrainian advance in the area. /2
isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…

Southern Axis Update:

The #Ukrainian General Staff reported that #Russian forces launched airstrikes at Lyubomyrivka (approximately 28km north of #Kherson City), and Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces left the settlement. /3
isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…

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ISW

@TheStudyofWar

Sep 1

#Ukrainian Counteroffensive Thread:

Military operations on the scale of this counteroffensive do not succeed or fail in a day or a week. /1
isw.pub/RusCampaignAug…

The timing of the start of the counteroffensive is consistent with the observed degradation of #Russian capabilities in western #Kherson Oblast balanced against the need to start liberating occupied #Ukrainian lands and people as soon as possible. /2

Counteroffensive operations will very likely unfold over the coming weeks and possibly months as #Ukrainian forces take advantage of the conditions they have set to defeat particular sectors of the line they have identified as vulnerable. /3

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ISW

@TheStudyofWar

Aug 26

@TheStudyofWar

Afghanistan’s economic weakness provides China with the ideal opening to utilize its Belt and Road Initiative to establish influence over the country, notes @TheStudyofWar researcher Peter Mills in this @FoxNews examination of the consequences of the U.S. military withdrawal.

https://twitter.com/FoxNews/status/1563117818970640387

[The Belt and Road approach] has helped China establish a widespread and deeply-enmeshed influence in various areas around the world, including countries on the other side of the planet, but any such projects remain in the early stages, according to Mills.

Despite its ambition, "we're still not really seeing China put forth substantive investment," Mills said, noting that there is "a lot of talk" but not much movement on several project ideas, including mining in the country or establishing a power plant in northern Afghanistan.

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ISW

@TheStudyofWar

Aug 26

#Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s August 25 decree to increase the size of the Russian military is unlikely to generate significant combat power in the near future and indicates that he is unlikely to order a mass mobilization soon.

Full report: isw.pub/RusCampaignAug…

The decree increases the nominal end strength of the Russian Armed Forces by 137,000 military personnel, from 1,013,628 to 1,150,628, starting on January 1, 2023. The Russian military has not historically met its end-strength targets. 2/
isw.pub/RusCampaignAug…

The announcement of a relatively modest (yet likely still unattainable) increased end strength target strongly suggests that #Putin remains determined to avoid full mobilization, and #Russia would likely face serious obstacles to adding large numbers of new soldiers quickly. /3

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