🧵The #Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; #Putin likely hopes to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war to “defend” newly-claimed "Russian territory." isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
2/ #Putin and his advisors have apparently realized that current Russian forces are insufficient to conquer #Ukraine and that efforts to build large forces quickly through voluntary mobilization are culminating short of the Russian military’s force requirements.
3/ #Putin is therefore likely setting legal and informational conditions to improve Russian force generation without resorting to expanded conscription by changing the balance of carrots and sticks the #Kremlin has been using to spur voluntary recruitment. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
4/ #Putin may believe that he can appeal to Russian ethno-nationalism and the defense of purportedly “Russian peoples” and claimed Russian land to generate additional volunteer forces. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
5/ #Putin may seek to rely on enhanced rhetoric in part because the #Kremlin cannot pay for even the service incentives, like bonuses and employment benefits, that it has already promised Russian recruits. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
6/ But #Putin is also adding new and harsher punishments in an effort to contain the risk of the collapse of Russian military units fighting in #Ukraine and draft-dodging within #Russia. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
7/ The #Kremlin rushed the passage of a new law through the State Duma on September 20, circumventing normal parliamentary procedures. This law codifies dramatically increased penalties for desertion, refusing conscription orders, and insubordination.
8/ The legislation also criminalizes voluntary surrender and makes surrender a crime punishable by ten years in prison. The law notably does not order full-scale mobilization or broader conscription or make any preparations for such activities. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
9/ @TheStudyofWar has observed no evidence that the Kremlin is imminently intending to change its conscription practices. The #Kremlin’s new law is about strengthening the Kremlin’s coercive volunteerism, or what Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called “self-mobilization.”
10/ The #Kremlin is therefore taking steps to directly increase force generation through continued voluntary self-mobilization and an expansion of its legal authority to deploy Russian conscripts already with the force to fight in #Ukraine. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
11/ #Putin’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory will broaden the domestic legal definition of “Russian” territory under Russian law, enabling the Russian military to legally and openly deploy conscripts already in the Russian military to fight in #Ukraine.
12/ Russian leadership has already deployed undertrained conscripts to #Ukraine in direct violation of Russian law and faced domestic backlash. Illegal annexation could provide Putin with a loophole allowing for the overt deployment of conscripts to fight. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
13/ Russian-appointed occupation officials in #Kherson and #Zaporizhia oblasts recently announced the formation of “volunteer” units to fight with the Russian military against #Ukraine... isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
14/ ...and Putin’s appeals to nationalism may also generate small increases in volunteer recruitment from within Russia and parts of occupied #Donetsk and #Luhansk. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
15/ Further, the Russian State Duma separately passed new incentives for foreign nationals to fight in #Russia’s military to obtain Russian citizenship and will likely increase overseas recruitment accordingly. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
16/ Local Russian administrators will continue to attempt to form volunteer units, with decreasing effect, as @TheStudyofWar has previously reported & mapped. Russian forces and the Wagner Private Military Company are directly recruiting from Russian prisons, as we also reported.
17/ #Putin likely hopes that increasing self-mobilization, and cracking down on unwilling Russian forces, will enable him to take the rest of #Donetsk and defend Russian-occupied parts of #Luhansk, #Kherson, and #Zaporizhia oblasts. He is mistaken.
18/ Putin has neither the time nor the resources needed to generate effective combat power. He will likely wait to see if these efforts are successful before either escalating further or blaming his loss on a scapegoat - most likely Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu/the Russian MoD.
19/ #Putin likely also intends to deter #Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensives by annexing occupied Ukrainian territory and framing Ukrainian attempts to liberate occupied territory as attacks on #Russia. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
20/ Russian officials and propagandists issued vague warnings on September 20 that “the infringement of Russian territory is a crime; committing this crime permits using all means of self-defense." isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
21/ Russian officials are demonstrably panicked over Ukrainian advances, as @TheStudyofWar assessed on September 19. The #Kremlin likely intends these vague warnings to exacerbate Ukrainian and global fears of nuclear escalation. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
22/ However, #Putin has already declined to enforce any territory-specific redlines in response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed #Crimea - occupied territory he has controlled for eight years and declares to be Russian. isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
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Ukrainian forces likely continued limited counteroffensive operations along the #Kharkiv-#Luhansk Oblast border and continued attacks toward #Lyman on September 22. /1 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
#Russian sources also stated that Ukrainian forces broke through at Korovii Yar (22km northwest of #Lyman) and are continuing attacks in Drobysheve (just west of Lyman). /3 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
New: the Kremlin’s heavy-handed approach to partial mobilization may successfully meet the internal #Russian quota of mobilized personnel but is unlikely to generate effective soldiers. It is prompting significant domestic backlash for little gain.
Russian authorities are forcibly recruiting Russian citizens to fight in #Ukraine on flimsy pretexts, openly violating the #Kremlin’s promise to recruit only those with military experience just 24 hours after its September 21 declaration. 2/ isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
#Kremlin quotas will likely force local officials to mobilize men regardless of their military status and will likely incentivize the mobilization of ethnically non-Russian and immigrant communities at a disproportional rate. 3/ isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization” reflected many problems Russia faces in its faltering invasion of #Ukraine that #Moscow is unlikely to be able to resolve in the coming months.
#Putin’s order to mobilize part of #Russia’s “trained” reserve, that is, individuals who have completed their mandatory conscript service, will not generate significant usable Russian combat power for months. 2/ isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
It may suffice to sustain the current levels of Russian military manpower in 2023 by offsetting Russian casualties, although even that is not yet clear. 3/ isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
Russian Defense Minister Sergei #Shoigu’s interview offers more insight into what the Russian “partial mobilization” really means. We will unpack some of the key points in this🧵
2/ #Shoigu, like #Putin, defends the mobilization order on the grounds of Western support for #Ukraine, rather than the upcoming annexation of occupied territory. It’s still a “special military operation,” not a Patriotic War.
3/ #Shoigu emphasized that this is a partial reserve call-up, not expanded conscription: “This is precisely from the reserves,” he said. “It isn’t anyone who has never seen anything of the army...”
.@TheStudyofWar agrees with @KofmanMichael that #Russia's partial mobilization is unlikely to change battlefield dynamics rapidly and that #Ukraine retains “an important window of opportunity” in the coming months. /1
We also agree that #Russia has some limited capacity to induct and train large numbers of reservists; hence the rolling mobilization announced by Russian Minister of Defense Sergei #Shoigu, which we’ll explore in a separate thread. /2
We further concur with @KofmanMichael that the 300k number Shoigu put out is “likely to be notional” and that the final result will likely “be a lot less than what Moscow might expect." /3
Several #Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops are attacking #Lyman from the northwest (around the Sviatohirsk-Yarova area) and south (along the Shchurove-Dibrova line). /2 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
#Russian sources also continue to indicate that Ukrainian troops are likely conducting offensive operations across the #Oskil River with the intention of penetrating Russian rear areas in occupied #Luhansk Oblast. /3 isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…