#Belgium: recognizes contribution of the paper by #Germany and #Philippines to identify threats and irresponsible behaviour in space.
#Belgium calls on all to step away from counter measures.
Support commitment by the U.S. not to conduct destructive #ASAT tests in space.
#Mexico Commitment to preserve outer space for exclusively peaceful uses and comprehensive disarmament under global control. ALL weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited and eliminated regardless of where they are. Reject the placement of ANY kind of weapon in outer space
#Mexico Geopolitical competition playing out in space. Calls attention to military re-organizations to tackle security and threats in space. Concerns of possible militararization of space. People are searching for supremacy. Accidents could lead to conflict on Earth.
#Mexico: Article 9 of OST = states must carry out activities with due regard for interests of other states parties. Use and exploration must be for benefit and interest of all states.
#Mexico: Important to define subjective concepts such as perception of a threat. And develop TCBMs to avoid wrongful interpretations and to classify threatening actions.
Importance of legally binding international agreement that is verifiable to prevent war/weapons.
#Egypt: essential elements to consider include:
- destruction of space objects or use of directed energy/electronic
- militarization is the biggest threat
- debris is also a threat
#Egypt: Distinction b/w ir/responsible behaviour: need to take account of DUE REGARD including security and safety in outer space. Activities must be conducted to avoid arms race.
#SriLanka: Concerns about weaponization and arms race
Increasing number of players including commercial raises concerns about threats and issue of attribution
#SriLanka: -Article 6 OST: states have responsible for national activities in outer space by all national actors. In conjunction with Art 1: for the benefit and interest of all countries. But what constitutes national activities
#SriLanka: UNGA #PAROS resolution: existing legal regime by itself does not guarantee prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Need a binding instrument on PAROS. Concerned about delay. Need to maintain space free of weaponization.
#Sweden: Champion for full participation of women in arms control. Welcomes such an approach to the discussion. Commends @UNIDIR and #Australia for side event on #gender equality.
#Sweden: Welcomes commitment by US and others not to conduct destructive DA #ASAT testing as a norm of responsible behaviour
#Sweden: issues for attention:
-use of kinetic force against space objects
-RPO conducted in non-transparent without proper communication/consent
-Non-kinetic actions that that jeopardize safety, security of people, goods or infrastructure
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#France draws attention to FALSE perception that some irresponsible practices might provide more advantages than disadvantages. Must deconstruct through transparency, cooperation, and commitments such as that regarding destructive DA #ASAT tests.
#Algeria: Must go hand in hand with PAROS discussions
Need transparency and more ambitious confidence building measures. Particular responsibility of states with advanced capabilities to prevent PAROS.
#Algeria: Promote full access to technology through cooperation and tech assistance and capacity building in developing countries
Need to strengthen legal regime in outer space for a common future.
#NewZealand: Should not be focused exclusively on kinetic threats. Non-kinetic including #cyber pose significant threats and possible irreversible loss and damage to infrastructure on earth
Canada's Annual Report on Military Exports 2020 released: bit.ly/3uLC9GU
2020: 3rd highest-ever year for Cdn non-US arms exports
Total (non-US) exports: $1.966B, ⬇️ 47.6% over 2019
Saudi: $1.311B, ⬇️ 54.2% / 2019
UK: $122M ⬆️ 5.6% / 2019
Turkey: $48M ⬇️ 68.2% / 2019
🧵
Saudi exports down by half, yet representing 67% of Canada's *total* non-US arms exports. 93.9% of this value was for the export of (GDLS-C) LAVs. Second-largest category of exports is for turrets mounted on LAVs, incl. large-caliber and heavy machine gun turrets, at $61M
Notably, no Canadian rifles appear to have been exported to Saudi Arabia in 2020, a departure from recent years.