Thread by @mewalters101

Let's talk #Russian #nuclear strategy and why that's relevant to recent developments in Russia's war in #Ukraine.
First, Ukraine has made major territorial gains, especially around Kharkiv. This has put a lot of pressure on Putin. 1/23

This has hit his international standing and was on display at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Uzbekistan. Putin was publicly put down by Modi and Xi, and today Erdogan also chided him - they all had the same message: the war must end. 2/

On top of that, other Central Asian nations didn't treat Putin with the respect that he would normally expect. Not to mention the added instability along Russia's borders with fighting btw #Armenia - #Azerbaijan, and #Tajikistan - #Kyrgyzstan. 3/

Second, we've known fake referendums in Russian occupied areas of Ukraine were in the works for a while. But that timeline just got pushed up to sometime in the next week. The votes will include not only Donetsk and Luhansk, but also Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. 4/

As @TheStudyofWar has noted, Russia does not occupy the entirety of these four oblasts, which could put them "in the strange position of demanding that Ukrainian forces unoccupy ‘Russian’ territory." #awkward 5/

Which brings us to our third issue and why folks are talking about Russian #nukes again. Some caveats, even with the 2020 release of "On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence", Russian nuclear strategy and policy isn't totally clear. 6/

So I'll do my best to break down what we know and why folks are getting worked up.
Soviet nuclear policy wasn't exactly transparent either, but in 1982 Brezhnev committed the USSR to a no first use policy. But after the Cold War, in 1993 Russia rejected it. 7/

In 1997, it stated nuclear weapons could be used "in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state." And in 2000 specified "large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons" against Russia could be met with nukes. 8/

Russian military doctrine in 2010 stated, "reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the..." 9/

"...Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat."
Pretty much the same wording was used in 2014. 10/

Now that 2020 document I mentioned emphasizes the role of nuclear weapons to deference and defense, laying out specific scenarios when #nukes would be used. 11/

The first three are clear: "reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies" or the "use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary" against Russia and/or its allies. 12/

#Nukes could also be used to respond to an "attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." Basically if Russian 2nd strike capability is threatened. 13/

The 4th scenario is our problem: "aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy." Basically, we don't know what the Russian threshold is for when the Russian state is sufficiently threatened. 14/

Since the upcoming fake referendums will undoubtedly support being annexed to Russia, by next week there may well be active fighting happening on land Russia claims as Russian territory. 15/

Although President Biden and others have already announced they won't accept the referendums, I seriously doubt that will change Putin's calculus. 16/

It's also not clear if Russia would see losing a conventional war as an existential threat - an important question given Ukrainian advances. The 2020 document states, "in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of..." 17/

"...military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation." Does this mean Russia would use tactical #nukes to try and salvage a conventional war it was losing? Experts disagree and frankly we don't know. 18/

Now all of this sounds pretty bad and a desperate dictator rarely leads to good things. But Putin is no idiot and he has gone on record multiple time emphasizing just how bad nuclear war would be for everyone. 19/

In 2018 he said, "we are prepared and will use nuclear weapons only when we know for certain that some potential aggressor is attacking Russia, our territory [with nuclear weapons]…. Only when we know for certain—and this takes a few seconds to understand—that Russia is..." 20/

"...being attacked will we deliver a counterstrike…. Of course, this amounts to a global catastrophe, but I would like to repeat that we cannot be the initiators of such a catastrophe because we have no provision for a preventive strike." 21/

This of course doesn't rule out the possibility that Putin might think he could strike Ukraine without escalating it beyond Ukraine's borders. But I don't think he would escalate to #nukes lightly. 22/

Bottom line: Yes, Putin is increasingly isolated and desperate. Yes, there's concerning ambiguity in Russia's #nuclear strategy. No, we don't need to start panicking just yet. 23/23